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I. INTRODUCTION
China first offered preferential tax treatment to overseas investors
when it opened its door to foreign direct investment in the late 1970s.1
Over the next several years, the country's foreign tax preference regime
grew in complexity with the proliferation of schemes based on criteria as
diverse as a foreign party's form of investment,2 geographic location,3 in-
' On July 1, 1979, the Chinese legislature adopted the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, which, for the first time since 1949, legally per-
mitted private foreign capital investment in Mainland China. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Zhong Wai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [Equity Joint Venture Law], 1979 FAGUI HUMiAN 125
[hereinafter Equity Joint Venture Law or EJV Law]. The EJV Law promised tax reductions
and exemptions for joint ventures using advanced technology by world standards as well as
tax refunds for reinvestment ofjoint venturer profits. EJV Law, art. 7.
2 On September 10, 1980, the Chinese legislature adopted the Income Tax Law of the
People's Republic of China Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures. Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhong Wai Hezi Jingying Qiye Suodeshui Fa, 1980 FAGUl HuIBiAN 13 [herein-
after JVITL]. This law creates a new income tax for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures.
In addition, the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises, which was adopted on December 13, 1981, set up a separate income tax for for-
eign investments in forms other than equity joint ventures. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa, 1981 FAGUI HUIAN 21 [hereinafter FEITL]. For differences
between the two laws, see text accompanying infra notes 49-56.
3 According to the Provisional Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic
of China Regarding the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprises Income Tax and Con-
solidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic Zones and the Fourteen
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dustry/sector classification4 and even ethnic background. The Chinese
concept of shuishou youhui, or "tax preferences,' 6 encompasses reduced tax
rates, tax exemptions, reductions, investment refunds, accelerated deprecia-
tion, carry-over loss and other tax burden reducing measures. 7 The gov-
Coastal Cities, promulgated by the State Council on November 15, 1984, for instance, for-
eign investment in certain coastal cities was granted special tax benefits not available in
other parts of the country. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingji Tequ
he Yanhai Shisi Ge Ganggou Chengshi Jianzheng Mianzheng Qiye Suode Shui he Gong-
shang Tongyi Shui de Zhanxing Guiding, 1984 FAGUI HUIBIAN 218 [hereinafter 1984 Tax
Reduction and Exemption Regulations]. For various regionally based preferential schemes,
see text accompanying infra notes 89-170.
4 See, e.g,, Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi De Guiding, 1986 FAGUI HUMLBAN
501 [hereinafter 22 Articles], promulgated on October 11, 1986. 22 Articles give special
treatment to foreign investment enterprises which export most of their products or use ad-
vanced technology.
5 A 1985 State Council Circular provided preferential treatment for investments made by
Huaqiao, or Chinese residing abroad. Guowuyuan Guanyu Huaqiao Touzi Youhui De
Zhanxing Guiding [1985 Regulations on Preferences for Overseas Chinese Investment], Apr.
2, 1985, in GUOWUYUAN FAZmJU BANGONGSHI ZUIGAo RENMIN FAYUAN RENMIN FAYUAN
CHUBANSHE [OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL LEGAL DEPARTMENT & PEOPLE'S COURT PUBLISHING
HOUSE, SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT], ZHONGGUO JINGJI KAIFANG DIQu FALU GUIFAN QUANJI
[COLLECTION OF LAWS AND RULES OF CHNA'S ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS] 775 (1996) [herein-
after LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS].
6 When describing special tax provisions conferring benefits on taxpayers, the Chinese
prefer the expression shuishou youhui which literally means "tax preferences." In the West,
tax preferences refer to differences between taxable income and the theoretical concept of
accretion which provides a method to define the tax base by looking at the income of a tax-
payer; accordingly, income "should be thought of as a person's entire accretion to his or her
wealth." RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 224 (5th ed. 1989). The expression "tax incentive" refers to tax reliefs for invest-
ment. Id. at 601-02. In economist terms, "incentive" equates "desire for satisfaction", and
tax incentive means "the influence of taxation on the actions which a person takes as a result
of his incentive, i.e., desire for satisfaction." Gershon Cooper, Taxation and Incentive in
Mobilization, in COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC Ass'N, READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 470,471 (1959) (emphasis added).
7 See LIU ZHICHENG ET AL., SHEHUI ZHUYI SHUISHOU LiLUN RUOGAN WENTI [SOME
ISSUES CONCERNING THE SOCIALIST TAX THEORY] 464-69 (1992). Other preferences include
tax credits, tax sparings, and installment tax payments. Id. The Chinese concept of shuishou
youhui or tax preferences may not exactly coincide with the Western concept of "tax expen-
ditures." For instance, a low tax rate is identified by the Chinese as preferential tax treat-
ment, although, according to the traditional western classification, a rate change is part of the
so-called normative elements of a revenue raising system and therefore outside the concept
of tax expenditures. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Con-
cept: Current Development and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L. REv. 225, 228 (1979); Stanley
S. Surrey, Tax Incentives - Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison with Di-
rect Government Expenditures, in TAX INCENTIVES (Symposium conducted by the Tax In-
stitute of America November 20-21, 1969) 3, 1971 [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives). A
low rate "represents a cooperative agreement on burden-sharing once the tax base has been
established." Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-time vs. Periodic An Economic Analy-
sis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 305, 307 (1994). For a discussion of tax
expenditures, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
ExPENDrrURES chs. Vii-Viii (1973). Even in the West, definitions of what constitutes a tax
551
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:549 (1998)
emiment has demonstrated preferential treatment for foreign investors
through the enterprise income tax8, turnover taxes9, and other applicable
taxes. °
. Until the early 1990s, the Chinese government created these "prefer-
ences" in order to promote foreign investment." As foreign capital has
poured into the country in record volume since the early 1990s,12 however,
expenditure in practice have been controversial. A recent Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development [hereinafter OECD] survey on tax expenditures among member
countries includes as tax expenditures the following items: (1) exemptions: income excluded
from the tax base, (2) allowances: amounts deducted from gross income to arrive at taxable
income; (3) credits: amounts deducted from tax liability; (4) rate reliefs: a reduced rate of tax
applied to a class of taxpayers or activities; (5) tax deferrals: a relief which takes the form of
a delay in paying tax. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TAX ExPENDITURE: RECENT EXPERIENCES 9 (1996).
8 See text accompanying infra notes 50-198. Chinese enterprise income taxes are compa-
rable to a corporate income tax in the West and apply to the net income of enterprises and
other business organizations in China. See CAiSHUI FA JIAOCHENG [MANUAL ON FINANCE
AND TAx LAW] 236 (Zhang Shouwen et al. ed., 1996).
9 See text accompanying infra notes 200-58. Turnover taxes refer to taxes imposed on
transactions or the turnover of business. LIU LONGHENG, ZHONGGUO SHUIFA GAILUN [A
TREATISE ON CHINESE TAx LAW] 62 (1995).
1o Other than enterprise income and turnover taxes, foreign investments in China are also
subject to such taxes as real estate tax, MICHAEL J. MOSER & WINSTON K. ZEE, CHINA TAX
GUIDE 105-06 (2d ed. 1993); vehicle and vessel license tax, id. at 106-07; and stamp tax, id.
at 108-17. Relief has been granted to foreign investment with regard to some of those taxes.
Id. at 114-15. Foreign investors have also been exempted from urban maintenance and con-
struction tax (chengshi weihu jianshe shui), fixed asset investment direction adjusting tax
(guding zichan touzifangxiang tiaofie shui) and cultivated land use tax (gengdi zhanyong
shui). ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGI-EGUO CAIZHENG Bu SHUIZHENG SI [TAX DEPARTMENT,
FINANCE MINISTRY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], ZHONGGUO SHUISHOU ZHIDU [TAX
SYSTEM OF CHINA] 220 (1996) [hereinafter TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA].
11 See, e.g., Ji Honggeng, Woguo Dui Wai Kaifang De Disange Cengci [The Third Stage
of Our Country's Opening to the Outside World], in RENMIN RIBAO GONGSHANG Bu
[INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, PEOPLE'S DAILY], ZHONGGUO DuI WAI KAIFANG
GONGZUO SHIWU SHOUCE [PRACTICAL MANUAL OF CHINA'S OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE
WORLD] 397, 398-99 (1987) [hereinafter CHINA'S OPENING] (preferential treatment to attract
foreign investment in Yangtze Delta and other coastal open areas). Besides tax preferences,
foreign businesses were offered discounts for land use, flexible foreign exchange arrange-
ments, and relaxed import and export control. See, e.g., Thomas J. Klitgaard & Mayre Ras-
mussen, Preferential Treatment for Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China:
Special Economic Zones and Industrial Development Districts, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 377, 384-90 (1984) (various preferential measures as investment incentives). For a
general discussion of Chinese measures intended to attract foreign capital in the 1980s, see
Jerome Alan Cohen & Stuart Valentine, Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic
of China: Progress, Problems and Proposals, 1 J. CHINESE L. 161, 169-78 (1987).
12 According to a United Nations Trade and Development Conference report published in
September 1996, China attracted U.S. $37.5 billion foreign capital in 1995, which made the
country, for the third consecutive year, the second largest foreign investment recipient after
the United States, and foreign investment in China represented an estimate 12% of the global
foreign investment. XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Sept. 25, 1996, at 8. In
1996, foreign direct investment in China rose to U.S. $40 billion, Yin Zi Zhengce Quxiang Ze
You Er Yong [Direction of Foreign Investment Policy: An Optimal Use], XIANGGANG JINGJI
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the official line has changed. 13 In April 1996, the authorities ended import
tax exemptions for new foreign investment projects and scheduled a phas-
ing-out of import tax exemptions for existing grojeets.14 The decision has
since had an impact upon foreign investment. The government has con-
RiBAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC TIMES), Jan. 8, 1997, at A21. Foreign investment in China is
expected to reach US$ 49 billion in 1997. Foreign Investment to Hit USS 49b Next Year, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 6, 1996, Business, at 4 (citing a forecast by China's central
bank governor).
13 The official line in 1993, still stressed the important role tax preferences may play in
the country's opening-up policy. See Hu Guangbao, Zhuajin Youli Shi Jiakuai Yanjiang He
Neilu Chengshi Duiwai Kaifang Bufa [Seizing Opportunities to Speed Up the Pace of
Opening Up for Cities Along the Yangtze River and Interior Provinces], 1993 ZHONGGUO
JINGJI TEQU Yu YANHAI JINGJI JIsHu KAIFAQU NIANJIAN [1993 YEARBOOK OF CHINA'S
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND COASTAL ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
AREAS] 62, 63-64 (He Chunlin ed., 1993) [hereinafter Y.B. SEZs & COASTAL ETDAs] (the
author was vice-director of the State Council's Special Economic Zones Office; he discussed
at length preferential policies including tax preferences granted to various cities for purposes
of attracting foreign business). The tone soon changed. In a 1994 seminar, Vice-Premier Li
Lanqing emphasized a necessary transition from preferential policies to non-tax measures to
attract foreign investment in various development zones. Li Lanqing Fuzongli Zai Qingzhu
Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Shi Zhounian Zuotanhui Shang De Jianghua [Speech of Vice-Premier Li
Lanqing at the Forum Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the Economic and Technologi-
cal Development Areas] [hereinafter Li Lanqing], in 1995 ZHONGGUO JINGn TEQu KAIFAQU
NIANJIAN [1995 YEARBOOK OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND DEVELOPMENT
AREAS] 24, 29 (Hu Ping ed., 1995) [hereinafter Y.B. SEZs & DAs]. A long-term develop-
ment plan presented by the State Council in early 1996 no longer mentioned tax preferences
as a major tool vying for foreign investment. See Weilai Wu Nian Buzai Youhui Xiyin Waizi
[No More Use of Preferences for Attracting Foreign Investment in the Next Five Years],
MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Mar. 5, 1996, at B2 [hereinafter No More Use of Preferences].
14 Guanyu Gaige He Tiaozheng Jinkou Shuishou Zhengce De Tongzhi [Notification Con-
ceming Policy Reform and Adjustments of Import Taxation], issued by the State Council on
December 26, 1995, TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 443-45 [hereinafter 1995 Noti-
fication on Import Taxation]. For an English summary of that decision, see China's Foreign
Taxation Policy, 11 CHINA TRADE & INVESTMENT, Apr. 1996, at 17; Sun Qun, TariffAdjust-
ment and Scheme of Shadow Margin Account for Processing Trade, 11 CHINA TRADE &
INVESTMENT, Aug. 1996, at 12, 14. See also Roberta Donovan, No Place to Hide (Almost),
34 CHINA TRADE REP., Mar. 1996, at 2; Peng Xianling, No Relief? 34 CHINA TRADE REP.,
Feb. 1996, at 10.
15 The cost of doing business in China would rise anywhere between 20 to 50% as a re-
sult of the revocation of import tax exemptions, see Changes to Import Tax Seen Giving Ri-
vals Edge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 1, 1996, Business, at 3 (the cost of bringing in
equipment for nev foreign projects would increase by an average of 23%); Peng, supra note
14 (an accounting firm partner reckoned that start-up costs could go 40-50% higher), foreign
businesses were upset. See Geoffrey Crothall, Reformist Vanguard Urged to Maintain
Leading Role, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 11, 1996, China Business Review, at 2; see
also Changes to Import Tax Seen Giving Rivals Edge, supra (Japanese prediction for a drop
in new investment in 1996 as a result of tax changes). The 1996 foreign investment slow-
down was attributed to the April tax changes. Quxiao Jinkuo Shuishou Iianmian Waishang
Touzi Bufa Fanghuan [Abolition of Import Tax Exemptions and Reductions Slowed Down
the Pace of Foreign Investment], XIANGGANG JINGJI RIBAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC TIMES),
Jan. 8, 1997, at A27. Foreign investment also fell in the first quarter of 1997 on a year-to-
year basis and the fall was again blamed on the 1996 tax changes. Wang Xiangwei, Tax
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templated further restructuring moves.16 Even the World Bank has offered
China advice on how to shape its tax and preference policy for foreign in-
vestment.17 The tax concessions which overseas businesses have taken for
granted for years are hanging in the balance.18  Official rhetoric seems to
have softened a bit lately. Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji introduced new tax
initiatives during the 1997 World Bank-IMF annual meeting in Hong Kong,
including the reintroduction of some of the import tax exemptions abolished
just over a year ago.' 9
Changes Knock Foreign Capital Flow, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 20, 1997, Business, at
5.
16 One important move will be the merger of separate income tax regimes governing do-
mestically-owned and foreign investment enterprises. See, e.g., Dong Shukui, General
Situation and Development Tendency of Foreign Taxation, 11 CMINA TRADE & INVESTMENT,
Aug. 1996, at 10, 11 (under the unifying tax laws and equalizing tax burden guideline, enter-
prise income taxes and local taxes currently separately applied to domestic and foreign in-
vestment enterprises would be unified; the author was deputy Director General of Foreign
Investment Taxation Department, State Administration of Taxation). There has been confu-
sion about the timetable for the merger. Compare No More Use of Preferences, supra note
13 (merger of separate income tax regimes within five years from 1996) with Zhongwai Qiye
Tongyi Shuilu [Uniform Tax Rates for Chinese and Foreign Enterprises], XING DAO RIBAO
(SING TAO DAILY) (HK), Nov. 17, 1995, at BI (unified income tax may come as soon as July
1996) [hereinafter Unified Tax Rates] and Caizhengbu Liao Liang Nian Hou Tongyi Qiye
Suodeshui [The Ministry of Finance Expects Unifying Enterprise Income Tax in Two Years],
XiN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Oct. 23, 1996, at 13 (two years from 1996)
[hereinafter Ministry of Finance on Unifying Tax]. Meanwhile, it has been the official line
to use non-tax measures such as promised national treatment to vie for foreign capital and
technology. See, e.g., Sun Zhenyu, Woguo Liyong Waizi De Jiben Zhuangkuang He Ruogan
Zhongda Zhengce Wenti [The Basic Situation and Some Major Policy Issues Concerning
Our Country's Utilization of Foreign Investment], GuonI SHANGWU [INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS], 1995 No. 5, at 1, 11 [hereinafter Sun, Basic Situation] (the author, a vice-minister
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in charge of foreign investment, stated that China
would gradually give foreign businesses same treatment in areas such as fee charge, loan and
credit, and foreign exchange).
17 Shi Hang Zhu Beijing Daibiaochu [World Bank Beijing Office], Zhongguo Dui
Waishang Zhiie Touzi De Shuishou Zhengce [China's Tax Policy for Foreign Direct In-
vestment], SHEWAI SHUIWU [INTERNATIONAL TAXATiON IN CHINA], 1996 No. 5, at 4 (the pa-
per was presented by the World Bank's Beijing representative to the Chinese Ministry of
Finance in August 1995) [hereinafter 1995 World Bank Paper]. For a discussion of the pa-
per, see infra Part VII.
1' See, e.g., China Will Cut Incentives, Premier Says, 22 TAX PLANNING INT'L REv., Nov.
1995, at 19 (Chinese Premier said Beijing would gradually reduce tax reliefs and other pref-
erential measures given to foreign firms operating in China); Crothall, supra note 15 (Di-
rector of the State Council's Special Economic Zones Office suggested that foreign
investment in SEZs would enjoy no more favorable treatment than in other areas); Unified
Tax Rates, supra note 16 (as a result of proposed uniform enterprise income tax, tax rates
would rise).
19 Zhu optimistic as reforms pay economic dividends, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 23,
1997, World Bank/IMF Special, at II. For the latest developments in reintroduced import tax
exemptions, see infra note 422.
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Chinese tax law and policy involve basic differences from those in the
West. 20  There have been many academic and professional writings on
China's tax regimes governing foreign businesses, but the country's com-
plex preferential tax rules and practice have not been critically reviewed. In
addition, the underlying philosophy and approaches behind preferential tax
rules and practice have not been adequately examined. This article attempts
to fill the gap. The scope of the present study is confined to tax treatment
for major forms of foreign direct investment in China,22 namely, Chinese-
20 Discussing China's "tax process,"George W. Gregg, Sr. stated: "ITihe philosophy be-
hind Chinese law must be kept in mind", because laws and legal decisions "may be viewed
by a Chinese... in an entirely different light than the legal philosophy applied by a Western
idealist." George W. Gregg, Sr., China Tax Law: The "Tax Process," 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 61, 62 (1989).
21 For implications of China's tax system in the late 1970s on foreign businesses, see
Richard D. Pomp et al., The Evolving Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 TEX.
INT'L L. J. 11, 16-40 (1981); Richard D. Pomp & Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Structure of the
People's Republic of China, 20 VA. J INT'L L. I (1979); Paul D. Reynolds, Doing Business
with the People's Republic of China: Tax Consideration, 14 INT'L L. 49 (1980). For tax en-
actments on foreign investment in the early 1980s, see Pomp, supra, at 52-66; William P.
Alford & David E. Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of China's
Emerging Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 Nw. J. INT'L. &
Bus. 56 (1981); Carl A. Nordberg, Jr. & Irene Price, The Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises [hereinafter Foreign Enterprises Tax
Law], in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1983 191 (Practising Law Institute
1983); Don R. Castleman, Taxation in the People's Republic of China: The System and Its
Function, 46 ALBANY L. REV. 776 (1982); David R. Simon, Note, Taxation of Joint Ventures
in the People's Republic of China: A LegalAnalysis in the Context of Current Chinese Eco-
nomic and Political Conditions, 15 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 513 (1982); Anna M. Han, People's
Republic of China's Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law and Regulations, 6 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMiP. L. REv. 689 (1983). For the development of the tax regime governing for-
eign investment during the 1980s, see Timothy A. Gelatt & Richard D. Pomp, China's Tax
System: An Overview and Transactional Analysis, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE
LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CINA 42 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987) [hereinafter
FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT]; James W. Harrison, Tax Aspects of Doing Business in the
People's Republic of China - A Comparative Summary for U.S. Investors, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J.
381 (1990); A.J. EASSON & Li JINYAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1989); Alex Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and In-
vestment in the People's Republic of China, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L.& Bus. 666 (1985). For tax
changes since 1990, see Stephen C. Curley & Darren R. Fortunato, Tax Considerations for
Investors in China, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 531 (1995); Jeri C. Weber, Note, For-
eign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Tax Law Attempts to Provide Incentives,
46 TAX LAW. 275-93 (1992); Gerald A. Wunsch & Dingfa Liu, Recent Chinese Tax Legisla-
tion Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 2 IND. INT'L L.& COMP. L. REV. 415 (1992); Al-
lison E. Wielobob, Note, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic Development, 9
TEMPLE INT'L & COMp. L.J. 413 (1995). For an overview of China's taxation on foreign in-
vestors, see also MOSER & ZEE, supra note 10.
22 This article excludes tax treatment of portfolio investment as well as foreign represen-
tative offices in China. For a discussion of foreign representative offices in China, see Clark
T. Randt, Jr., Representative Offices in China: The Legal Aspects of Registration and Con-
trol, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, supra note 21, at 304.
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foreign equity joint ventures (EJVs),23 Chinese-foreign contractual joint
ventures (CJVs), 24 wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs),25 and joint
development and exploitation of oil, gas and other natural resources.26 The
Chinese collectively refer to these forms of foreign direct investment as
waishang touzi qiye, or "foreign investment enterprises" (FIEs). Chinese
neizi qiye, or "domestically owned enterprises" (DOEs), were subject to
separate enterprise income and turnover tax regimes until 1994.27 While
23 A Chinese-foreign equity joint venture is a limited liability company to which Chinese
and foreign parties contribute capital and receive an equity interest proportionate to the size
of their investment; distribution of profits and return on investment are determined strictly
on the basis of the parties' respective equity contribution. EJV Law, supra note 1, art. 4,
For discussions of Chinese-foreign EJVs, see, e.g., Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at
179-80; Ann Fenwick, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: An Assess-
ment of the First Five Years, 40 Bus. L. 839, 843-54 (1985); Michael J. Moser, Foreign In-
vestment in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, supra note 21,
at 90, 100-26.
24 A contractual joint venture, also called cooperative joint venture, is formed by Chinese
and foreign parties on the terms and conditions set forth in their joint venture contract and
articles of association as to contribution and distribution; thus unlike an EJV, a CJV can dis-
tribute profits non pro rata to the parties' contribution, and has more flexibility in determin-
ing its management structure; in fact, a CJV can be a limited liability company with a legal
person status or just an ad hoc arrangement between the parties. See Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhong Wai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa [Law of the People's Republic of China on
Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises], art. 2, 1988 FAGUI HUIBIAN 429, 429-30. For
discussions of CJVs, see, e.g., Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at 180-81; Peter J. Halasz
& Lan Lan, New Rules of the Game, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 39, available in
WESTLAW, Tp-all database; Moser, supra note 23, at 96-100.
25 A WFOE is a limited liability company that is incorporated under Chinese law but is
solely foreign owned. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye Fa [Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment], art. 2, 1986
FAGUI HuiBIAN 495, 495. For discussion of WFOEs, see Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11,
at 181; Moser, supra note 23, at 126-30; Z.Y. James Fang & David K.Y. Tang, The Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law: Defining the Legislative History and Interpreting the Stat-
ute, 2 J. CHINESE L. 153 (1988); Lucille A. Barale, Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises -
Changing Policy, Changing Attitudes, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 30.
26 Under such joint development arrangements, foreign investors agree to first conduct
programs of geophysical exploration of natural resources in China at their own expense and
risk, and, once resources are discovered, both Chinese and foreign parties share investment
and risk; after cost and taxes are deducted, the parties divide the output or income according
to their agreed-upon formula. See, e.g., Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at 181-82. See
generally, Michael J. Moser, Legal Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Devel-
opment in China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, supra note 21, at 270. For a recent dis-
cussion of Chinese-foreign joint development of onshore oil resources, see Kevin M. Wolf,
The Legal Framework for Joint Development of China's Onshore Oil Resources: Negotia-
tion Strategies and Future Prospects, 9 J. CHINEsEL. 141 (1995).
27 For a discussion of pre-1994 tax regimes governing DOEs, see generally CHRISTINE
P.W. WONG ET AL., FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1995); CHINA: REVENuE MOBILIZATION AND TAx POLICY (A WORLD
BANK COUNTRY STUDY, 1990); Yeh Chang-mei, Mainland China's Tax System in Compari-
son: Before and Since 1979, IssuEs & STUDIES, Mar. 1993, at 52.
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FIEs and DOEs have been governed by a single turnover tax system since
281994, separate enterprise income taxes remain to date.
After providing an overview of major preferential tax schemes for for-
eign investment as they have evolved since 1979, this article discusses how
government policies and cultural factors influenced the country's tax pref-
erence rule formulation and development. The Chinese Communist Party
has long viewed taxation as an important tool to achieve non-revenue policy
goals. Just as harsh taxes could penalize and marginalize rural landlords
and urban capitalists, tax reductions and exemptions could promote Party
political and economic objectives. When the leadership decided to open the
door to foreign direct investment in the late 1970s, 29 taxation became one of
the preferred instruments to promote that particular policy. References to
"international practice" and foreign ideas like profit maximization were
used to appeal to overseas business communities. Tax preferences serve the
Party's developmental priorities. In foreign investment policy, priorities
have been set according to forms, geographic location, industry/sector clas-
sification and even ethnic background of foreign investment. Those criteria
have undergone constant changes since the opening-up policy began. For
instance, forms and ethnic background of foreign investment have become
less conspicuous in recent years, if not altogether eliminated. The emphasis
on geographic location has also recently shifted in favor of interior prov-
inces although coastal areas still maintain an edge. Once policy priorities
move, preference rules have to adjust. Policy factors may consist of com-
peting considerations, however. For example, Chinese fascination with hi-
tech projects must be reconciled, for instance, with the Chinese inclination
towards ethnic Chinese investors. Additionally, while foreign-funded busi-
nesses contribute to Chinese tax collections, tax preferences imply revenue
losses. A final example is the government's strong interest in protecting
Chinese socialism from the dangers of capitalist pursuit of profits, even as it
seeks to open the country to foreign investment.
Cultural factors also affect the formulation and development of Chi-
nese tax preferences to foreign investments. Traditionally, tax leniency was
a hallmark of the Chinese ruler's virtue and was intended to win the trust of
the people. The proper way of treating foreigners similarly required dem-
onstration of virtue through acts of largess and hospitality. Tax preferences
are therefore a modem means of expressing Chinese virtue and generosity,
because they are intended to establish good reputations and win trust with
foreign businesses. Moreover, by conceptualizing them as a modem ex-
pression of generosity, the government has justified tax preferences in a
culturally familiar context, not just in terms of international practice or for-
eign ideas; references to 1i ("trust and generosity") provide the Chinese with
indispensable justification and assurance for the tax preferences. Mean-
28 See text accompanying infra notes 224-29.
29 See text accompanying supra note 1.
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while, by invoking the ideas of virtue and generosity, the Chinese hoped to
set a moral example for foreigners. The government would have a solid
ground for administrative and legal action against those who did not con-
duct business according to Chinese norms and expectations. Recent efforts
to justify preference law changes have invoked the generosity, moral exam-
ple and state coercion paradigms. The Chinese ideas of virtue and trust
through largess and hospitality were reflected in the way the Chinese pref-
erence rules were announced. As the tradition stresses an image of sincerity
and generosity, tax law contained generous but vague benefit promises
without spelling out the exact conditions and limitations. In practice,
though, conditions and limitations apply. While foreign business people
and lawyers have been troubled by such discrepancies between rhetoric and
practice, the Chinese people feel it is quite natural that policy and moral
considerations are always relevant to interpretation and application of law.
Friendship/relationship building is another factor which explains Chinese
preference law. Like generosity, it provides a culturally familiar approach
to opening up the country to foreign investment. The friend-
ship/relationship approach embodied the formulation of the policies favor-
ing ethnic Chinese investments and regionally-based schemes.
This article also discusses Chinese views and experiences regarding
economic efficiency and tax equities. Chinese officials do not entirely ad-
here to those concepts as they are used in the West. With regard to eco-
nomic efficiency, they do not accept, for instance, the notion that the
market, and not the government, is the best way to determine resource allo-
cation. As a result Chinese officials do not allow their policy decisions to
be challenged on technical grounds or by neutral standards. On the other
hand, the Chinese want to utilize the assumptions and uncertainties pro-
vided by market-driven, economic analyses - an approach which is con-
sistent with the modem concept of effectiveness and efficiency. This
tension is also manifested in the Chinese approach to tax equities. The
early Chinese tax policy-making ignored equity issues, such as disparate
(and inequitable) tax treatments between FIEs and DOEs, and between
coastal and interior areas. Such disparities were inevitable in the early
years as tax preferences were supposed to follow then developmental pri-
orities and objectives. Foreign investments received special treatment be-
cause they could contribute to the country's modernization in a way that
DOEs were unable. Coastal areas deserved more privileges because they
were more likely than the country's interior to attract overseas capital and
technology and therefore make the opening-up policy a success. In recent
years, however, as domestically-owned enterprises and interior provinces
began to claim more resources, the Chinese have turned to equity argu-
ments to support tax law changes and address revenue concerns. In the
West, efficiency and equity analyses militate against the use of tax incen-
tives. In China, however, where policy and cultural factors favor tax pref-
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erences, efficiency and equity arguments have been used as tools to ration-
alize the preference policy or its change.
In conclusion, policy-making in China is subject to the leadership's
perception of problems and solutions. Taxation must reflect political and
economic concerns and closely follow policy choice. For the Chinese, the
objective, economic value to foreign businesses should not be as important
as the Chinese sincerity and friendly sentiments that the preferential meas-
ures symbolize. While the Chinese do refer to modern concepts such as ef-
ficiency or equity, they tend to apply their own interpretation and
understanding.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CHINESE TAx PREFERENCES TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
A. Post-Mao China's New Attitude Toward Overseas Private Investment
For historical and political reasons, 30 China's pre-1978 economic ties
with the rest of the world were largely confined to imports and exports of
goods.3' Limited exposure to international exchanges hindered the coun-
try's modernization efforts. The leadership sensed the gravity of the crisis
the country was facing with the political turmoil, economic mismanage-
ment, and stagnation of popular living standards that marked the post-Mao
30 Countries dominated by the communist ideology followed a policy of autarky or self-
reliance and tended to minimize exposure to foreign economic forces. See DAVID G.
BROWN, PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA: SINO-FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 55-61 (1986) (summarizing Chinese foreign economic policy and practice be-
tween 1949-1976); FRANKLYN D. HOLZMAN, FOREIGN TRADE UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING 55
(1974) (discussing Soviet autarky); HENRY N. GERAEDTS, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION 1972-1981, 19-21 (1983)
(examining the Chinese concept of self-reliance); GENE T. HsIAO, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF
CHINA: POLICY, LAw, AND PRACTICE 8-26 (1977) (outlining Chinese foreign trade policy un-
til the mid-1970s). For the Chinese, past humiliating experiences with foreign powers added
to their fear of foreign dominance through economic and eventually political influence.
BROWN, supra; HSIAO, supra, at 9. Moreover, a U.S.-led embargo as a result of the Korean
War made broad economic intercourse between China and Western countries difficult and
even impossible in areas such as technology transfers. See BRO\vN, supra, at 56; RAYMOND
L. LEE, CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1940-1965: A POLICY STUDY 54-
82 (1982).
31 During the 1950s, China relied on aid and advice from the Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries to implement its industrialization programs; after the Sino-Soviet split in
the early 1960s, Chairman Mao Zedong refused to accept foreign funds, whether in the form
of loans or direct investment, out of fear that the arrival of foreign capital would bring with it
political pressure from foreign nations, as China's experience with the Soviets demonstrated.
See ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 135-82 (1966); GEORGE GINSBURGS, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
OF TRADE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6-19, 43-64 (1976);
HSIAO, supra note 30; LEE, supra note 30, at 96-182.
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years.32 As a result, during 1977-1978, the Chinese leadership launched gi-
gantic construction plans to speed up the country's development.33 While
such efforts turned out to be too ambitious to sustain, as indicated by the pe-
riod of retrenchment that followed,34 the mentality of pursuing fast devel-
opmene 5 persisted and was later translated into the opening-up policy 36 and
other reform programs.37 Chinese economic policies were subordinated to
political considerations and the opening-up policy, like other reform initia-
32 Despite heroic investment rates and rapid growth since the late 1950s, the Chinese
people's living standards were still lagging because of stagnant productivity. See, e.g., CARL
RISKIN, CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1949 261-66
(1987); Robert F. Demberger, The Chinese Search for the Path of Self-Sustained Growth in
the 1980s: An Assessment, in CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS PART 1 19, 20-27
(Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States ed., 1982) [hereinafter FOUR
MODERNIZATIONS].
33 In early 1978, Hua Guofeng, the then Party Chairman and Premier Minister announced
an over-ambitious Ten Year Plan which reflected "a sense of urgency about growth",
RISKIN, supra note 32, at 259; this and other ambitious plans for accelerated economic de-
velopment were initially supported by other leaders like Deng Xiaoping. BARRY NAUGHTON,
GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 62 (1995).
34 See Demberger, supra note 32, at 28-31 (discussing the policy of readjustment).
35 This fast development mentality was traceable to Maoist ideology, as the "Maoist view
of how to accomplish development was through a 'revolutionary' process entailing rapid,
massive, and often violent change." SUZANNE OGDEN, CHINA'S UNRESOLVED ISSUES:
POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURE 87 (1995). Fast development reflected Mao's belief
not only that "the socialist road was qualitatively different but also that it was faster and
more efficient." Stephen Andors, The Political and Organizational Implications of China's
New Economic Policies: 1976-1979, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CHINESE SOCIETY
162, 165 (Sidney L. Greenblatt et al. eds., 1981).36 Duiwai Kaifang or "opening to the outside world" was formally announced by Deng
Xiaoping in June 1980 when he referred to China's policy of strengthening international ties,
paying particular attention to the acquisition and assimilation of experiences, technology and
capital of advanced countries. ZHONGGUO DUIwAi JINGJI MAOYI LILUN HE ZHENGCE
[CHINA'S THEORIES AND POLICIES ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE] 88 (Wang
Shaoxi ed., 3d ed. 1995). The origin of the policy has been attributed to the Third Plenum of
the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, in which
the Party leadership officially abandoned its previous emphasis on political struggle and
ideological purity and gave priority to economic development. In fact, the idea of opening-
up was formulated and developed over many years. Deng Xiaoping was the "most outspo-
ken advocate" of the introduction of Western technology in the mid-1970s. BROWN, supra
note 30, at 76. The Communiqu6 of the Third Plenum expressly referred to the importance
of acquisition of foreign technology, PEKING REV., Dec. 29, 1978, at 6, but did not mention
the introduction of foreign capital or investment. Nevertheless, compensation trade, proc-
essing agreements, coproduction and licensing were permitted as experiments with new
forms of foreign economic cooperation. BROWN, supra note 30, at 80-88. By the end of
1978, the idea of equity joint ventures was presented to foreign companies for consideration.
China Offers 49% Equity Ownership in Joint Ventures, CHINA BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978,
at 61.
37 For a discussion of early Post-Mao reform assessment, see Demberger, supra note 32,
at 35-72.
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fives, sought "to deliver more of the rewards of economic growth to the
Chinese people in order to solidify [leaders'] political position[s]. 38
As the country's economic underdevelopment was attributed to its low
technological development, 39 Chinese leaders turned to imports of Western
technology in the late 1970s.4 ° Massive hardware imports proved to be too
expensive41 and foreign direct investment was therefore sought as an alter-
native.42 Overseas investment was intended to introduce advanced technol-
ogy to the Chinese as well as to help the country resolve shortages of funds,
management expertise and other needed skills.4  Other gains from opening-
38 NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 61 (citing and interpreting Paul Hare, What Can China
Learn from the Hungarian Economic Reform?, in TRANSFORMING CHINA'S ECONOMY IN THE
EIGHrTIES 51, 58 (S. Feuchtwang et al. eds., 1988)); see also Michel Oksenberg & Richard C.
Bush, China, 1972-1982: From Revolution to Reform, in CHINA BRIEFING 1982 11, 18
(Richard C. Bush ed., 1983) (the Chinese Communist Party's major immediate objective in
the late 1970s was to improve the standard of living of the populace). Improvement of the
people's living standards as a policy objective constituted a significant departure from the
Stalinist development strategy, which was characterized by a high rate of accumulation and
investment, and the concentration of that investment in heavy industry. For a discussion of
China's shift away from the Stalinist strategy, see Demberger, supra note 32, at 54-59.
39 In a major national science conference in March 1978, a government official admitted
that China was between fifteen to twenty years behind advanced world levels in many
branches of science and technology. Leo A. Orleans, Science, Elitism, and Economic Read-
justment, in FOUR MODERNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 475, 480. The relative weakness of
China's economic modernization was explained by the country's technological stagnation.
See Carl Riskin, Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China, in CHINA'S MODERN ECONOMY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 49, 56-83 (Dwight H. Perkins ed., 1975) (containing a summary of
technological explanations for traditional Chinese economic retardation).
40 For China's overambitious plans to import massive amounts of foreign technology in
the 1970s, see, e.g., RISKIN, supra note 32, at 259-60; GERAEDTS, supra note 30, at 58-70.
China's development strategy in 1977-78 was similar to its previous practice with the ex-
ception of a "greater reliance on foreign sources." Tien-tung Hsueh & Tun-oy Woo, Re-
forms of The Economic Structure in the People's Republic of China, in CHINA:
MODERNIZATION IN THE 1980s 231, 264 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed., 1989) [hereinafter
MODERNIZATION IN THE 1980s].
41 Attempts at massive technology and hardware imports in the late 1970s "not only ex-
ceeded China's ability to pay, but also saddled the country with an obligation to commit an
even greater sum to the provision of ancillary equipment and parts." RISIN, supra note 32,
at 260. According to another observer, "domestic economic and financial limitations and a
lack of qualified technical personnel became critical constraints on [China's] ability to make
effective use of this newly acquired technology." Denis Fred Simon, China's Capacity to
Assimilate Foreign Technology: An Assessment, in FOUR MODERNIZATIONS, supra note 32,
at 514, 523.
42 See Demberger, supra note 32, at 40-41 ("the Chinese are attempting to further ease
constraints imposed by their limited export earnings on their import capacity by encouraging
foreign investment by means of joint ventures, compensation trade, and leasing arrange-
ments."). Efforts started in Guangdong Province as early as 1978 to solicit Hong Kong and
Macau businesses to set up processing and assembly operations or other joint undertakings.
BROWN, supra note 30, at 80-85.
43 As Chinese Premier Zhao Zhiyang stated in the early 1980s, the opening-up policy
would enable China to take advantage of international resources, develop international mar-
kets and learn expertise in managing foreign economic relations and trade. Zhao Ziyang,
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up were also expected. By welcoming foreign capital, China could present
a new image to the world, cementing ties with Western countries against the
then common adversary, the Soviet Union.44 For people in Hong Kong,
Macau or Taiwan and for Overseas Chinese, the new image could encour-
age a renewal of their traditional bonds with their ancestral land. The reuni-
fication of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan was also much in the mind of
Chinese leaders; they thought that the arrival of foreign capital might be
further construed as an international endorsement of the new leadership and
its policy.
The opening-up policy called for improvements in the country's in-
vestment conditions.4 Preferential tax treatment was considered vital to the
country's efforts to attract foreign capital and technology.46  Shewai
Shuishou, or "foreign taxation," became a specialized branch of government
whose main objective was to promote the opening-up policy. Various
preferential tax schemes were set up over the next several years. Some
supposedly applied nationwide and others were available only to foreign
investors settled in designated areas. Additional fiscal benefits were offered
on the basis of industry/sector classification. Finally, the government
handed out special concessions that promoted investment projects by Over-
seas Chinese. With overlapping and sometimes inconsistent regimes, for-
eign taxation in general and tax preferences in particular looked so
complicated and confusing that "calculating which tax provisions provide
any single enterprise or investment possibility the most favorable treatment
has become a considerable burden, and expense, for foreign investors. 'A4
Dangqian De Jingji Xingshi he Jinhou Jingji Jianshe De Fangzhen [Current Economic Situa-
tion and Policies for Future Economic Construction], RENmN RMAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Dec.
14, 1981, at 1, 3.
44 See, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra note 33, at 62-63.45 The Chinese admitted that their lack of advanced equipment, technology, skilled per-
sonnel and management expertise, shortage of funds, and overpopulation were factors unfa-
vorable to Chinese-foreign economic ties. Hongqi Zazhi Bianjibu [Editorial Board, Red
Flag Magazine], Guanyu Woguo De Duiwai Jingii Guanxi Wenti [Issues Concerning Our
Country's Foreign Economic Relations], HONGQI [RED FLAG], Apr. 6, 1982, at 2, 3-4 [here-
inafter Red Flag Editorial]. There were, of course, more systemic problems such as labor,
domestic market access, the planned economy and the state bureaucracy. See, e.g., RISKIN,
supra note 32, at 327-38.
4 6 See, e.g., LIYONG WAIZI DE LiLuN Yu SHiiiAN [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
UTILIZING FOREIGN FUNDs] 43 (Fang Xiaoqiu ed., 1984) (whether China was attractive to
foreign capital depended on whether preferences were granted to foreign investors).
47 See N1U LICHENG ET AL., ZHONGGUO SHUISHOU ZHINAN [CHINA TAX GUIDE] 158 (1990)
(China set up a separate foreign taxation branch for the opening-up policy); Du MENGKUN,
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI ZHUYI SHUisHOu JINGJI LILUN Yu SHuIAN [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF CHINA's SOCIALIST TAXATION AND ECONOMY] 187 (1989) (the role of foreign taxation in
the implementation of the opening up policy must not be underestimated).
48 James V. Feinerman, Chinese Law Relating to Foreign Investment and Trade: The
Decade of Reform in Retrospect, in CHINA's ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s: THE
PROBLEMS OF REFORMS, MODERNIZATION, AND INTERDEPENDENCE 828, 832 (Joint Economic
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B. Nationwide Enterprise Income Tax Regimes And Preferential Treatment
The 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law promised income tax preferences
in two situations. EJVs were eligible for a reduction of or an exemption
from their income tax for the first two to three profit-making years if they
possessed "advanced technology by world standard. ' 49 Furthermore, a for-
eign joint venture could apply for a refund of a portion of the income tax
paid if it reinvested its net profit in China.5 0 The JVITL, adopted fourteen
months later, instituted an enterprise income tax for EJVs. In addition to
providing normative rules and a regulatory framework for tax administra-
tion,51 the legislation included a number of measures characterized as tax
preferences by the spokesman for the bill's sponsors.52 First, newly estab-
lished EJVs could apply for an exemption from income tax in the first
profit-making year and a fifty percent reduction of income tax in the second
and third years, provided that they were scheduled to operate for at least ten
years. 3 Following the expiration of this initial exemption and reduction,
EJVs engaged in relatively low-profit sectors like farming and forestry or
established in remote and economically underdeveloped regions were eligi-
ble for fifteen to thirty percent income tax reduction for ten more years,
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance.5 4 Next, joint venturers
that reinvested their shares of profit in China for a period of at least five
years could obtain, upon approval, a refund of forty percent of the income
tax paid on the reinvested funds.,5 5 Finally, two provisions for computing
Committee, Congress of the United States ed., 1991) [hereinafter CHINA'S ECONOMIC
DILEMMAS].49 EJV Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
50 id.
51 For discussions on the JVITL, see Castleman, supra note 21, at 385-87; Easson & Li,
supra note 21, at 672-76; Harrison, supra note 21, at 777-80; Pomp et al., supra note 21, at
52-66; Simon, supra note 21, at 537-50.
52 Gu Ming Tongzhi Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying
Qiye Suodeshui Fa Cao'an He Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren Suodeshui Fa Cao'an
De Shuoming [Comrade Gu Ming's Explanations on the Draft Income Tax Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures and The Draft Individ-
ual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China] [hereinafter Gu Ming], FAGUI
XUANBIAN 624, 625-27 (Falu Chubanshe [Law Publishing House], 1983) [hereinafter 1983
FAGUi XUANBiAN].
53 JVITL, supra note 2, art. 5; Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 626. A 1983 amendment of the
JVITL extended the period for tax exemption from one year to the first two years after the
EJV made a profit and the following 50% reduction in income tax was also stretched from
two to three years. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Suodeshui Fa De Jueding
[Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Concerning Revi-
sion of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Regarding Chinese-Foreign
Joint Ventures], 1983 FAGUI HuILAN 115-16.
-4 JVITL, supra note 2, art. 5; Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 626.
55 JVITL, supra note 2, art. 6; Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 626-27. Another incentive for
foreign investors to keep and eventually invest their profit in China was a 10% tax levied on
foreign investors when they repatriated profits. JVITL, supra note 2, art. 4. The 10% addi-
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the taxable income of EJVs were characterized as "preferential." The first
was permission to use, upon app roval, accelerated depreciation of fixed as-
sets in special circumstances. The second involved the carry-over of
losses to offset profits for five years.57 The JVITL imposed a thirty percent
tax rate plus an additional three percent local surcharge. 8 This combined
thirty-three percent tax rate was believed to be attractive because corporate
income tax rates were around fifty percent in most developed countries and
between thirty-five and forty percent in many developing countries.59
The 1980 JVITL applied to EJVs. Foreign investors that chose the in-
vestment form of WFOE or CJV were subject to the FEITL, enacted fifteen
months later.60 The tax on the income of a "foreign enterprise" was com-
puted on a progressive rate schedule with five brackets ranging from twenty
percent for the annual income of up to 250,000 Rmb, to forty percent for
the annual income exceeding 1 million Rmb. 61 An additional ten percent
local tax was levied on the taxable income.62 The FEITL offered fewer
preferences to foreign enterprises than the JVITL did to EJVs. There was
no general income tax exemption or reduction for newly established foreign
enterprises. Only foreign enterprises engaged in farming, forestry, hus-
bandry or other low-profit operations and scheduled to operate for ten years
or more could apply for an exemption in the first profit-making year and a
fifty percent reduction in the following two years. A fifteen to thirty per-
cent reduction in income tax for another ten years could be available after
the expiration of the foregoing exemption and reduction, subject to the ap-
tional tax on the amount of remitted profits out of China was intended to achieve a similar
goal, namely, to encourage use or reinvestment by foreign investors of their shares of profit
within China, as no tax liability would arise if received profits were not moved out of the
country. Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 626.
56 Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 627. The JVITL itself did not explicitly refer to permission
of accelerated depreciation. The relevant provision was found, however, in Rules for the
Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Chi-
nese-Foreign Joint Ventures (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye
Suodeshui Fa Shixing Xize), art. 13, approved by the State Council on December 10, 1980
and promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on December 14, 1980, 1980 FAGUI HUmIAN
116, 119-20.57 JVITL, supra note 2, art. 7; Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 627.58 JVITL, supra note 2, art. 3.
59 Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 625.
60 The FEITL applied to "foreign enterprises" which referred to any foreign companies
and business entities that maintained an establishment in China and engaged in business ei-
ther independently, or in co-operative production or business with Chinese enterprises in a
form other than that of an EJV. FEITL, supra note 2, art. 1. For discussions of the FEITL,
see, Easson & Li, supra note 21, at 676-81; Harrison, supra note 21, at 387-94; Norberg &
Price, supra note 21; Simon, supra note 21, at 550-55.
61 FEITL, supra note 2, art. 3.
62 FEITL, supra note 2, art. 4. The FEITL also imposed a withholding tax of 20% on all
China-sourced dividend, interest, rental, royalty and other income of foreign companies and
business entities that did not have an establishment in China. Id. art. 11.
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proval of the Ministry of Finance.63 Unlike EJVs, foreign enterprises re-
ceived no tax benefits under the FEITL for reinvesting their profits in the
country. In computing their taxable income, however, foreign enterprises
like EJVs could carry forward losses for five years.64 The foreign enter-
prises could also use accelerated methods of depreciation of fixed assets,
provided that the operation did not involve exploitation of offshore petro-
leum or other natural resources and subject to the approval by the Ministry
of Finance.65 As a gesture to foreign enterprises with small-scale produc-
tion and low profit, the legislation allowed provincial governments to waive
or reduce local income tax.
66
The JVITL and FEITL were replaced by a single enterprise income tax
in 1991 when the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Con-
cerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (Unified
Tax Law or UTL) was adopted.67 The new regime no longer distinguishes
between different forms of investment6 8 The UTL applies a thirty percent
flat rate to all FIEs, plus a three percent local surtax.6 9 FIEs engaged in
productive sectors and scheduled to operate for ten years or more are enti-
63 FEITL, supra note 2, art. 5; see also Xie Ming Tongzhi Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa Cao'an De Shuoming Zhaiyao [Extracts of Com-
rade Xie Ming's Explanations on the Draft Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China Concerning Foreign Enterprises], in 1983 FAGui XuANBiAN, supra note 52, at 621,
622-23 [hereinafter Xie Ming].
64 FEITL, supra note 2, art. 6.65 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shixing Xize [Detailed
Rules and Regulations for the Implementations of the Income Tax Law of the People's Re-
public of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises], art. 18, approved by the State Council on
February 17, 1982 and promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on February 21, 1982, 1982
FAGUI Humi AN 221,226.
66 FEITL, supra note 2, art. 4; Xie Ming, supra note 63, at 623.67 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa
[Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enter-
prises and Foreign Enterprises] 1991 FAGuI HUmiAN 281 [hereinafter UTL].
68 Under the UTL, "foreign investment enterprises" refers to EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs,
and "foreign enterprises" are divided into two categories: foreign companies and business
entities that set up an establishment in China and those maintaining no establishment in
China, but having earned an income with a source in China. UTL, supra note 67, art. 2. As
the Director of the State Administration of Taxation explained, the UTL provided a uniform
approach to tax rates, preferential tax treatment and tax collection jurisdiction with regard to
all foreign funded businesses operating in China. Jin Xin, Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye He
Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa De Jieshao He Shuoming [Summary and Explanations on the
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enter-
prises and Foreign Enterprises], ZHONGGUO SHUVU BAO [CINA's TAX NEWs], Apr. 29,
1991, at 1. For discussions on the UTL, see Curley & Fortunato, supra note 21, at 546-64;
Weber, supra note 21, at 289-92; Wunsch & Liu, supra note 21, at 415-22.69 UTL, supra note 67, art. 5. Wang Bingqian, Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa Cao'an De Shuoming [Explanations
on the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises], RENmiN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Apr. 15, 1991, at 2
(UTL followed JVITL by keeping the 30% rate plus 3% local surcharge).
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tied to a two-year tax exemption, after they make a profit, followed by a
three-year, fifty percent reduction.70 FIEEs engaged in agriculture, forestry,
or husbandry, or those FEs located in economically underdeveloped re-
mote regions may obtain, upon application and approval, another fifteen to
thirty percent reduction in income tax for ten more years after the expiration
of the exemption and reduction.71 The new regime retains provisions per-
mitting carrying forward of losses72 and the use of accelerated methods of
depreciation. 73 It also sanctions various preferential schemes enacted by
previous State Council regulations. 74 The UTL liberalized tax preference
rules and practice. The two-year tax exemption and three-year tax reduc-
tion are available to productive WFOEs and CJVs,75 and are no longer lim-
ited to EJVs. Provincial governments can waive or cut down local surtax
for all kinds of FIEs in designated industries or sectors,76 not just for small
scale and low profit foreign enterprises as under the FEITL. While the
JVITL allowed only EJVs to apply for the forty percent refund of the tax
paid on the portion of any reinvested profit, the UTL extends eligibility for
this refund to all FIEs.77 Qualified FIEs are automatically granted the two-
year exemption and three-year fifty percent reduction without any prior ap-
plication and aproval.7 s Profits received by foreign investors from FIEs
are tax exempt. The UTL also raises the amount of deduction for business
entertainment expenses80 and permits businesses to write off bad debts.
81
70 UTL, supra note 67, art. 8. The tax holidays are not available, however, to petroleum,
natural gas, rare metal, and precious metal exploitation projects, which are governed by
separate government regulations. Id.
71 Id.
72 UTL, supra note 67, art. 11.73 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa
Shishi Xize [Detailed Implementing Rules for the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic
of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises], arts. 34 & 40,
1991 FAGuI HuiBiAN 290, 299 & 301.
74 UTL, supra note 67, arts. 7-8; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye he
Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Xize [Detailed Rules .on the Implementation of the In-
come Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign-investment Enter-
prises and Foreign-owned Enterprises], arts. 68-75, 1991 Fagui Huibian 290 [hereinafter
UTL Implementing Rules]75 Wang, supra note 69.
76 UTL, supra note 67, art. 9.
77 UTL, supra note 67, art. 10.78 Under the JVITL and FEITL, the granting of tax holidays was not automatic but was
subject to approval by government tax officials. JVITL supra note 67, art. 5; FEITL supra
note 2, art. 5. Article 8 of the UTL no longer requires application by FIEs or approval by tax
authorities.
79 UTL, supra note 67, art. 19(1); see also Jin, supra note 67 (abolition of 10% surcharge
and remitted profit tax exempt).
80 UTL Implementing Rules, supra note 74, art. 22. Under previous accounting and tax
rules, business entertainment expense deduction was capped at 3% of the net annual sales
under 15 million yuan and 1% of any net annual sales exceeding 15 million yuan; UTL Im-
plementing Rules raised the cap to 5% and 3% respectively. See Wang Xuanhui, Yingna
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One change that adversely affects foreign investors is the revocation of tax
holidays that the JVITL granted to EJVs engaged in non-productive and
service sectors.82  Pre-1991 EJVs may still retain JVITL tax holidays,
though, until the end of the term of their joint venture contracts.83
Separate tax and preferential regimes currently apply to FIEs and
DOEs. As domestic complaints about preference treatment reserved for
FIEs are mounting, the country's decision-making circle is now in favor of
a single enterprise income tax regime for both FIEs and DOEs 84 with near
8Suniformity in preferential treatmentY. Such uniformity would likely come
at the expense of many of the existing preferences enjoyed by foreign busi-
nesses. Foreign banks in China, for example, are now charged thirty-three
percent income tax for conducting Chinese currency transactions just like
domestic banks, while the fifteen percent preferential rate only applies to
their foreign exchange business. Moreover, with regard to their income
from Chinese currency business, foreign banks cannot enjoy the one-year
income tax exemption followed by a two-year, fifty percent reduction.17 If
foreign banks are allowed to conduct renminbi transactions like domestic
banks, they must pay the same tax.88 While reduction or elimination of tax
benefits for FIEs may not confer upon DOEs any direct fiscal benefits, it
would at least ease domestic discontent.
C. Regional Develoment Strategy and Enterprise Income Tax Preferences
1. Special Economic Zones
Chinese leaders prioritized the introduction of foreign capital and tech-
nology on a gradual, region-by-region basis. 89 This development strategy
Shui Suode Er Jisuan De Ruogan Xianding [Some Limitations on Computing Taxable In-
come], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU [CHINA TAXATION], 1992 No. 8, 26, at 26.
81 UTL Implementing Rules, supra note 74, art. 25. Under previous accounting and tax
rules, writing offbad debts was not permitted. See Wang, supra note 80.82 Wang, supra note 69.
83 UTL, supra note 67, art. 27.
84 See supra note 16.
85 See, e.g., Shao Mingjun & Liang Youping, Liang Shui Heyi De Ruogan Sikao [Reflec-
tions on the Merger of Two Taxes], SI-IEVAI SHUISHOU [INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN
CHINA], 1996 No. 3, 8, at 8-10.86 Foreign Banks Hit by 33% Tax for Yuan Transactions, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, July
1, 1997, Business, at 3. For tax preferential treatment of foreign banks and branches in Pu-
dong, Shanghai, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
87 id.
88 Foo Choy Peng, Taxing Question of National Treatment for Foreign Banks, S. CHNA
MORNING PosT, Apr. 18, 1997, Business, at 4.
89 This strategy followed the idea that investment should be concentrated where it would
be most likely to yield higher returns, and investment policy must be tilted in favor of those
geographical areas susceptible to fast development. See Liu Fuhuan, Lun Tequ He Puqu
Fazhan De Bianzhengfa [On the Dialectic of the Development of Special Zones and Non-
Special Zones], in 1994 ZHONGGUO JINGJI TEQU KAIFANGDIQU NIANJIAN [1994 YEARBOOK
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began with the creation of special economic zones. On July 15, 1979, the
Party Central Committee and State Council approved the Guangdong and
Fujian provincial party committees' proposals to set up experimental chu-
kou tequ, or "special export zones," in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou of the
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of the Fujian Province.90 These special
export zones were created to vie for overseas investment.91 They were later
renamedjingfi tequ, or "special economic zones" (SEZs).92 With its vast
expanse, large population, huge regional contrasts, antiquated industrial
hardware and infrastructure, and shortage of trained managers and skilled
workers, China needed astronomical infusion of foreign capital and massive
amounts of imports of modem equipment and technology in order to make
an immediate, visible difference in productivity and standard of living.
The country's business environment in the late 1970s, however, was
not conducive to foreign investment. On top of its historic autarky and
xenophobia, China maintained a Stalinist political, economic and legal
structure when the country was opened up. Strong domestic resistance ac-
companied any attempt to bring about profound changes. Chinese policy
makers had no illusions about a quick result on a national scale, nor did
they welcome the drastic transformation that foreign capital inflows could
bring to the country's economy and society. By creating SEZs in three cit-
ies in Guangdong and one city in Fujian, Chinese leaders anticipated that
funds from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and other Overseas Chinese would
flow into those areas because of geographic proximity, cultural closeness
OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND OPENING AREAS] 217, 217 (Hu Ping ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Y.B. SEZs & OPEN AREAS]. Deng Xiaoping did away with Maoist equalitarian
ideology and encouraged some areas to get rich first. See Deng Xiaoping, Banhao Jingfi
Tequ Zengfia Duiwai Kaifang Chengshi [Improving Special Economic Zones and Increasing
the Number of Open Cities], Feb. 24, 1984 [hereinafter Deng, Improving Special Economic
Zones], in 3 DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN [SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING] 51, 52
(1993) [hereinafter SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING].
90 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Pizhuan Guangdong Shengwei, Fujian Shengwei
Guanyu Duiwai Jingji Huodong He Linghuo Cuoshi De Liangge Baogao Zhaiyao [Issuance
and Approval by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council
of Two Reports of the Party Committees of Guangdong and Fujian Provinces Concerning
Foreign Economic Activities and Flexible Measures (Extracts)], July 15, 1979 [hereinafter
Reports of Guangdong & Fujian], in ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG SHUJICHU YANJIUSHI JINGJI
ZHU [ECONOMIC SECTION, RESEARCH GROUP OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE], Dui WAI KAIFANG ZHENGCE WENXIAN HUIBIAN
[COLLECTED POLICY DOCUMENTS CONCERNING OPENING UP TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD] 34
(1985) [hereinafter COLLECTED POLICY DOCUMENTS].
91 Id.
92 GEORGE CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 30
(1990). For discussions of SEZs, see KEvlN B. BUCKNALL, CHINA AND THE OPEN DOOR
POLICY 143-67 (1989); Norman Y.T. Ng, From Special Economic Zones to the Coastal
Open Cities: A Strategy for Modernization of China, in MODERNIZATION IN THE 1980s, supra
note 40, at 445.
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and kinship.93 Foreign capital could thus turn a small number of sites into
an overnight success story.94 The government could then use the success of
the SEZs for a variety of political and economic purposes.95 For example,
prosperous SEZs could be used as showcases for Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan.96 Meanwhile, the concentration of foreign businesses in designated
and separated areas would ensure that the impact of foreign capital on Chi-
nese society and domestic economy would remain under control. 7
Because the SEZs constituted the preliminary phase of the opening-up
policy, the government took unprecedented efforts to secure their success.
93 See, e.g., Reports of Guangdong & Fujian, supra note 90, at 34; Liang Xiang, Shezhi
Jingfi Tequ Shi Woguo Shixing Duiwai Kaifang Zhengce De Yi Da Chuangju [The Creation
of Special Economic Zones Is Great Pioneering Work of Our Country's Opening Up Policy],
in 1983 ZHONGGUO JINGJI TEQU NIANJIAN [1983 YEARBOOK OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONES] 104, 105 (Xianggang Zhongguo Jingji Tequ Nianjian Chubanshe [Hong Kong Pub-
lishing House of Yearbook of China's Special Economic Zones], 1983) [hereinafter 1983
Y.B. SEZs] (Mayor of Shenzhen cited links with Hong Kong, Macau and Overseas Chinese
as a major advantage for the success of Shenzhen SEZ).
94 The idea of SEZs was inspired by free trade zones, or export processing zones in other
countries, notably those in neighbouring Asian economies like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Sin-
gapore. Li~i ENZHAO, LuE LUN DUIvAI JINGJI KAIFANG [ON ECONOMIC OPENING UP TO THE
OUTSIDE WORLD] 58-59 (1985); see also BUCKNALL, supra note 92, at 143 (The Chinese ap-
proached the United Nations for technical assistance and investigated some of the foreign
export zones or free trade zones to improve SEZs' chances of success). One difference was,
however, that unlike Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone in Taiwan or the Santa Cruz Elec-
tronics Export Processing Zone in India which were industrial sections with limited func-
tions, Chinese SEZs are "permanent modem industrial and economically viable entities."
Ng, supra note 92, at 448; see also Liang, supra note 93, at 106 (in addition to focusing on
industrial investment projects, Shenzhen SEZ would also develop commerce, agriculture,
animal husbandry, residence, tourism and other industries and sectors).
95 SEZs have been assigned the following functions: (1) serving as bridges for the intro-
duction of foreign capital, technology and expertise and training classrooms for Chinese
managers and workers to gain knowledge and experience from foreigners, (2) encouraging
regional competition, (3) enhancing the country's foreign exchange earning capacity, (4)
serving as laboratories for experiment for domestic reform efforts, and (5) providing job op-
portunities. Ng, supra note 92, at 448-49; see also BUCKNALL, supra note 92, at 144.96 Liang, supra note 93, at 108 (linking development of Shenzhen SEZ to prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong); Sun Ru, Cong Zhanlue Yiyi Tan Jingfi Tequ De Zuoyong He Jian-
she [A Discussion on the Function and Construction of Special Economic Zones from Stra-
tegic Viewpoints], in 1983 Y.B. SEZs, supra note 93, at 649, 653 (Shengzhen SEZ as a
model for reunification of Taiwan).97 Chinese literature stressed the importance of separating SEZs from the rest of the
country. See Liu, supra note 94, at 60 (SEZs avoid direct exposure of domestic economy to
world economy and protect domestic economy); Xu Dixin, Guanyu Jingfi Tequ De Jige Li-
lun Wenti [Some Theoretical Issues Concerning Special Economic Zones], in 1983 Y.B.
SEZs, supra note 93, at 573, 575 (arguing that SEZs would prevent foreign investment from
reaching the interior unrestrained). By separating SEZs from the rest of the country, the
spread of Western ideas and culture would be contained as well. As one commentator ob-
served, there was similarity between SEZs and the trading ports, treaty ports and concessions
historically used by China to limit foreign influence. SUSAN L. SHIRK, How CHINA OPENED
ITS DOOR: THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF THE PRC's FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
REFORMS 35-36 (1994).
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The government reinforced the natural advantages of the SEZs, such as
their geographic accessibility and ties with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan,
by according provincial and local authorities great autonomy and broad
powers in such matters as finance, foreign investment/trade, foreign ex-
change, labor, and price control.9 This decentralization was expected to
stimulate local enthusiasm, which was necessary for the SEZs' develop-
ment. The government added various preferential measures, including tax
reductions and exemptions, to make investment in SEZs look more advan-
tageous.99 Early preferential tax treatment of foreign investors in SEZs was
governed by the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong
Province,1° ° which, in fact, preceded the 1980 JVITL. The 1984 Tax Re-
duction and Exemption Regulations fine-tuned and augmented the tax pref-
erence regime in SEZs °'0 by unifying tax treatment for foreign investment
projects in all four SEZs'0 2 and in Hainan Island.10 3
98 Reports of Guangdong & Fujian, supra note 90, at 38-41; Liang, supra note 93, at 105-
06.
99 Reports of Guangdong & Fujian, supra note 90, at 41 (adoption of preferential tariffs,
simplified customs procedure, permission of profit repatriation, easy banking access); Liang,
supra note 93, at 105 (low tax rates, tax reduction and exemption, reinvestment tax benefits,
import duty exemption, preferential land use, relaxed export requirements in Shenzhen).
1oo Guangdong Jingji Tequ Tiaoli [Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guang-
dong Province], 1980 FAGUI HuiBiAN 175 [hereinafter Guangdong SEZs Regulations]. Fu-
jian Province applied most of the same or similar preferential treatment to Xiamen SEZ.
See Zou Erjun & Jiang Ping, Xiamen Jingfi Tequ Qingkuang Jieshao [Introduction to Xia-
men Special Economic Zone], in 1983 Y.B. SEZs, supra note 93, at 315, 318. Chapter III of
Guangdong SEZs Regulations, entitled "Preferential Measures," promised tax preferences
for foreign investment projects in SEZs. Accordingly, the enterprise income tax rate was
15%. Guangdong SEZs Regulations, art. 14. Unspecified "special preferential treatment"
was provided to enterprises established within two years of the promulgation of the regula-
tions, with an investment of U.S. $5 million or more, involving higher technology, or having
a longer capital period. Id. Foreign businesses that reinvest their profits in SEZs for a pe-
riod of five years or more may apply for a reduction of or exemption from income tax on the
reinvested portion. Id. art. 16. The Shekou Industrial Zone in Shenzhen apparently had its
own regulations granting tax holidays and taxing corporate profit at a 10% rate. Thomas J.
Rasmussen & Eugene A. Theroux, China's New Tax Laws for Joint Ventures and Individu-
als, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 36, 37. There was confusion about which regime
should prevail. Id.
101 A major difference was the distinction made by the 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemp-
tion Regulations between productive and service-oriented investment projects; productive
enterprises referred to those engaged in manufacturing, communication and transport, agri-
culture, forestry, husbandry or other sectors deemed productive. 1984 Tax Reduction and
Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, l(a)(3). If they were scheduled to operate for 10 years
or more, they would enjoy, upon approval, an income tax exemption for the first and second
years after they made a profit and a 50% reduction in income tax from the third year to the
fifth year. Id. On the other hand, service-oriented projects were offered a one-year exemp-
tion followed by another two years' 50% reduction if they exceeded U.S. $5 million in capi-
tal investment and were scheduled for operation for 10 years or more. Id. l(a)(2).
102 Id. 1(a).
0 3 Id. 1(j). Hainan Island was subsequently made a new province and the country's fifth
and largest SEZ, with the same attributes as other SEZs, including tax preferences. Decision
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Compared to nationwide enterprise income tax treatment, several pref-
erential features in SEZs stood out. All foreign investment projects in SEZs
enjoyed a reduced fifteen percent enterprise income tax rate104 without the
distinctions between forms of investment required by the 1980 JVITL and
1981 FEITL.105 The local governments in SEZs could waive or reduce lo-
cal income tax106 EJVs in SEZs were exempt from the ten percent income
tax on their expatriated profits. 7 Even though the 1991 UTL broadened
tax preferences nationwide, FIEs in SEZs still enjoy benefits not generally
available such as the reduced fifteen percent income tax rate. Most signifi-
cantly, SEZs set up precedents for the authorities to create preferences
which help channel foreign capital and technology into other designated
priority areas. With a plethora of preferential schemes and overlapping
promises, foreign investors in a designated area may claim not only benefits
that are available nationwide, but also special treatment offered by applica-
ble regional schemes.
of the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on the Establishment of
Hainan Province (Di Qi Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di Yi Ci Huiyi Guanyu Sheli
Hainan Sheng De Jueding), adopted on April 13, 1988, 1988 FALu HUmIAN 127; Decision
of the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on the Establishment of
Hainan Special Economic Zone (Di Qi Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di Yi Ci Huiyi
Guanyu Sheli Hainan Jingji Tequ De Jueding), adopted on April 13, 1988, 1988 FALu
HUIBiAN 128. According to the State Council Regulations Concerning the Encouragement
of Investment and Development of Hainan Island (Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli Touzi Kaifa
Hainandao De Guiding), promulgated on May 4, 1988, 1988 FAGUI HuIBIAN 435 [hereinafter
1988 Hainan Regulations], both foreign and domestic investments in the newly established
province would enjoy tax and other benefits similar or identical to those in the other four
SEZs under the 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations. Benefits include a 15%
business income rate with a surcharge of 10% for local income tax, 1988 Hainan Regula-
tions, art. 12; a two-year tax exemption followed by a three-year 50% reduction for produc-
tive enterprises, id.; a one-year tax exemption followed by a two-year 50% reduction for
enterprises in service sectors with an investment of over U.S. $5 million, id.; waiver and/or
reduction of local income tax by the provincial government, id.; and exemption of foreign
investors from income tax on the amount of their repatriated profit. Id. The 1988 Hainan
Regulations also incorporated tax benefits from other laws and regulations such as the refund
of 40% of the income tax paid on the portion of reinvestment of profit for a period of not less
than five years, id. art. 19. Longer tax holidays consisting of a five-year income tax exemp-
tion after profit-making followed by another five-year 50% reduction were accorded to en-
terprises engaged in the development and operation of port, wharf, airport, road, railway,
power station, coal mining, hydro-electric and other infrastructure facilities, or agriculture,
and were scheduled to operate for fifteen years or more in Hainan Island. Id. art. 12.
104 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, l(a).
105 Id. Productive CJVs and WFOEs in SEZs were the biggest beneficiaries since the
JVITL, as amended in 1983, already offered all EJVs identical tax holidays; service-oriented
CJVs and WFOEs in SEZs would also gain from the 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption
Regulations as the 1981 FEITL provided no tax holidays at all.
106 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, l(b).
107 Id. l(c).
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2. ETDAs, OUDs and COERs
Following the establishment of SEZs, the Party leadership called for
the country's entire coastal area to play an active role in expanding foreign
trade and seeking overseas capital and technology.0 8 The coastal regions
were well positioned to attract foreign investment. 0 9 They had geographic
advantages, they had a relatively more developed industrial, technological
and infrastructure base than the rest of the country, and they were the an-
cestral home to most Overseas Chinese.1 10 In May 1984, the Party Central
Committee and State Council designated fourteen coastal cities as Yanhai
Kaifang Chengshi, or "Coastal Open Cities" ("COCs"),1 and granted them
enlarged autonomy on economic development and foreign investment mat-
ters.1 2 The government devised two tiers of preferences.
First, the government designated certain areas within COCs as Jingfi
Jishu Kaifaqu, or "Economic and Technological Development Areas"
("ETDAs"). ETDAs duplicated some of the characteristics of the SEZs
in order to speed up economic development in COCs.114 ETDAs targeted
technology and capital intensive projects. 15 The establishment of ETDAs
required injections of massive amounts of funds to build transport, commu-
nication facilities and other infrastructure facilities to suit the needs of for-
108 Editorial, Jianchi Duiwai Kaifang Zhengce Fahui Yanhai Diqu Youshi [Upholding the
Opening Up Policy and Giving Full Play to Advantages of Coastal Areas], RENMIN RmAO
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Jan. 17, 1982, reprinted in CHINA'S OPENING, supra note 11, at 94-95.
'09 Id. at 95-96.
"lid.
11 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Pizhuan Yanhai Bufen Chengshi Zuo-
tanhui Jiyao De Tongzhi [Notification of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
and State Council Concerning the Issuance and Approval of the Summary of the Forum on
Coastal Cities], in COLLECTED POLICY DoCuMENTs, supra note 90, at 476 [hereinafter Forum
on Coastal Cities]. The fourteen coastal cities were Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao,
Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhan-
jiang, and Beihai. Id. at 480.112 Local governments in COCs were given autonomy and power to deal with matters
such as foreign investment project approval, foreign exchange control, import and export,
preferential treatment for foreign investment, and a structure construction. Id. at 480-85.
"
3 Id. at 482.
114 There were political obstacles to the expansion of SEZs. During the 1980s, Chen
Yun, a senior Party leader, identified SEZs with capitalist speculation and advocated a con-
tainment policy. CHEN YuN, Jingfi Jianshe De Jige Zhongyao Fangzhen [Some Important
Guiding Principles for Economic Construction] [hereinafter Guiding Principles], in 3 CHEN
YN WENXUAN [SELECTED WORKS OF CHEN YuN] 305, 307 (1986) [hereinafter SELECTED
WORKS OF CHEN YUN]; CHEN YuN, Jiaqiang He Gayin Jing/i Jihua Gongzuo [Strengthening
and Improving Economic Planning Works], in id. at 309, 311. Proponents of the SEZ policy
had to take pains to explain the necessity of establishing SEZs and assure critics that the so-
cialist system of the country would not be affected. See Ng, supra note 92, at 449-50; see
also BUCKNALL, supra note 92, at 162-64.
115 Forum on Coastal Cities, supra note I 11, at 483.
China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment
18:549 (1998)
eign businesses, 16 so the central authorities needed to control the number
and size of ETDAs to ensure success.1 7 The central authorities therefore
retained the final say on matters such as whether an ETDA could be estab-
lished, where in the city it should be located, and how large it should be.'
18
As SEZ policy showed, tax treatment was the barometer of how open and
favorable an area would be to foreign investment, and, subsequently, efforts
to improve investment conditions needed to incorporate preferential tax
measures. The government therefore offered a reduced fifteen percent in-
come tax rate, 19 tax holidays and other benefits1 20 to productive foreign in-
vestment projects in ETDAs.
In an attempt to revitalize the industry and economy of urban areas of
COCs through foreign investment, the government created a second tier of
preferred areas called Lao Shiqu, or "Old Urban Districts" (OUDs), 121 with
limited incentives to foreign investment. The 1984 Tax Reduction and Ex-
emption Regulations have allowed a reduced fifteen percent rate to certain
productive EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs in OUDs. In particular, the enterprises
must be technology or know-how intensive, with an investment exceeding
U.S. $30 million and a long investment recovery period, or they must be122
projects related to energy, transport or port construction. EJVs, WFOEs
and CJVs based in OUDs which are not eligible for the fifteen percent rate
receive a twenty percent reduction in their applicable income tax if they fall
within one of the following sectors: (1) machinery, manufacturing and
electronics; (2) metallurgy, chemical, and building material; (3) light in-
116 See Hu, supra note 13, at 65 (ETDAs in coastal cities required about 100 million yuan
investment per square kilometer for infrastructure development).
17 According to state policy guidelines, ETDAs must be limited and marked geographi-
cally and supervised by the state; the set-up of ETDAs must be examined and approved on a
case-by-case basis. Kuoda Duiwai Kaizhan Jingfi Huodong De Quanli Dul Touzi Banchang
Keshang Shixing Youhui Zhengce [To Enlarge Authorities for Conducting Foreign-Related
Economic Activities and Apply Preferential Measures to Foreign Investment], RENMIN
RIBAo [PEOPLE'S DAILY], July 13, 1984, at 2.
118 Whether COCs could set up ETDAs and the location and size of ETDAs all needed to
be approved by the State Council. See Guowuyuan Pifu Yanhai Gangkou Chengshi Jinyibu
Shixing Duiwai Kaifang De Baogao [The State Council's Approval and Reply on Reports
Concerning Further Opening Up of Coastal Port Cities] [hereinafter Opening Up of Coastal
Cities], in CHINA'S OPENING, supra note 11, at 62.
119 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, at 2(a).
120 Productive foreign investment projects scheduled to operate for ten years or more in
ETDAs were granted an income tax exemption for the first two years after profit-making and
50% tax reduction for the next three years. Id. They can also enjoy local tax waivers and
reductions by municipal governments, id. at 2(b), and tax exemption of repatriated profits,
id. at 2(c). Investment in ETDAs was not strictly limited, however, to hi-tech projects, and
the government documents approving the creation of ETDAs spoke of goals such as ex-
panding export sectors, upgrading products and industrial production, and renovating old
domestic enterprises. Opening Up of Coastal Cities, supra note 118, at 64 (concerning ap-
proval of Tianjin ETDA).
121 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, at 3(a).
122 d.
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dustry, textile, and packaging; (4) medical equipment and pharmaceutical;
(5) agriculture, forestry, husbandry, aquatic breeding and processing related
to any one of these sectors; or (6) construction.1
23
In January 1985, as yet another regionally-based developmental initia-
tive, the State Council declared cities and counties in the Yangtze and Pearl
River Deltas, and the South Fujian (Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou) area to
be Yanhai Jingji Kaifangqu, or "Coastal Economic Open Regions"
(CEORs)12 4 and bestowed upon them special tax measures.125 Composed of
both urban and rural areas, CEORs had been the bases of the country's tra-
ditional export industries like textiles, handicrafts, light industry and native
products. 126 The introduction of foreign capital and technology, as well as
management and marketing skills, was intended to improve and expand ex-
port sectors. The government again justified this latest initiative on the re-
gions' geographic proximity to neighboring countries as well as the fact that
the regions were the original home to many Overseas Chinese and Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan compatriots.127 The Ministry of Finance issued a
set of regulations in 1988 to clarify the tax positions of foreign investors in
CEORs. Tax preferences for foreign investment in CEORs closely track
those available in OUDs.
129
" Id. While local authorities may waive or reduce local income tax for investment proj-
ects in OUDs, id. at 3(b), neither tax holidays nor refunds were granted.
'24 Guowuyuan Guanyu Pizhuan Changiiang Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou He Minnan Xia
Zhang Quan Sanjiaozhou Diqu Zuotanhui Jiyao De Tongzhi [Notification of the State Coun-
cil Regarding Approval and Issuance of Extracts of the Minute of the Meeting on Yangtze
Delta, Pearl River Delta and South Fujian Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Delta Areas], Feb.
18, 1985, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 175. The list of CEORs was
later expanded to cover over 150 cities and counties in 8 provinces. See Guowuyuan Gua-
nyu Kuoda Yanhai Jingji Kaifangqu Fanwei De Tongzhi [Notice of the State Council Con-
ceming the Enlargement of the Scope of Coastal Open Economic Regions], 1988 FAGUI
HUmIAN 446. As a result, CEORs reach the East Liaoning and East Shangdong Peninsulas.
125 Chen Tanqiang, Zhongguo Duiwai Kaifang Zhanxian Xin Geju [Newly Developed
Situations for China's Opening Up], LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], 1985 No. 8, reprinted in
CHrNA's OPENING, supra note 11, at 391, 394-95 (preferential treatment on income tax, turn-
over taxes and customs duty).
126 See Renmin Ribao Pinglunyuan [People's Daily Commentator], Yanhai Xing Neidi
Wang [Prosperous Coast and Prosperous Interior], RENMIN RiBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Feb.
1, 1985, reprinted in CHINA'S OPENING, supra note 11, at 389, 389-90; Ji, supra note 11, at
401-03.
127 Ji, supra note 11, at 398.
128 Guanyu Yanhai Jingji Kaifangqu Guli Waishang Touzi Jianzheng Mianzheng Qiye
Suodeshui He Gongshang Tongyi Shui De Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional Regulations Con-
cerning the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated In-
dustrial and Commercial Tax for Encouragement of Foreign Investments in Coastal
Economic Open Regions], 1988 FAGUI HUIBIAN 281 [hereinafter 1988 CEORs Tax Regula-
tions].
129 Preferential measures include a 15% income tax for certain eligible foreign-funded
enterprises in CEORs, and a 20% reduction for foreign-funded enterprises engaged in certain
designated sectors like machinery, manufacturing, and electronics. 1988 CEORs Tax Regu-
lations, supra note 128, at 1.
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Regional tax preference regimes as established during the 1980s dis-
tinguished priority cities and counties like SEZs, ETDAs, OUDs and
CEORs from the rest of the country. Further differences were created
among priority cities and counties themselves. The country's SEZs offered
the most generous tax benefits to foreign investors because they were the
first to be selected for regional development and their top priority status has
remained mostly unchanged over the years. China's leaders attached great
importance to the accomplishments of SEZs1 3 The adoption of other pri-
ority schemes was not supposed to threaten the position enjoyed by SEZs.
Indeed, to allow exactly the same preferential treatment in non-SEZ areas
was thought to lead to unhealthy competition and divert attention from
SEZs 1 31 The expansion of the idea of SEZs would have raised eyebrows in
the conservative wing of the Party leadership. Tax benefits available to for-
eign investment in ETDAs, OUDs and CEORs were therefore capped.
Similarly, among ETDAs, OUDs and CEORs, 32 the strategy was to con-
centrate limited resources for improvement of infrastructures in small geo-
graphic areas.
1 33
3. New Waves of Regional Preferences in the Early 1990s
In the aftermath of the Democracy Movement of the spring of 1989
and the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
Party leaders concluded that their continued grip on power would hinge
more than ever on their ability to deliver the material rewards they had
promised to the Chinese people a decade before. To accelerate economic
development, the central authorities approved the further opening and de-
130 See Deng, Improving Special Economic Zones, supra note 89, at 51 n.* (Deng Xiaop-
ing relying on Shenzhen's development and accomplishments to prove the correctness of
Party policy).
131 Concerns about competition were expressed when the decision on COCs development
was made. Forum on Coastal Cities, supra note 111, at 485-86. Deng Xiaoping himself
made it clear that COCs should not be called SEZs. Id. at 478.
132 Local officials pressed for the development of hi-tech and capital intensive projects, as
they were symbols of modernization, and expressed little interest in renovating state enter-
prises, as some of them were controlled by the central government, whereas the central gov-
ernment policy favored the use of foreign capital and technology to renovate the old
industrial base located in coastal cities. Ji Chongwei, Woguo Duiwai Kaifang Zhengce De
Lilun He Shifian [Theory and Practice of Our Country's Opening Up Policy], in LUN
ZHONGGUO DUIVAI KAIFANG DE ZHANLUE HE ZHENGCE [ON CHINA'S OPENING UP STRATEGY
AND POLICY] 3, 19 (1995).
133 Chen Zhaobin, Shilun Zhongguo Yanhai Duiwai Kaffang Dai De Xingchengjiegou Ji
Fazhan Zhanlue [A Preliminary Discussion on the Formation, Structure and Development
Strategy of China's Coastal Open Belt], in 1983 Y.B. SEZs, supra note 93, at 667, 680-81
(limited geographic areas of ETDAs would produce quick result); Tan Hanhuai, Yan Zhe
Duiwai Kaifang De Dadao Xiangqiang Maiin [Moving Forward Along the Path of Opening
Up], in 1980-1989 Y.B. SEZs & COASTAL ETDAS, supra note 13, at 12, 13 (purpose of ET-
DAs was to create favorable investment conditions in smaller areas and accelerate those cit-
ies' economic development).
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velopment of the Pudong New District in the City of Shanghai. 134 Shanghai
is one of the COCs that benefitted from the 1984 decision to set up ETDAs
and designate OUDs. 135 Shanghai is China's largest and most industrialized
city and is strategically located in one of the country's richest and most de-
veloped areas, the Yangtze River Delta. Its leading role in the country's in-
dustrial and technological sectors coupled with the city's concentrated
number of skilled workers, technicians and managers, 136 offers unparalleled
advantages. 137 The Party leadership chose Shanghai as the leader for the
next wave of overseas investment into the country. 13' By designating a new
priority district in Shanghai, the government was repeating the SEZ strat-
egy, focusing on a rather small area to increase the visibility of foreign in-
vestments and their success. Preferential schemes cornparable to those in
SEZs were adopted for foreign investment in Pudong. 13, The program ap-
134 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Kaifa He Kaifang Pudong Wenti De Pi Fu [Approval and
Reply of the State Council Concerning the Development and Opening of Pudong], June 2,
1990, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 226.
135 See supra note 111.
136 See Huang Qifan, Shenhua Gaige Zhudong Tiaokong Baochi Pudong Kaifa Kaifang
De Lianghao Shitou [Deepening Reform, Undertaking An Active Adjustment and Control to
Keep the Momentum of Pudong's Development and Opening], in 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPEN
AREAS, supra note 89, at 248, 248-49.
137 Deng Xiaoping stated that "Shanghainese are smart and of good quality," "although
the decision on Special Economic Zones was then based on considerations of geographic lo-
cations, . . . Shanghai has the advantage of talented people." Deng Xiaoping, Shicha Shang-
hai Shi De Tanhua [Talks During the Inspection in Shanghai), Jan. 28 - Feb. 18, 1991
[hereinafter Deng, Talks in Shanghai], in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note
89, at 366, 366.
138 Deng Xiaoping again said that once Shanghai was open, "the situation of reform and
opening up in the Yangtze River Delta, in Yangtze River Regions and even in the entire
country would be different." Deng Xiaoping, Zai Wuchang Shenzhen Zhuhai Shanghai Deng
Di De Tanhua Yaodian [Major Points from the Talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and
Shanghai], Jan. 18, - Feb. 21, 1992, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note
89, at 370, 376.
139 Shanghai Pudong Kaifa Shixiang Youhui Zhengce [Ten Preferential Policies for the
Development of Shanghai Pudong], adopted by the State Council on April 18, 1990, in
GUOJIA JIWEI GuoTu DIQU SI GANBU PEIXUN ZHONGXIN [CADRES TRAINING CENTER &
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL TERRITORIES AND REGIONS, STATE PLANNING COMMISSION],
ZHONGGUO DuIWAI KAIFANG ZHENGCE FAGUI HUIBiAN [COLLECTION OF CHINA'S OPENING
UP POLICIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS] 19 (1992) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF OPENING UP
POLICIES]; Guanyu Shanghai Pudong Xinqu Guli Waishang Touzi Jianzheng Mianzheng
Qiye Suodeshui He Gongshang Tongyi Shui De Guiding [Regulations Concerning the Re-
duction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commer-
cial Tax for Encouragement of Foreign Investment in Shanghai Pudong New District], 1990
FAGui HuIBiAN 291 [hereinafter 1990 Shanghai Pudong Tax Regulations]; Shanghaishi Guli
Waishang Touzi Pudong Xinqu De Ruogan Guiding [Regulations of the Shanghai Munici-
pality for Encouragement of Foreign Investment in the Pudong New District], in LAWS OF
ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 1273 [hereinafter Shanghai Pudong Regulations].
Pudong literally means the eastern side of the Huangpu River, which traverses Shanghai.
Puxi, the western side of the Huangpu River, has been a modem metropolis with the major-
ity of the city's administration, industry, and commerce. In contrast, prior to the 1990s, Pu-
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plies a fifteen percent enterprise income tax rate to FIEs engaged in pro-
ductive sectors,'4 0 large infrastructure development projects, construction of
airport, port, railway, road, power station, or other energy and communica-
tion projects,14 ' as well as certain foreign banks, branches, and Chinese-
foreign joint banking corporations or finance companies established in Pu-
dong.14 2 All FIEs in Pudong are exempt from local enterprise income sur-
charge until the year 2000.14
In early 1992, the State Council decided to open cities bordering Rus-
sia and Mongolia, 144 and create Bianjing Jingi Hezuo Qu, or "Border Eco-
nomic Cooperation Zones" (BECZs). 1  The decision came shortly after
political changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European block.
Not surprisingly, the government stated that the improvement of the living
standards of local residents was a major goal of the creation of BECZs. 146
Concerns for stability in border areas called for fast economic growth; both
domestic and foreign investments were encouraged through preferential
measures.1 47 The plan offered a preferential income tax rate of twenty-four
percent to FIEs incorporated in BECZs. 141 More border cities and towns
dong was largely farming land. For a discussion of Pudong development policy, see Bin
Xue Sang, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China? - An Analysis of the Special
Regulations and Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130
(1993).
'40 1990 Shanghai Pudong Tax Regulations, supra note 139, art. 2 (productive foreign in-
vestment enterprises in Pudong were also offered a two years' exemption followed by a
three-year 50% reduction after profit making if they were scheduled to operate for ten years
or more).
141 Id. art. 4 (if scheduled for a term of at least 15 years, these projects can enjoy a five-
year exemption after profit making followed by a five-year 50% reduction in income tax)
142 Id. art. 6. Foreign-funded banks and branches with a foreign-invested capital or oper-
ating funds from foreign headquarters exceeding US$ 10 million and a term of 10 years or
more can enjoy the 15% rate for the tax on their income derived from loan businesses as well
as a one-year exemption after profit making followed by a two-year 50% reduction in in-
come tax. Id. Like their counterparts in SEZs, FIEs in Pudong are entitled to a refund of
40% of the tax paid on the portion of their reinvested profit. Id. art. 8. FIEs in Pudong are
also exempted from inome tax on their repatriated profits. Id. art. 9.
143 Shanghai Pudong Regulations, supra note 139, art. 12.
144 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Heihe Deng Sige Bianjing Chengshi De
Tongzhi [Notification of the State Council Concerning Further Opening Four Border Cities
Including Heihe], Mar. 9, 1992, 1992 FAGUI HuIm AN 505 [hereinafter Notification Con-
ceming Heihe]. Those four border cities were Heihe and Suifenghe of Heilongjiang Prov-
ince, Hunchun of Jilin Province, and Manzhouli of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
145 Id. at 506.
146 Huo Qingxian, Bianjing Jingfi Hezuo Qu Zai Woguo Quanfangwei Kaifang Geju
Zhong De Diwei He Zuoyong [The Position and Role of Border Economic Cooperation
Zones in The All-Direction Opening of Our Country], in 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPEN AREAS,
supra note 89, at 238, 239.
147 Attracting domestic investment was the primary goal of BECZs. See Notification
Concerning Heihe, supra note 144, at 506.
148 Id. Provincial and local governments promised, however, more preferential tax treat-
ment such as lower enterprise income tax rates and tax holidays. See, e.g., Manzhouli Shi
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were later designated as open border cities and permitted to set up their own
BECZs.149 Recognizing that urban popular discontent was responsible for
the unrest in the spring of 1989, the central authorities placed an increased
emphasis on economic development in cities in order to maintain political
and social stability. These efforts to stimulate economic growth in urban
areas spread to non-coastal cities. Large cities alongside the Yangtze River
and in interior provinces were accorded a status similar to that of COCs,
°5 0
with permission to set up their own ETDAs.15 1 The sphere of CEORs was
Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Duiwai Kaifang Ruogan Zhengce Guiding [Regulations of Manz-
houli Municipal People's Government Regarding Policies of Opening Up], in ZHONGGUO
YANBIAN KAIFANG CHENGSHI Touzi MAOYI ZHINAN [GUIDE FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN
CHINA'S BORDER OPEN CITIES] 180, 180-81 (Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Chubanshe [Pub-
lishing House of the Central Ethnic Institute], 1993) [hereinafter GUIDE FOR BORDER OPEN
CITIES] (14% enterprise income rate, tax holidays for service-oriented FIEs).
149 The additional border cities and towns were Pingxiang and Dongxing of Guangxi
Zhuang Ethnic Autonomous Region, Wangding, Ruili, and Hekou of Yunnan Province,
Dandong of Liaoning Province, and Erlianhaote of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
See Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Nanning, Kunming Shi Ji Pingxiang Deng
Wuge Bianjing Chengzhen De Tongzhi [Notification of the State Council Concerning Fur-
ther Opening the Cities of Nanning and Kunming and Five Border Cities and Towns In-
cluding Pingxiang], 1992 FAGUI HuImAN 508; Guowyuan Guanyu Dandong Shi Jianli
Bianjing Jingji Hezuo Qu De Pifu [Approval and Reply of the State Council Concerning the
Establishment of A Border Economic Cooperation Zone in the City of Dandong], id. at 511;
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Erlianhaote Shi De Tongzhi [Notification of
the State Council Concerning Further Opening the City of Erlianhaote], id. at 513. Provin-
cial and local governments promised more preferential treatment to foreign investment than
the central authorities expressly allowed. See, e.g., Wanding Shi Guanyu Shuishou Youhui
De Youguan Guiding [Regulations of Wanding Municipality Concerning Tax Preferences],
art. 17, in GUIDE FOR BORDER OPEN CITIES, supra note 148, at 289, 292 (15% enterprise in-
come rate, a total of six years tax exemption and reduction for productive FIEs and exemp-
tion for FIEs in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry).
"0 In 1992, the following cities were selected to benefit from special policies:
Chongqing, Yueyang, Wuhan, Jiujiang, Wuhu, Harbin, Changchun, Huhehaote, Shijiaz-
huang, Taiyuan, Hefei, Nanchang, Zhengzhou, Changsha, Chengdu, Guiyang, Xi'an, Lanz-
hou, Xining and Yinchuan. "Coastal Open City Policies" would apply to those cities.
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Chongqing Deng Shi De Tongzhi [Notification
of the State Council Regarding Further Opening Up of Chongqing and Other Cities], 1992
FAGUI HUIBIAN 512. Other cities were later added to the list. See Guowuyuan Guanyu
Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Huangshi Shi De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning Fur-
ther Opening Up of Huangshi City], 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPEN AREAS, supra note 89, at 40
(applying Coastal Open City policies applied to Huangshi).
151 In 1993, the State Council approved the establishment of ETDAs in Wuhan, Wuhu,
Chongqing, Hangzhou, Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, and Xiaoshan. Guowuyuan Guanyu
Sheli Wuhan Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the Es-
tablishment of Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Area], 1994 Y.B. SEZs &
OPEN AREAS, supra note 89, at 43; Guowuyuan Guanyu Sheli Wuhu Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu De
Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of Wuhu Economic and
Technological Development Area], id. at 44; Guowuyuan Guanyu Sheli Chongqing Jingji
Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of
Chongqing Economic and Technological Development Area], id. at 45; Guowuyuan Guanyu
Sheli Hangzhou Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the
Establishment of Hangzhou Economic and Technological Development Area], id. at 46;
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similarly expanded.5 2 Finally, various newly designated priority zones and
areas mushroomed in coastal regions and urban areas. This grant of special
status and subsequent preferential measures were designed to attract foreign
investment. They included Baoshuiqu, or "Bonded Zones" or "Free Trade
Zones,' 5 3 Gao Xin Jishu Chanye Kaifaqu, or "High and New Technology
Industrial Development Areas,"' 5 4 Tai Shang Touziqu, or "Taiwan Invest-
Guovuyuan Guanyu Sheli Shenyang Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply of the State Coun-
cil Concerning the Establishment of Shenyang Economic and Technological Development
Area], id. at 47; Guowuyuan Guanyu Sheli Changchun Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply
of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of Changchun Economic and Techno-
logical Development Area], id. at 48; Guowuyuan Guanyu Sheli Harbin Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu
De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of Harbin Economic and
Technological Development Area], id. at 49; Guowuyuan Guanyu Sheli Xiaoshan Jingji
Jishu Kaifaqu De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of Xia-
oshan Economic and Technological Development Area], id. at 50 (in the case of Xiaoshan
ETDA, only 15% enterprise income tax rate explicitly made available).
152 Later included within CEORs were the city of Jinan, in Shangdong Province, the cities
and counties of Sanming, Nanping, Longyan, Fu'an in Fujian Province, and the city of Don-
gying, Shandong Province. Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiang Jinan Shi Huaru Yanhai Jingji Kai-
fangqu De Fuhan [Reply of the State Council Concerning Incorporating the City of Jinan
into Coastal Economic Open Regions], 1990 FAGuI HUtIAN 386; Guowuyuan Guanyu Fu-
jian Sheng Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Wenti De Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning
Questions of Further Opening Up of Fujian Province], in 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPEN AREAS,
supra note 89, at 39; Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Huanghe Sanjiaozhou Kaifa Wenti De
Pifu [Reply of the State Council Concerning Questions of Accelerating the Development of
Yellow River Delta], id. at 42.
153 The first Bonded Zone or Free Trade Zone was established in Waigaoqiao, Shanghai
Pudong District in 1990. See Lin Qihui, Jianli Baoshuiqu Shi Kuoda Duiwai Kaifang De
Zhongda Buzou [The Establishment of Bonded Areas As A Major Step in Expanding Open-
ing Up], in 1990-1992 Y.B. SEZ & COASTAL ETDAs, supra note 13, at 56, 56. Productive
FIEs in bonded zones enjoy a 15% income tax rate. Id. at 57. More than a dozen such zones
have been approved so far; they are located in Dalian, Tianjin, Qingdao, Zhangjiagang, Wai-
gaoqiao in Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shatoujiao in Shenzhen, Guangzhou,
Haikou, Yangpu in Hainan. See Ripe for Investment, Bus. CHINA, May 27, 1996, at 8, 8.
Two new ones were set up in 1996, Lantian in Shenzhen, Minr BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Oct.
10, 1996, at Al1, and Zhuhai, MrNG BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Nov. 14, 1996, at A13.
14 In May 1988, the State Council approved the creation of a New Technology Industrial
Development Experimental Zone in Beijing [hereinafter Beijing NTIDEZ]. Beijing Shi Xin
Jishu Chanye Kaifa Shiyan Qu Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on the New Tech-
nology Industrial Development Experimental Zone in Beijing City], 1988 FAGUI HUIBIAN
1007 [hereinafter Regulations on Beijing NTIDEZ]. In Beijing NTIDEZ, tax benefits were
offered to both domestic and foreign investments; qualified enterprises would only pay a
15% rate for enterprise income tax, and the rate could be lowered to 10% if the value of their
exports reached 40% of the total production value in the same year. Regulations on Beijing
NTIDEZ, art. 5. Qualified enterprises would enjoy a three-year income tax exemption from
the date of their operation, and upon approval, their income tax would be reduced by 50%
from the fourth year through the sixth year. Id. In March 1991, as similar high-tech devel-
opment zones surged across the country, the central government picked over twenty of them
as State-level "High and New Technology Industrial Development Areas" [hereinafter
HNTIDAS] for special treatment. Guowuyuan Guanyu Pizhun Guojia Gao Xin Jishu Chanye
Kaifaqu He Youguan Zhengce Guiding De Tongzhi [Notification of the State Council Con-
cerning the Approval of State High and New Technology Industrial Development Areas and
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To accommodate the developments of the last several years, the gov-
ernment has seen fit to rebalance regional interests by shifting more re-
sources to favor the development of the Chinese interior regions.
According to the 1994 statistics, eighty-five percent of the total foreign in-
vestment in China for the previous fifteen years was concentrated in just
twelve coastal provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions that cov-
ered only 13.4% of the area of the country. 157 Meanwhile, the economic
growth in the interior provinces was slower than that of coastal regions.
151
Related Policy Regulations], 1991 FAGUI HuiBIAN 767. A 15% income tax rate applied to
qualified enterprises. Guowuyuan Guanyu Pizhun Guojia Gao Xin Jishu Chanye Kaifaqu
Shuishou Zhengce De Guiding [Regulations on Tax Policy of State High and New Technol-
ogy Industrial Development Areas], 1991 FAGUI HUBIAN 777. A two-year income tax ex-
emption also applies. Id. art. 6. FIEs in State-approved HNTIDAs set up within SEZs or
ETDAs can still enjoy tax benefits as provided for in those special investment areas. Id.
1
55 Two Taiwan Investment Zones were set up in Fujian Province, one in Xiamen and an-
other in Fuzhou. Guowuyuan Guanyu Zai Fujiansheng Yanhai Diqu Sheli Taishang Touziqu
De Pi Fu Jielu [Approval and Reply of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of
Taiwan Investment Zones in Coastal Areas of Fujian Province (Extract)], in LAws OF
ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 222 (ETDA policy applied to the zone in Fuzhou
and SEZ policy applied to the one in Xiamen).
156 Guowuyuari Guanyu Shiban Guojia Luyou Dujia Qu Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi
[Notification of the State Council on Issues Concerning Trial Establishment of State Tourist
and Resort Areas], in COLLECTION OF OPENING UP POLICIES, supra note 139, at 62. The en-
terprise income tax for FIEs in State Tourist and Resort Areas is reduced to 24%. Id. Eleven
State Tourist and Resort Areas were approved and they are located in Yalong Bay in Hainan,
Dianchi in Kunming, Yintan in Beihai, Nanhu in Guangzhou, Wuyi Mountain in Fujian,
Meizhou Island, Zhijiang in Hangzhou, Hengsha Island in Shanghai, Taihu in Jiangsu, Shi-
laoren in Qingdao and Jinshitan in Dalian. See TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at
225-26. Other special zones and areas are Yangpu Kaifaqu or Yangpu Development Zone in
Hainan Province and Suzhou Gongye Yuanqu or Suzhou Industrial Park Zone in Jiangsu
Province. Id. at 226.
157 Liu Xiaohua, Guanyu Jiakuai Xibu Diqu Liyong Waizi De Jidian Kanfa [Views on
Speeding Up The Utilization of Foreign Capital By Western Areas], in 1994 Y.B. SEZs &
OPEN AREAS, supra note 89, at 220, 220. In contrast, interior provinces including Inner
Mongolia, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang were
only able to obtain just over U.S. $2 billion in foreign capital in 1992, a mere four percent of
the total overseas investment in China for that year. See Serge Verma, Looking Inland,
CHINA Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 19, 19.
158 In recent years, according to a critic, the annual economic growth was 20% for eastern
provinces, but 8% for interior provinces. Sichuansheng Difang Shuiwuju Ketizu [Research
Group, Sichuan Province Local Tax Bureau], Newaizi Qiye Suodeshui Tongyi De Buzhou Ji
Guishu [Steps and Classifications of Unifying Enterprise Income Tax for Domestic and For-
eign Investments], S-EWAI SHUISHOU [INT'L TAXAnON IN CHINA], 1996 No. 3, 19, at 19. But
see David L. Denny, Provincial Economic Differences Diminished in the Decade of Reform,
in CHINA'S ECONOMIC DILEMMAS, supra note 48, at 186 (espousing the belief that provincial
economic disparities widened was exaggerated).
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Party leaders intended these disparities, to some extent, when they first in-
troduced a regional development strategy that primarily benefited coastal
provinces. Some now argue that the uneven economic development justifies
the discontinuation of the lopsided preferential policies. In any event, rap-
idly growing economic gaps between rich coastal regions and poor interior
provinces have given rise to unhealthy regional jealousy and competition 59
as well as serious threats to the country's political stability and social or-
der.
160
To be sure, tax preferences during the 1980s were not totally lopsided
in favor of rich coastal regions. The 1980 JVITL, the 1981 FEITL and the
1991 UTL all contained enterprise income tax exemptions and reductions to
encourage investments in economically underdeveloped, remote areas.
Such preferences could appease poor areas including those in the interior
provinces. With mounting regional frictions, the central authorities have
moved away from favoring coastal regions and have instead focused on
stimulating economic development in the central and western provinces.
16 1
To accelerate interior development, the central authorities also increased
state budget allocations and government direct investment, 162 and urged
coastal provinces and cities to provide financial aid and technical assis-
tance.163  Interior provincial and local governments were given greater
159 For instance, soon after the establishment of SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian prov-
inces, northern provinces sought similar development priority status by proposing the estab-
lishment of free port, free trade zones, new economic zones or northern special zones.
Yantai Caizhengju [Finance Bureau, Yantai City], Yantai Jingfi Jishu Kaifaqu De Xianz-
huang Wenti Ji Duice [The Current Situation, Problems and Solutions in Yantai Economic
and Technological Development Area], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Oct. 13, 1990, 45, at 47 [hereinafter Yantai Finance Bureau].
160 Most of the country's ethnic minorities live in western provinces, and poverty is be-
lieved to be a cause of ethnic unrest. Zhou Yi, Qingxie Xibu Guangkai Caiyuan [Tilting In
Favor of the West and Widening Sources for Wealth], XIN BAO [HONG KONG ECONOMIC
JOURNAL], Aug. 16, 1996, at 9. Prior to 1949, inland provinces were major revolutionary
war bases for the Chinese Communist Party, and it is politically and emotionally unaccept-
able to leave them behind. Inland provinces have already supplied a large army of migrants
who are lured by coastal regions' newly found prosperity. These migrants, most of whom
are young, unemployed peasants and workers, are perceived as a major force of threat to so-
cial stability and have been blamed for dramatic increases in crime nationwide.
161 Li Lanqing Fuzongli Zat Jingi Jishu Kaifaqu Waishang Touzi Yantaohui Shang De
Jianghua [Speech of Vice Premier Li Lanqing at the Seminar on Foreign Investment in Eco-
nomic and Technological Development Areas], Oct. 21, 1994 in Dalian [hereinafter Li Lan-
qing Speech], in 1995 Y.B. SEZs & DAs, supra note 13, at 18, 21-22; see also Verma, supra
note 157, at 19. A recent World Bank study has concluded that China must revamp its for-
eign direct investment policy to channel more foreign funds to the interior. Simon Beck,
World Bank Says China's Poor Interior Being Ignored, S. CINA MORNING PosT, Mar. 12,
1997, Business, at 1.
162 The state has decided, for instance, to invest heavily to improve roads, railways and
communications in interior provinces. WENHUI BAO (WEN WEI PO) (HK), July 26, 1996, at
A7.
163 The State Council reportedly required each of thirteen coastal provinces and munici-
palities to provide funds and assistance to ten inland provinces for local development.
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autonomy for investment purposes. 164 Suggested measures to attract for-
eign investments in interior provinces include: giving foreign investment
enterprises greater access to domestic markets; creating more flexible and
preferential policies favoring projects which develop local resources and
build infrastructure; giving foreign investors permission to establish holding
companies for investment in the interior provinces; and creating measures
encouraging foreign investment enterprises in coastal areas to go west and
set up new joint ventures locally.165 As the development strategy changes,
so should regional tax preferences.
Two questions have arisen from this growing emphasis on the Chinese
interior. First, should interior provinces be able to offer special tax treat-
ment to attract funds? While provincial and local officials tend to take their
cue from coastal development experiences, the central authorities appear to
be ambiguous on this question. 16  Nevertheless, the central authorities ap-
proved new preferential treatment favoring foreign investors in interior re-
gions.167 Second, and more controversially, what should be done about
Zhongguo Yingxing Guiding Dongbu Fuzhu Xibu [China's Mandatory Requirement that the
Eastern Part Assist the Western Part], MING BAO (MING PAO) (H-K), Oct. 14, 1996, at A8.
164 ZhongXi Bu San Jucuo Jiasu Fazhan [Three Measures to Accelerate Development in
Central and Western Provinces], WEN HUI BAO (WEN WEI PO) (HK), July 26, 1996, at A5
[hereinafter Three Measures].
165 Li Lanqing Speech, supra note 161, at 21-22; see also Three Measures, supra note
164 (introducing BOT for local infrastructure building, and more reflexibility for foreign ex-
change control). BOT is short for the foreign investment form of building-operation-transfer
in infrastructure projects. Under Chinese regulations, the government awards, "by way of a
concession agreement and within the prescribed period, the project to the project company
established for the concession project by the foreign company;" "[t]he project company shall
be responsible for the investment, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the
project;" "[u]pon expiration of the concession period, the project company shall transfer the
facilities of the concession project to the government department without compensation."
Several Issues Concerning the Examination, Approval and Administration of Experimental
Foreign-Invested Concession Project Circular, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1996, at 22, 22-
23. For a discussion China's adoption of BOT, see Chris Hunter & Colleen Lau, Facing up
the Risk of BOT Investment, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1996, at 14; Sarah Chan, The
Laibin B Project: Balancing Risk and Reward, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, May 1996, at 19.
" Compare Ministry of Finance on Unifying Tax, supra note 16 (citing an official of the
Ministry of Finance as saying no income tax preferences would be granted to enterprises in
central and western regions) with Zhongguo Quanmian Jiantao Liyong Waizi Zhengce
[China is Conducting an Overhaul of its Foreign Investment Policy], XINBAO (HONG KONG
ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Oct. 8, 1997, at 8 (an assistant minister of foreign economic relations
and trade revealing that the state was considering preferential treatment to lure foreign capi-
tal to interior provinces).
167 Foreign investments in interior provinces can enjoy the same tax benefits as in OUDs
and COCs, namely a 24% rate for enterprise income tax, Sun, Basic Situation, supra note 16,
at 6. New enterprises in certain areas in the city of Chongqing continue to benefit from the
duty free and tax exempt status for import of materials. Chongqing Yinzi Yong Quanguo Zui
Youhui Zhengce [Chongqing Has the Most Preferential Policy for Attracting Investment],
XIANGGANG SHANG BAO [HONG KONG COMMERCIAL DAILY], Feb. 1, 1997, at Al. Foreign
investors in the Tibet Autonomous Region pay no enterprise income tax. There has been
scholarly support for tax preferences for foreign investment in interior provinces. Wang
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existing regional preferential schemes in coastal areas? As the country's
regional development focus has changed, old arrangements should be scaled
down. 68 Attempts to reduce coastal privileges 169 have encountered strong
resistance from coastal areas. 70
D. Hi-Tech and Industry Specific Enterprise Income Tax Preferences
The 1979 EN Law promised tax holidays only to enterprises using ad-
vanced technology, but this narrow approach was quickly abandoned. The
subsequently enacted JVITL provided tax reductions and exemptions with-
out conditioning them upon the use of advanced technology. The 1984 Tax
Reduction and Exemption Regulations distinguished between productive
sectors and service-oriented sectors, providing more tax benefits for the
former in SEZs and ETDAs. 171 An industry/sector specific preferential re-
gime was simultaneously introduced for foreign investment in OUDs and,
subsequently, CEORs. 172
In the following years, the government targeted investment projects in
preferred sectors/industries for tax preferences.1  The 22 Articles issued on
Zheng et al., Tongyi Neiwaizi Qiye Suodeshui De Nandian Yu Duice [Difficulty and Solu-
tions for Unifying Income Tax of Domestic and Foreign Investment Enterprises], CAIZHENG
YANJIu [FINANCE RESEARCH], 1996 No. 6, 24, at 28.
168 See, e.g., Crothall, supra note 15 (Director of the State Council's SEZ Office indicat-
ing that SEZs would enjoy no more favorable treatment than is accorded to other regions by
the end of the century).
16 9 The revocation of import tax exemption, for instance, hit foreign investment in SEZs
hardest. See Christine Chan, Zhuhai's Attraction Fade for Foreigners, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Jan. 11, 1996, China Business Review, at 2.
170 See supra notes 463-72.
171 See supra notes 101, 119-20and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 122, 129 and accompanying text.
173 As the lack of adequate infrastructure seriously hindered economic development and
foreign trade and investment flows, the government turned to foreign capital to help ease the
country's bottlenecks. In September 1985, the State Council issued the Provisional Regula-
tions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Concerning Preferential Treat-
ment for Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures for Port and Berth Construction (Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Guanyu Zhongwai Hezi Jianshe Gangkou Matou Youhui
Daiyu De Zhanxing Guiding), promulgated on Sept. 30, 1985. 1985 FAGUI HUILAN 330
[hereinafter 1985 Regulations on Port and Berth Construction]. Accordingly, EJVs in port
and berth construction projects would pay income tax at a reduced 15% rate. 1985 Regula-
tions on Port and Berth Construction, art. 6. If these projects are newly established and
scheduled to operate for 15 years or more, they may obtain, upon application and approval,
an exemption from income tax for the first five years after they make a profit and a 50% re-
duction in income tax for another five years. Id. After the expiration of the above exemp-
tion and reduction, should such EJVs still encounter difficulty in paying tax, further
exemption or reduction may be granted upon approval of the Ministry of Finance. Id. For-
eign joint venturers are also exempt from tax on the remittance of their shares of profits out
of China. Id. art. 7. Provincial governments may waive and/or cut down local income tax, if
appropriate. Id. art. 6. The 1985 Regulations on Port and Berth Construction also tracked
preferential provisions in the 1980 JVITL including the refund of 40% of the tax paid on the
portion of the profit reinvested in the construction of new berths or wharfs. Id. art. 9.
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October 11, 1986 singled out two categories of FIEs for special treat-
ment.174 The first, Chanping Chukou Qiye, or "Product-Exporting Enter-
prises" (PEEs), were defined as enterprises that produce goods mainly for
export and maintain a net positive foreign exchange balance at the end of
the year.' 75 On top of any tax exemption and reduction to which a PEE is
entitled, the 22 Articles further cut the applicable income tax rate by fifty
percent if the value of the PEE's annual exports exceeds seventy percent of
the value of its total production in that year. 176 In SEZs, ETDAs, or other
areas where the enterprise income tax for FIEs is already reduced to fifteen
percent, PEEs whose annual export value meets the above seventy percent
ratio would pay a mere ten percent rate for the enterprise income tax.177
The second category of FIEs eligible for special treatment under the 22 Ar-
ticles is Xianjin Jishu Qiye, or "Technologically Advanced Enterprises"
(TAEs). 78 This category includes those productive enterprises which, with
advanced technology provided by foreign investors, are able to develop new
products, or upgrade existing products, and therefore earn foreign exchange
through exports or import substitution. 179 The 22 Articles grant TAEs a
fifty percent reduction in income tax for another three years following the
expiration of otherwise applicable tax exemptions and reductions. 180 If for-
eign investors reinvest their shares of profit to set up or expand PEEs or
TAEs in China for a term of not less than five years, then, subject to exami-
nation by tax authorities, the investor may receive a complete refund of the
enterprise income tax paid on the portion of the reinvested profit.'8 '
Shenzhen SEZ made ten-year-long tax holidays available to FIEs in harbor and dock devel-
opment with I I or more years' management period. Shenzhen 's New Preferential Policies
for Attracting Domestic and Foreign Funds, CHNA TRADE & INVESTMENT, Dec. 1994, at 27,
27.
174 For an introduction to the 22 Articles, see Jerome Alan Cohen & Ta-Kuang Chang,
New Foreign Investment Provisions, CHmNA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 11.
175 22 Articles, supra note 4, art. 2.
176 Id. art. 8.
177 Id.
178 Id. art. 2.
179 Id.
'18 Id. art. 9.
18 22 Articles, supra note 4, art. 10. After the promulgation of the 22 Articles by the
State Council, local governments issued their own regulations containing similar or identical
preferential treatment. See, e.g., Neimenggu Zizhiqu Guli Waishang Touzi Tiaoli [Regula-
tions of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region for Encouragement of Foreign Investment],
arts. 6-7, adopted by the Twenty-First Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh
People's Congress of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on June 29, 1991, in LAWS OF
ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 1313, 1313 (two years of enterprise income tax ex-
emption and three years of 50% reduction for productive FIEs; continued 50% income tax
reduction for qualified PEEs and 50% income tax reduction for another three years for
TAEs); Baotoushi Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi De Youhui Banfa [Methods of Baotou City
Concerning Preferences for Encouragement of Foreign Investment], arts. 4-5, promulgated
by Baotou City People's Government on June 4, 1992, id. at 1322, 1322 (same); Shandong-
sheng Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi De Youhui Cuoshi [Measures of the
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In recent years, however, a much greater stress has been placed on the
need for foreign investment in hi-tech and other priority industries and sec-
tors. 182 In contrast to the policy of the 1980s, low value-added processing
People's Government of Shandong Province Concerning Preferences for Encouragement of
Foreign Investment], arts. 4-5, Oct. 15, 1986, id. at 1555, 1555 (50% income tax reduction
for PEEs and 50% income tax reduction for another three years for TAEs); Hunansheng Guli
Waishang Touzi Tiaoli [Regulations of Hunan Province for Encouragement of Foreign In-
vestment], art. 14, adopted by the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the
Seventh People's Congress of Hunan Province on November 17, 1991, id. at 1617, 1618
(same); Sichuansheng Guli Waishang Touzi Tiaoli [Regulations of Sichuan Province for En-
couragement of Foreign Investment], art. 22, adopted by the Thirty-Second Session of the
Standing Committee of the Seventh People's Congress of Sichuan Province on December 1,
1992, id. at 1758, 1761 (two years' enterprise income tax exemption and three years' 50%
reduction for productive FIEs; continued 50% income tax reduction for qualified PEEs and
50% income tax reduction for another three years for TAEs); Chengdushi Guli Waishang
Touzi Tiaoli [Regulations of Chengdu City for Encouragement of Foreign Investment], art.
19, adopted by the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh Peo-
ple's Congress of Chengdu City on August 28, 1992, and the Thirty-First Session of the
Standing Committee of the Seventh People's Congress of Sichuan Province on September
26, 1992, id. at 1775, 1777 (same). The 1991 Unified Tax Law and its implementing rules
endorsed industry and sector-specific tax preferences in the 1985 Regulations on Port and
Berth Construction and the 22 Articles. UTL, supra note 67, art. 8, UTL Implementing
Rules, supra note 74, art. 75(a),(g),(h).
182 In 1995, for the first time since the opening up policy, the Chinese government made
public a set of guidelines for direct foreign investment: all investments are divided into four
categories, namely, encouraged, allowed, limited, and banned; encouraged investments in-
clude projects using new and high technology, advanced technology, as well as projects in
energy, communication and main raw materials industries. Zhidao Waishang Touzi Fangxi-
ang Zhanxing Guiding [Interim Provisions on the Guide of Foreign Investment], arts. 4-5,
approved by the State Council on June 7, 1995 and promulgated on June 20, 1995, 1995
FAGUI HUmIAN 615, 616. Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji is reported to have endorsed a
more discriminating approach to selecting foreign investment: he argued in favor of more
projects which could bring in technology and management skill; he warned of looming dan-
gers from foreign control of Chinese industries and markets. See Daniel Kwan, Zhu Calls
for Restraint in Joint Ventures, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 7. Chinese offi-
cials also called for restrictions on foreign investment when "domestic production capacity is
already abundant." Call to Curb Foreign Investment in Textiles, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 17, 1997, Business, at 4. The government tries to exercise a greater state control on
large foreign investment projects to avoid foreign monopoly of domestic industries, SeeJing
Mao Wei Tiyi Shoujin Waishang Touzi Zhongda Xiangmu [The Economic and Trade Com-
mission Suggests Restrictions on Large Foreign Investment Projects], MING BAO (MING
PAO) (HK), Jan. 29, 1997, at Al1l, and use of more portfolio investment and less foreign di-
rect investment. See Zhongguo Zhubu Jianshao Yilai Waizi Zhifie Touzi [China Gradually
Reduces Reliance on Foreign Direct Investment], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC
JOURNAL), Oct. 22, 1996, at 10 (citing a Chinese government researcher). The Chinese ap-
pear to be alarmed by the fast growth of foreign investment enterprises and their ability to
grasp domestic market shares; it was recently reported that while foreign investment enter-
prises represented only less than 10% of the total number of industrial enterprises in the
country, their output reached 20% of the domestic industrial production. Liyong Waizi
Dalunzhan Xiaoyan Zaiqi [Revival of the Debate on Use of Foreign Investment], MING BAo
(MING PAO) (HK), Feb. 19, 1997, at A 1l. Concerns were also expressed that foreign ventur-
ers were trying to increase their shares in joint ventures, which constituted a threat to the
Chinese side. Geoffrey Crothall, China Fears Lost Control, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 8,
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investments have been officially discouraged, especially in coastal areas.
183
As a result, broad, technology-neutral and industry-neutral tax concessions
would be replaced by narrower and more selective preferences. It is possi-
ble that only hi-tech and investment projects in some identified industries
and sectors would receive meaningful benefits.
1 14
E. Enterprise Income Tax Preferences to Overseas Chinese Investors
Capital from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese busi-
ness communities was the primary target of policy initiatives such as the
one establishing SEZs.185 Unsure of how Western capitalists would react to
1996, Business, at 1. Calls for restriction on foreign investment were made in industries
such as textile, Call to Curb Foreign Investment in Textiles, supra, consumer electronics, Li
Minyi, Zhongguo Jiadianye Zao Waizi Weyiao [China's Consumer Electronic Industry Has
Been Encircled and Suppressed by Foreign Investment], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC
JOURNAL), Dec. 11, 1996, at 13, and pharmaceuticals, Yiyao Hangye Liyong Waizi Zhengce
Jiang Banbu [The Policy of Utilizing Foreign Investment in Pharmaceutical Industry Will Be
Issued], XIANGGANG JINGJI RiBAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC TIMES), Jan. 8, 1997, at A25. A
commentator noted that, "China has more foreign investment than it can comfortably absorb,
... [h]igh rates of investment and a greater number of large projects are enabling the gov-
ernment to be more selective in the types of business they encourage now than in the past."
Embattled Enterprises, Bus. CHINA, Mar. 6, 1995, at 5, 6.
183 The benefits of processing and assembling projects are now believed to have been
outweighed by numerous problems. For example, such projects are low valued-added and
because equipment, machinery and raw materials used for production were imported duty
free and tax exempt prior to the 1996 revocation of tax exemptions, they benefitted the Chi-
nese side too little, mainly in the form of processing fee payments received from commis-
sioning parties. See Zhu Rongfi Yaoqiu Jianguan Jiagong Maoyi [Zhu Rongfi Demands
Supervision on Processing Trade], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Aug. 20,
1996, at 12 (quoting Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji) [hereinafter Zhu Rongfi on Processing
Trade]. Moreover, China's dependency on massive volumes of low-priced merchandise ex-
ports has given rise to constant frictions with trading partners, there is a need for upgrading
export sectors and moving towards high value-added products. See Hu Ping, Jiushi Niandai
Zhongguo Duiwai Kaifang De Shi Da Qushi [Ten Trends in China's Opening Up During the
1990s], in 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPENED REGIONS, supra note 89, at 209, 209; Zhou Wendao,
Baohu Minzu Gongye Yingyou Zhengti Duice [A Need for An Overall Policy For Protecting
National Industry], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Sept. 16, 1996, at 9. Chi-
nese President Jiang Zemin suggested in 1994 that labor-intensive and low-technology in-
vestment projects would be discouraged in coastal areas, although they could still play a role
in interior provinces' development. Zeng ChuangXin Youshi Gengshang Yicenglou [Adding
and Creating New Advantages and Moving to a Higher Level], in 1995 Y.B. SEZs & DAs,
supra note 13, at 3, 4.
184 Tax preferences for high-tech enterprises would be maintained after the merger of two
sets of enterprise income tax. Ministry of Finance on Unifying Tax, supra note 16. Prefer-
ential treatment was also promised to preferred industries or sectors. See Ruo Cheng,
Huagongye Liyong Waizi Tu Xian Yiwoweizhu [Utilization of Foreign Investment in the
Chemical Industry Emphasizes Serving China], XiN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL),
Oct. 1, 1996, at 31 (tax preferences accorded to foreign investment in the chemical industry
using new technology, producing new products or developing new sectors).
185 Deng Xiaoping explained the choice of SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xia-
men in the following terms: "Shenzhen is next to Hong Kong; Zhuhai is close to Macau;
Shantou was chosen because many overseas Chinese in South East Asian countries were
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the country's opening up,186 Chinese officials naturally turned to those po-
tential investors with whom they were most familiar. The presumption was
that Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese businesses would
come to invest in China out of love for their ancestral land and that these
businesses would want to help the country's efforts at modernization. 87 In
any event, they were not as threatening to Chinese interests as foreign busi-
nesses without any ethnic Chinese background. There was a consensus in
the policy-making and academic circles that investors from Hong Kong,
Macau, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese communities deserved special con-
siderations and rewards because of their patriotism and great contribution to
the modernization of the Motherland.'88
Under the 1985 Regulations on Preferences to Overseas Chinese In-
vestment, investors identified as Huaqiao, or "Overseas Chinese," could
enjoy special tax benefits not available to other investors. For example,
Overseas Chinese investors enjoyed a three-year enterprise income tax ex-
emption from the first profit-making year which was followed by an addi-
tional four-year, fifty percent tax reduction,'89 and, ultimately, a permanent
twenty percent rate reduction after the expiration of the initial tax holi-
days.' 90 In addition, particular Overseas Chinese investment projects were
taxed at a fifteen percent rate, provided that these projects satisfied the
state's urgent needs, were in short supply, or met other technological or de-
velopmental requirements. 19' Overseas Chinese investors were also offered
an exemption from income tax on repatriated profits, a refund on reinvested
shares of profits, and an accelerated depreciation of fixed assets upon ap-
Chaozhou natives; Xiamen was chosen because Minnan people are numerous in doing busi-
ness overseas." Deng, Tall in Shanghai, supra note 137, at 366.
186 Deng Xiaoping stated that some people in Western countries still tried to contain
China and did not want to see a modernized China. Deng Xiaoping, Woguo Jingfi Jianshe
De Lishi Jingyan [Historical Lessons of Our Country's Economic Construction], May 6,
1982, in SELECTED WORKs OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 89, at 360,361.
18
7 See, e.g., Ma Hong, Yanhai Kaifang Chengshi Xuyao Yanjiu De Jige Wenti [Issues to
Be Studied on Coastal Open Cities], in 1984 Y.B. SEZs, supra note 93, at 770, 772 (ex-
plaining that overseas Chinese care about the motherland). See also LuCIAN W. PYE,
CHINESE NEGOTIATING STYLE: COMMERCIAL APPROACHES AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLES 72
(1992) (Chinese officials believed that Overseas Chinese must have feelings of patriotism).
18s See Directive of the State Council Regarding Strengthening Works to Utilization of
Foreign Investment, Sept. 3, 1983, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 772,
774 (special preferences for investments by overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Macau and Tai-
wan compatriots); Ma, supra note 187, at 772 (it is natural to give greater preferences to
overseas Chinese investors); Forum On Coastal Cities, supra note 111, at 489 (overseas Chi-
nese should be given preferential treatment over other foreign investors); FANG, supra note
46, at 43 (preferences for overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan investment).
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proval by provincial tax authorities.192 The central authorities authorized
the provincial governments to adopt detailed measures in order to imple-
ment preferences provided by the Regulations in their respective jurisdic-
tions.' 3 The term Huaqiao, or "Overseas Chinese," was not statutorily
defined, however. The 1985 Regulations on Preferences to Overseas Chi-
nese Investment were designated as an internal document which was not
supposed to be publicly disseminated. 194 Chinese officials expressed con-
cerns about possible diplomatic implications.19 5 Provincial and local gov-
ernments subsequently issued preferential tax measures patterned on the
central directives.196
The 1991 UTL and its implementing rules do not specifically mention
preferences granted to Overseas Chinese investment under the 1985 Regu-
lations.197 However, local regulations enacted after the 1991 UTL contin-
ued to provide special tax treatment for Overseas Chinese investors, and
investors from Hong Kong and Macau.19 8 While this author has not been
able to find any decision formally repealing the 1985 Regulations on Pref-
erences to Overseas Chinese Investment, the Overseas Chinese Office of
192 Id. No differentiation was made between EJV and non-EJV investments made by
overseas Chinese.
'93 Id. art. 9.
194 Guowuyuan Fabu Guanyu Huaqiao Touzi Youhui De Zhanxing Guiding De Tongzbi
[Notification of the State Council Regarding the Promulgation of the Regulations Concern-
ing Preferences for Overseas Chinese Investment], in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, Su-
pra note 5, at 775, 775.
195 Caution and prudence were urged when it came to promoting overseas Chinese in-
vestment in order to avoid concerns and suspicions by countries in which overseas Chinese
were residing. Forum On Coastal Cities, supra note 111, at 489-90.
19 6 See, e.g., Tangshanshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi De Ruogan
Guiding [Regulations of Tangshan City People's Government Concerning Encouragement
for Foreign Investment], in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 1308, 1310
(enterprises funded by overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macau compatriots enjoy three
years' enterprise income tax exemption followed by another four years' 50% reduction);
Huang Jiaxiu, Fuzhoushi Shewai Shuishou He Sanzi Qiye Mianlin Wenti De Tantao [A Pre-
liminary Discussion on Problems Faced by Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign
Taxation in Fuzhou City], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Aug.
2, 1986, at 6, 7 (three years' income tax exemption followed by another four years' 50% re-
duction for investment projects funded by overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwan com-
patriots in Fujian Province).
197 Article 75(i) of UTL Implementing Rules recognizes "exemption and reduction of
enterprise income tax contained in other regulations which were promulgated by or with the
approval of the State Council." UTL Implementing Rules, supra note 74. It is unclear
whether tax exemptions and reductions in the 1985 Regulations on Preferences to Overseas
Chinese Investment are covered by this provision.
198 Baotoushi Guanyu Guli Huaqiao He Xianggang Aomen Taiwan Tongbao Touzi De
Youhui Banfa [Preferential Measures of Baotou City for Encouragement of Investment by
Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan Compatriots], art. 4, promulgated by
Baotou City People's Government on June 4, 1992, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, su-
pra note 5, at 1321, 1321 (income tax for enterprises funded by overseas Chinese, Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan compatriots reduced to 14% rate).
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the State Council suggested, in a recent telephone inquiry, that the Regula-
tions as such were no longer in force.199 On the other hand, it is possible
that some of the provincial and local preferential measures for Overseas
Chinese investment may still be effective, so long as they are within the
authority of the local governments and they do not infiinge upon state reve-
nue collections.
F. Turnover Taxes and Preferential Treatment for Foreign Investment
Liuzhuan shui, or "turnover taxes," have provided the Chinese State
with the bulk of its tax revenues.2 ° In 1958, the Chinese government im-
posed a single tax called Gongshang Tongyi Shui, or "Consolidated Indus-
trial and Commercial Tax" (CICT),2  to replace a number of separate taxes
that had existed since the early 1950s. 20 2 Described as "a broadly-based
turnover tax or as a combination of cascading sales and excise taxes,"20 3 the
CICT applied to business entities and individuals whenever industrial prod-
ucts changed hands, farming products were purchased, foreign goods were
imported, goods were sold at retail, or communication, transport or other
services were rendered.2 4 In 1973, the CICT, together with some other
taxes, was replaced by a new Gongshangshui, or "Industrial and Commer-
cial Tax" (ICT).205  Unlike the CICT, whose rates varied depending on
199 Telephone Interview with an official at the Overseas Chinese Office of the State
Council (Oct. 9, 1996).200 In 1994, various turnover taxes including value-added tax, consumption tax, business
tax and custom duties provided the state with almost 4.058 trillion yuan in revenue, or
72.05% of the country's total taxes collected. TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 20.
201 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongshang Tongyi Shui Tiaoli Cao'an [The Consoli-
dated Industrial and Commercial Tax Regulations of the People's Republic of China (Draft)]
adopted in principle by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Sep-
tember 11, 1958 and promulgated by the State Council on September 13, 1958 for trial im-
plementation, July-Dec. 1958 FAGui HUmiAN 126 [hereinafter CICTR]; Zhonghua Reninin
Gongheguo Gong Shang Tongyi Shui Tiaoli Shixing Xize Cao'an [Detailed Implementing
Rules for the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax Regulations of the People's Re-
public of China (Draft)], promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on September 13, 1958 for
trial implementation, id. at 137 [hereinafter Implementing Rules for CICTR].
202 For a summary of pre-CICT turnover taxes, see Pomp et al., supra note 21, at 16-18.
203 Id. at 19.
204 CICTR, supra note 201, arts. 4-8; Implementing Rules for CICTR, art.3. The CICT
applied to "all units or individuals" engaged in taxable activities including foreign businesses
operating in China. CICTR, supra note 201, art. 2. It was calculated on the amount of pro-
ceeds received from the sale of goods or services at a rate ranging from 1.5% for raw cotton
cloth to 69% for luxury cigarettes; the CICTR had a list of over forty different rates, gov-
erning more than one hundred categories of specified items; unlisted goods were subject to a
5% catch-all rate. Tax Rate Schedule attached to CICTR, 1958 FAGUI HUr IAN, 129, 129-
37; see also Pomp et al., supra note 21, at 22-24.
201 On March 30, 1972, the State Council formally approved the report of the Ministry of
Finance concerning the implementation of the ICT and, at the same time, promulgated the
Industrial and Commercial Tax Regulations of the People's Republic of China (Draft)
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong Shang Shui Tiaoli Cao'an). See 2 ZHONGHUA RENmIN
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products and services of the taxpayer, the ICT taxed businesses and enter-
prises at a single rate according to the sectorial classification of their main
line of trade and business. 20 6 The Chinese government never attempted,
however, to apply the ICT to businesses with private capital from abroad.20 7
When the country opened its door to foreign direct investment, it was
uncertain whether FIEs should pay the CICT.20 8 Because foreign investors
could not credit the CICT against foreign tax liability,20 9 there were con-
cerns that the combined effect of the enterprise income tax and the CICT
would discourage investment from overseas. 0 On the other hand, because
turnover taxes constituted important revenue sources for the state, there was
strong resistance to exempting foreign businesses from the CICT.211 Pro-
ponents of the latter position argued that any disincentive created by the
CICT was alleviated by generous income tax preferences. They also argued
GONGHEGUO GONGSHANG SHUISHOU SHI CHANGBIAN [COMPILATION OF THE HISTORY OF
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TAXATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 243 (Liu
Zhicheng et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
TAXATION]. For a description and discussion of major provisions of the Industrial and
Commercial Tax Regulations, see id. at 244-55.2
06 Id. at 246. There were 16 different rates under the ICT, ranging from 3% for such in-
dustrial and business sectors as textile dying enterprises specialing in production of raw cot-
ton cloth, commercial retailers, and public utility sectors, to 66% for producers of luxury
cigarettes. Id. at 246-47. Different rates applied, however, to cigarettes, liquor and sugar as
these products were continually taxed on a product-basis, no matter how the producer's main
line of business was classified. Id. at 255.
207 The Ministry of Finance explained that before the ICT was formally promulgated, old
rules continued to apply to tax matters involving non-domestic businesses. Id. at 257. As
the ICT had never been formally promulgated, it did not affect foreign direct investment un-
der the opening up policy. LI BICHANG, ZHONGGUO DuIwAI SHUISHOu FALu ZHIDu [CHINA'S
FOREIGN-RELATEDTAX SYSTEM] 101 (1988).208 See Pomp et al., supra note 21, at 30 n.106, 31-32; Pomp & Surrey, supra note 21, at
21-22.209 See Pomp & Surrey, supra note 21, at 15 n.60 (CICT unlikely to qualify as an income
tax or as a tax in lieu of an income tax to be creditable against U.S. income tax).210 See Wang Xuanhui, Dui Dangqian Shewai Shuishou Ruogan Wenti De Kanfa [Views
on Some Current Issues Concerning Foreign-Related Taxation], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO
[FINANCIAL RESEARCH MATERIALS], Sept. 15, 1984, at 2, 4; 1 DANGDAI ZHONGGUO
CAIZHENG [I CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FINANCE] 423-24 (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chuban-
she [Chinese Social Science Publishing House], 1988) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY CHINESE
FINANCE].
211 Wang, supra note 210, at 4; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FINANCE, supra note 210, at
424. The CICT remained the major tool for the government to raise revenue from foreign
businesses. From 1981 to 1983, CICT represented 48.3% of the total foreign-related tax
revenue for the state; in contrast, enterprise income tax only represented 27.2%; here, for-
eign-related tax referred to enterprise income tax, individual income tax, CICT, real estate
tax and vehicle license tax paid by FIEs, other foreign businesses and individuals. Lin
Rongsheng, San Nian Lai Shewai Shuishou De Jiben Qingkuang He Jinhou Gongzuo De Yi-
flan [Basic Situations Concerning Foreign-Related Taxation in the Last Three Years and
Views on the Future Work], in GuOJIA SHuIwuJu [STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION],
SHUISHOu GONGZUO WENXIAN HuIBIAN [COLLECTION AND COMPILATION OF TAX RELATED
DOCUMENTS] 788, 789 (1993) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF TAX DOCUMENTS].
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that the CICT would not increase the tax burden in any significant fashion
because it could be passed to consumers.212 After the central authorities
formally decided to subject foreign investment projects to the CICT,213 they
simultaneously offered relief from the tax through various measures.
They granted FIEs an exemption from CICT for imports of materials for
production of goods for export,215 as well as for imports of capital goods
212 Wang, supra 204, at 4; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FINANCE, supra note 210, at 424.
This argument was problematic as the price of goods is controlled by the government in a
planned economy and the tax burden may not be shifted through pricing. See RICHARD K.
DIAO, ZHONGGONG SHUISHOU ZHIDU [TAXATION SYSTEM OF COMMUNIST CHINA] 150-51
(1969); see also Ruhe Jianli Jingfi Tequ He Shewai Shuizhi Tixi De Yanjiu Baogao [Report
on the Study of How to Establish Special Economic Zones and Foreign Related Taxation
System], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCIAL RESEARCH MATERIALS], Feb. 6, 1987, at 38,
39 (as turnover taxes were included in the price, the burden was not as easily shiftable as in a
free price system).
211 In 1983, the Ministry of Finance issued a circular declaring that the CICT was appli-
cable to EJVs, CJVs, WFOEs and other foreign businesses operating in China. Caizhengbu
Guanyu Dui Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Hezuo Shengchan Jingying Qiye He Waishang
Duzi Qiye Zhengshou Gongshang Tongyi Shui Wenti De Tongzhi [Notification of the Min-
istry of Finance Concerning Issues of Collecting the Consolidated Industrial and Commer-
cial Tax from Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint
Ventures and Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises], in COLLECTION OF TAX DOCUMENTS, su-
pra note 211, at 460 [hereinafter 1983 Notification on CICT]. See also Pan Jing, Shilun
Woguo Shewai Shuifa De Fa Ding Xing Yuanze [A Preliminary Discussion on the Principle
of Legal Basis for Foreign Related Taxation in Our Country], SHUIWu YANJIU [TAX
STUDIES], 1995 No. 9, at 55, 56. The 1983 Notification on CICT, interestingly enough, re-
quested provincial authorities not to make the notice public for a while, although local offi-
cials were permitted to refer to the contents of the notice upon public inquiry. 1983
Notification on CICT, supra.
214 As the CICT contained higher rates for certain products and services than the ICT did,
the Ministry of Finance agreed to lower the CICT as applied to FIEs to the same level as the
ICT on domestic producers. See 1983 Notification on CICT, supra note 213. In 1984, the
ICT was broken down into four separate taxes, namely, product tax, value-added tax, busi-
ness tax, and salt tax; consequently, the Ministry of Finance issued a circular on April 29,
1985, stating that future FIEs were not permitted to claim lower rates under the ICT as the
ICT no longer existed. LI, supra note 207, at 103. For a short discussion of product tax,
value-added tax, business tax, and salt tax under the 1984 reform, see MOSER & ZEE, supra
note 10, at 99-104. Product tax, value-added tax, and business tax applied to all enterprises
including FIEs in Shenzhen and Hainan SEZs. Shenzhenshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu
Shenzhen Tequ Qiye Shuishou Zhengce Ruogan Wenti De Guiding [Regulations of Shenz-
hen City People's Government Concerning Certain Issues of the Enterprise Taxation Policy
for Enterprises in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone], Aug. 1, 1988, in SHAO MINGiuN, TEQU
SHUISHOu GAILuN [AN INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE] 604, 604
(1992); Hainansheng Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Guli Touzi De Shuishou Youhui Banfa [Pro-
visions of Tax Preferences of the Hainan Provincial People's Government for Encourage-
ment of Foreign Investments], promulgated on August 5, 1988, LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN
AREAS, supra note 5, at 1739, 1740; see also MOSER & ZEE, supra note 10, at 99.215 See, e.g., Guanyu Zhongwai Hezuo Jingyin Qiye Jinchukou Huowu De Jianguan He
Zheng Mian Shui De Guiding [Regulations Concerning the Supervision and Tax Collection
and Exemption of Imports and Exports of Goods by Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint
Ventures], art. 6, promulgated by the General Customs Office, Ministry of Finance and
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on January 31, 1984, 1984 FAGUI
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which were a part of foreign investors' capital contributions.216 Moreover,
the central authorities granted CICT exemptions and reductions to FIEs
having financial difficulties.217 Finally, exports by FIEs were generally ex-
HumIAN 393, 395 [hereinafter Regulations on CJVs Imports and Exports] (imports of raw
materials, parts, spare parts, packaging materials by CJVs for production for export were
duty free and CICT exempt); Haiguan Zongshu Caizheng Bu Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Bu Gua-
nyu Zhongwai Hezi Jingyin Qiye Jinchukou Huowu De Jianguan He Zheng Mian Shui De
Guiding [Regulations of the General Customs Office, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Concerning the Supervision and Tax Collection and
Exemption of Imports and Exports of Goods by Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures], art.
6, promulgated by the General Customs Office, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade on April 30, 1984, 1984 FAGUI HuimAN 401, 402 [hereinafter
Regulations on EJVs Imports and Exports] (imports of raw materials, parts, spare parts,
packaging materials by EJVs for production for export were duty free and CICT exempt);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiguan Dui Waishang Touzi Qiye Luxing Chanping Chu-
kou Hetong Suoxu Jinkou Liao Jian Guanli Banfa [Measures of the Customs of the People's
Republic of China for the Administration of Imports of Materials and Parts Necessary For
the Performance of Export Contracts by Foreign Investment Enterprises], art. 4, promulgated
by the General Customs Office on November 24, 1986, 1986 FAGUI HUIBiAN 488, 489 (im-
ports of equipments, machinery, raw materials, combustible, parts, spare parts packaging
materials by FIEs necessary for production for exports were duty-free and CICT exempt).216 See, e.g., Regulations on EJVs Imports and Exports, supra note 215, art. 4 (duty-free
and CICT-exempt imports of capital goods, parts and other materials as foreign venturers'
contribution, within the total amount of investment of EJVs or as part of added capital if
capital goods, parts and materials were not available domestically); Regulations on CJVs
Imports and Exports, supra note 215, art. 4 (duty-free and CICT-exempt imports of pieces of
machinery, equipment and materials by CJVs for offshore petroleum exploitation, energy
development, construction of railroad, road, port, industry, agriculture, forestry scientific re-
search, education and health if machinery, equipment and materials were advanced, domesti-
cally unavailable or necessary for the construction of new production facilities or installation
of machinery); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye Fa Shishi Xize [Detailed Regula-
tions for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises], art. 52, approved by the State Council on October 28,
1990 and promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations on Decem-
ber 12, 1990, 1990 FAGui HuiA ,N 364, 377 (duty-free and CICT-exempt imports of capital
goods, parts and other materials as foreign investors' contribution, or within the total amount
of investment of WFOEs).
217 See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa Shishi
Tiaoli Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China On
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures], art. 72, promulgated by the State Council on September 20,
1983, 1983 FAGui HUtBiAN 276, 294 [hereinafter EJV Implementing Rules]; Guojia Shui-
wuju [State Administration of Taxation], Woguo Shewai Shuishou Youhui Guiding De
Zonghe Jieshao [A Short Introduction to Foreign Related Tax Preference Regulations of Our
Country], ZHONGGUO SHUiwu [CHINA TAXATION], 1988 No. 10, at 17, 18 (CICT reduction
and exemption for new FIEs upon application). The central tax authorities made a practice
of granting CICT relief to FIEs with similar difficulties. See Guojia Shuiwu Ju Guanyu
Waishang Touzi Qiye Shengchan Lalian Chanping Jianzheng Gongshang Tongyi Shui De
Tongzhi [Notification of the State Administration of Taxation Concerning Reduction of the
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for Foreign Investment Enterprises Engaged in
the Production of Zipper Products], June 19, 1990, reprinted in ZHONGGUO SHUIWU [CHINA
TAXATION], 1990 No. 9, at 42 (because of raw materials price increases, market saturation
and other difficulties of FIEs producing zippers, CICT for all such FIEs was reduced to eight
percent). CICT relief in case of financial difficulties were also promised by local regula-
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empt from CICT except for a few controlled items.218 Like enterprise in-
come tax preferences, relief from the CICT varied depending on applicable
regional preferential schemes. On top of benefits available nationwide, for-
eign investment projects in SEZs enjoyed additional CICT exemptions and
reductions.219 Similarly, the government provided special relief from the
CICT to foreign investment in ETDAs,220 OUDs, 221 and other priority ar-
tions. See, e.g., Beijing Shi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Shishi Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli
Waishang Touzi De Guiding De Ruogan Wenti [Provisions of Beijing Municipal People's
Government Concerning the Implementation of the Provisions of the State Council for the
Encouragement of Foreign Investment], art. 23, Oct. 11, 1986, 1986 BEuIING SIn FAGUI
GUIZHANG HUIBIAN [1986 COLLECTION OF BEIJING MUNICIPAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS]
398, 403 (CICT reduction and exemption for newly established product-exporting enter-
prises and technologically-advanced enterprises upon application and approval); Shanghai
Shi Minhang Hongqiao Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Waishang Touzi Youhui Guiding [Provisions
Concerning Preferences for Foreign Investment in Minhang Hongqiao Economic and Tech-
nological Development Areas of the City of Shanghai], art. 5, promulgated by Shanghai Mu-
nicipal Government on March 3, 1987, 1986-1987 SHANGHAI SHI FAGUI GUIZHANG HUIBiAN
[1986-1987 COLLECTION OF SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS] 341, 341
(CICT reduction or exemption to FIEs in ETDAs upon application and approval).218 See, e.g., 22 Articles, supra note 4, art. 11; Caizheng Bu Guanyu Zhongwai Hezi Jin-
gying Qiye Hezuo Jingying Qiye He Waishang Duzi Jingying Qiye Shengchan De Chukou
Chanping Zheng Mian Gongshang Tongyi Shui Wenti De Tongzhi [Notification of the Min-
istry of Finance Concerning Issues of Collection and Exemption of the Consolidated Indus-
trial and Commercial Tax for Exports of Products Manufactured by Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Ventures, Cooperative Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises], July
30, 1986, GUOnA SHUvujU [STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION], in ZHONGGUO SEMIVAI
SHUISHou FAG GUI JI [COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN
RELATED TAXATION] 242 (1989) (non-CICT exempt items included crude oil, petroleum
products or those subject to state special regulations).
219 See 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, 1(e) (50% reduc-
tion in CICT for imports of mineral oil, cigarettes, liquor and other consumer goods and im-
ports of non-controlled goods; CICT exemption for imports of reasonable amounts of
household items by foreign businessmen for their own use); id. at l(g) (50% reduction in
CICT for sales of mineral oil, cigarettes and liquor within SEZs and CICT exemption for
sales of other goods within SEZs); id. at 1(i) (CICT for foreign businesses engaged in bank-
ing and insurance in SEZs was reduced to 3%). For locally issued CICT benefits in SEZs,
see, e.g., Xiamen Shi Shuiwu Ju Guanche Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi Guid-
ing De Cuoshi [Methods of Xiamen Municipal Tax Bureau for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment], art. 12,
promulgated on Oct. 15, 1986, LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 1509, 1509
(a five year CICT exemption for business income of foreign investment banks and Chinese-
foreign joint venture banks in Xiamen SEZ).
220 See 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, 2(e) (CICT ex-
emption for imports of capital goods, raw materials, spare parts, vehicles, office items as
long as the imports would be used by enterprises themselves, and imports of raw materials,
spare parts, components and packing materials for production for exports); 2(f) (CICT ex-
emption for all exports except for products under state control); 2(g) (CICT exemption for
imports of reasonable amounts of household items and vehicles by foreign business person-
nel in ETDAs for their own use). Local regulations provided additional CICT benefits to
FIEs in ETDAs. See, e.g., Guangzhou Jingji Jishu Kaifaqu Gongshang Shuishou Shishi
Shixing Banfa [Trial Methods of the Implementation of Industrial and Commercial Taxes in
Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Areas], art. 5, promulgated by
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eas.222 More CICT benefits were granted to technologically advanced and
export-oriented foreign-funded projects.
223
In December 1993, as part of a national tax reform package,224 the
Chinese government overhauled the country's turnover tax system and re-
Guangzhou Municipal Government on April 9, 1985, 2 ZHONGGUO JINGJI TEQU HE DUiWA!
JINGJI FAGUI DI ER JI [2 CHINA'S LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS] 280, 280 (Haitian Chuban She [Haitian Publishing House],
1988) (CICT reduction or exemption upon approval for supplies of advanced technology and
equipment by FIEs in Guangzhou ETDA to Chinese enterprises; 50% CICT reduction upon
application and approval for approved domestic sales of goods produced by FIBs in ETDA
using domestic materials or parts; CICT reduction or exemption upon approval for sales of
raw materials and parts produced by FIBs to other enterprises in ETDA).
221 See 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations, supra note 3, 3(d) (CICT ex-
emption for imports of equipment for production or business operation and construction
materials if they were part of the original or additional investment and imports of vehicles
and office items for use by these foreign enterprises); 3(e) (CICT exemption for all exports
except for products under state control); 3(f) (CICT exemption for imports of raw materials,
spare parts, components and packing materials for production for exports); 3(g) (CICT ex-
emption for imports of reasonable amounts of household items and vehicles by foreign busi-
ness personnel in OUDs for their own use).
222 See 1988 CEOR Tax Regulations, supra note 128, at 4 (CICT exemption for imports
of equipment for production or business operation and construction materials in CEORs if
they were part of the original or additional investment and imports of vehicles and office
items for use by these foreign enterprises); id. at 5 (CICT exemption for all exports from
FIEs in CEORs except for crude oil, petroleum products and other goods under state con-
trol); id. at 6 (CICT exemption for imports of raw materials, spare parts, components and
packing materials for production for exports by FIBs in CEORs); id. at 7 (CICT exemption
for imports of reasonable amounts of household items and vehicles by foreign business per-
sonnel in CEORs for their own use); 1990 Shanghai Pudong Tax Regulations, supra note
139, art. 7 (three percent CICT for income from loans by foreign investment banks, branches
and Chinese-foreign joint venture banks in Shanghai Pudong); id. art. 12 (CICT exemption
for imports of capital goods, construction materials, spare parts, vehicles, office items in Pu-
dong as long as the imports would be used by FIEs themselves, and imports of raw materials,
spare parts, components and packing materials for production for exports); id. art. 13 (CICT
exemption for imports of reasonable amounts of household items and vehicles by foreign
business personnel in Pudong for their own use).
223 See, e.g., Fujian Sheng Zhengfu Guanyu Guli Waishang Touzi De Buchong Guiding
[Supplementary Provisions of Fujian Provincial Government for the Encouragement of For-
eign Investment], art. 7, promulgated by Fujian Provincial People's Government on October
15, 1986, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at 1481, 1482 (a two-year CICT
exemption for new products developed by FIEs which were considered to be domestically
advanced and import substitutes).
224 In addition to restructuring the country's turnover tax system as discussed below, the
1993 tax reform enacted a uniform enterprise income tax for domestically owned enterprises
to replace disparate existing enterprises income tax regimes, Provisional Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye
Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli), promulgated by the State Council on December 13, 1993, TAX
SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 270, a new individual income tax law, Individual In-
come Tax Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geren
Suodeshui Fa), revised by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
October 31, 1993, id. at 303, and new enactments and changes in resource tax, Provisional
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Resource Tax (Zhonghua Renmin Gong-
594
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structured the three existing taxes which governed DOEs into three new
taxes; namely, Zengzhi Shui, or "value-added tax" (VAT),225 Xiaofei Shui,
or "consumption tax,, 226 and Yingye Shui, or "business tax., 227 The new
heguo Ziyuanshui Zhanxing Tiaoli), promulgated by the State Council on December 25,
1993, id. at 320, and land value-added tax, Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic
of China on Land Value-Added Tax (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Zengzhishui
Zhanxing Tiaoli), promulgated by the State Council on December 13, 1993, id. at 360, urban
construction and maintenance tax, and land use tax. See Gongshang Shuizhi Kaige Shishi
Fang'an [Plan of the Implementation of the Reform of the Industrial and Commercial Tax
System], issued by State General Administration of Taxation on December 11, 1993, in
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GONGSHANG SHUISHOU JIBEN FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTION
OF BASIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TAXES OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 1, 3-9 (GuoJIA SHUVU ZONGJU BANGONGSFI [OFFICE OF THE
STATE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION] ed., 1994) [hereinafter Plan of 1993 Tax
Reform]. The 1993 tax reform also changed the fiscal relationship between the national and
local governments. Tax revenues are classified into three categories: the central govern-
ment's fixed tax revenue, local governments' fixed tax revenue and shared revenue between
the central and local governments. TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 21. The central
government's fixed tax revenue includes consumption and value-added taxes collected by
Chinese customs, consumption tax, and enterprise income tax paid by centrally-controlled
enterprises; local governments' fixed tax revenue includes business tax and enterprise in-
come tax paid by local enterprises; shared tax revenue is mainly value-added tax. Id. In-
come tax collected from Chinese-foreign joint ventures is the central government fixed
revenue if the Chinese venturer is an enterprise or entity under the control of the central gov-
ernment, or its ministries and departments; if the Chinese partner is a local enterprise or en-
tity, then income tax collected from the joint venture is local government fixed revenue.
Guanyu Zuohao Waishang Touzi Qiye Suodeshui Ruku Guanli Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi
[Notice Regarding Issues of Managing Receipt of Foreign Investment Enterprises Income
Tax by State Treasury], Mar. 28, 1995, id. at 766. Two separate tax organizations have been
set up: one is the state taxation bureau in charge of collecting the central government's fixed
tax revenue and shared tax revenue; the other is the local taxation bureau responsible for lo-
cal governments' fixed tax revenue collection. See Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Zujian
Zai Ge Di De Zhishu Jigou He Difang Shuiwu Ju De Shishi Yijian [Opinion of the State
General Administration of Taxation Concerning the Implementation of the Organization and
Establishment of Direct Tax Organs in Localities and Local Tax Bureaus], Dec. 4, 1993, id.
at 450. While collecting enterprise income tax, value-added tax and consumption tax from
FIEs is the responsibility of state taxation bureaus, other taxes to be paid by FIEs fall within
the competence of local taxation bureaus which may ask for help, however, from state taxa-
tion bureaus. Dong, supra note 16, at 11.
225 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zengzhi Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regula-
tions of the People's Republic of China on Value-Added Tax], promulgated by the State
Council on December 13, 1993, TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 247 [hereinafter
VAT Regulations]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zengzhi Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli Shishi
Xize [Detailed Rules on the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Value-Added Tax], promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on De-
cember 25, 1993, id. at 250 [hereinafter the Implementation Rule]. For discussions of
China's VAT, see, e.g., Joyce Peck et al., Enter the VAT, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994,
at 40; Wielobob, supra note 21, at 427-30; Jiang Xiangyuan & Jack Huang, China's New
VA TSystem, 28 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 619 (1995).
226 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofei Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations
of the People's Republic of China on Consumption Tax], promulgated by the State Council
on December 13, 1993, TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 256 [hereinafter Consump-
tion Tax Regulations]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiaofei Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli Shishi
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turnover taxes have applied to both DOEs and FIEs since January 1,
1994.228 As a result, the CICT is no longer applied to foreign businesses.229
China's new VAT is imposed at fixed rates230 and at each stage of the
production and distribution of goods, including wholesaling, retailing, and
imports.231  The VAT is also imposed on the processing and repair of
goods.232 Most services and transactions in intangibles and real property
are governed, however, by the business tax, not the VAT.233 The VAT was
Xize [Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on Consumption Tax], promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on Dec.
25, 1993, id. at 259 [hereinafter Consumption Tax Implementation Rules]. For discussions
of China's consumption tax, see, e.g., Peck et al., supra 219; Wielobob, supra note 21, at
431-32; Howard Gensler, The 1994 Consumption Tax of the People's Republic of China, 13
UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L. J. 293 (1995).227 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingye Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations
of the People's Republic of China on Business Tax], promulgated by the State Council on
December 13, 1993, TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 263 [hereinafter Business Tax
Regulations]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingye Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli Shishi Xize
[Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations of the People's Re-
public of China on Business Tax], promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on December 25,
1993, id. at 266 [hereinafter Business Tax Implementation Rules]. For discussions of
China's business tax, see, e.g., Peck et al., supra note 225; Wielobob, supra note 21, at 430-
31; Howard Gensler, The People's Republic of China Business Tax of 1994, 8 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 103 (1995).
2 VAT Regulations, supra note 225, art. 29; Consumption Tax Regulations, supra note
226, art. 19; Business Tax Regulations, supra note 227, art. 17. For a summary of China's
new turnover tax system, see Brossa Cheung et al., Strategic Issues and Implications of PRC
Tax Reform, 20 INT'L TAX J. 83, 84 (1996).
229 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Waishang Touzi
Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Shiyong Zengzhi Shui Xiaofei Shui Yingye Shui Deng Shuishou
Zhanxing Tiaoli De Jueding [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress Regarding the Application of Provisional Regulations on Taxes Such as Value-
Added Tax, Consumption Tax, and Business Tax to Foreign Investment Enterprises and For-
eign Enterprises], adopted at the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth Na-
tional People's Congress on December 29, 1993, TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at
243 [hereinafter Decision on Taxes].
230 The new VAT contains four rates: a standard rate of 17% on sales and imports of all
goods unless specifically excluded, as well as processing and repair activities; a reduced
13% rate on sales and imports of necessities such as foodstuffs, edible oil, tap water, farming
related products like feeds, chemical fertilizers, farming machine, and books, newspapers
and magazines; a 0% rate on exports, VAT Regulations, supra note 225, art. 2; and a flat 6%
rate on small businesses, id. art. 12.
231 Id. art. 1; VAT Implementation Rules, supra note 225, arts. 2-4. Exemptions from
VAT include sales of agriculture products by producers, imports of instruments or equip-
ment for scientific research, experiments and teaching, donation of materials and equipment
by foreign governments or international organizations, imports of equipment used to process
goods under a processing contract or compensation trade arrangement with foreign business.
VAT Regulations, supra note 225, art. 16.
232 Id.
233 Business Tax Regulations, supra note 227, art. 1. A business or transaction may be
subject to either VAT or business tax, but not to both at the same time. See VAT Imple-
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designed to be borne by the final consumer of the product.234 It is computed
on the invoiced amount of each taxable transaction,235 and collected from
the seller. 6 The seller, however, may claim a tax credit for VAT that the
seller previously paid on inputs into production against the output tax or
VAT collected from the seller's sales.237 In other words, the seller only
pays the remaining output VAT, or net VAT payable, to the tax authorities.
The VAT removed the cascade of taxes which typified the old CICT and
ICT. A direct consequence of the VAT input credit is an export VAT re-
funding mechanism. Because exports attract a zero percent VAT, and the
net VAT payable therefore becomes negative, exporters are entitled to a re-
fund from the state for the input VAT they paid for the production or proc-
essing of exported goods.28 The business tax, on the other hand, applies to
most services as well as transactions involving intangible property like
copyrights, patents, trademarks and real property, provided that such serv-
ices or transactions take place in China.2 ' 9 The consumption tax applies to
the production, processing or imports of certain specified goods.2 40
mentation Rules, supra note 225, art. 5 (services subject to business tax are not taxable under
VAT).
23
4 See Liu, supra note 9, at 152 (arguing that tax burden borne by the purchaser of goods
or services, not the VAT tax payer.).
235 VAT Regulations, supra note 225, arts. 3-6.
2 36 d. art. i.
237 Id. art. 8.
238 Id. art. 25; see also Chukou Huowu Tui Mian Shui Guanli Banfa [Methods of Ad-
ministration of Tax Refunds or Exemptions for Exports of Goods], Feb. 19, 1994, TAX
SYSTEM OF CFHNA, supra note 10, at 657. Accordingly, VAT refunds could be obtained by
exporters from tax authorities on a monthly basis; however, exports of certain goods are not
eligible for tax refunds, including crude oil and sugar. Id. at 658. The VAT tax refund
mechanism applies to FIEs exporting their products. Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye Chukou
Huowu Shuishou Wenti De Tongzhi [Notification Concerning Issues of Taxation on Exports
of Goods by Foreign Investment Enterprises], Aug. 25, 1994, id. at 664.
239 Business Tax Regulations, supra note 227, art. 1. Exempt from business tax are
nursing, medical and educational services, certain cultural events, agricultural training pro-
grams, labour services provided by handicapped individuals. Id. art. 6. There are two basic
rates for business tax: 3% for transportation, construction communications, sports, and cul-
tural activities, and 5% for transfers of intangible assets and real property, banking, insur-
ance, tourism, hotel, food catering, and other services; entertainment services are taxed,
however, at 5% to 20%, to be determined by local governments; business tax is levied on the
turnover of the taxpayer, id. art. 5, to be assessed at an interval of every five, ten, fifteen days
or monthly, or on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Id. art. 13.
240 Consumption Tax Regulations, supra note 226, arts. I & 2. According to the Con-
sumption Tax Table of Taxable Items and Tax Rates attached to Consumption Tax Regula-
tions, taxable items include beer, liquor, cosmetics, fireworks, jewelry, motorcycles, skin and
hair care products, small motor vehicles, tires, tobacco, gasoline and diesel fuel; consump-
tion tax is levied on the basis of the sales value of taxable goods, at a rate ranging from 3%
for certain motorcycles and cars to 45% for luxury cigarettes, but gasoline, diesel fuel and
certain type of alcohol are taxed at a fixed amount for goods of the same quantity. Id. at
258-59.
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The impact of new turnover taxes on existing FIEs has been mixed.24'
While some FIEs found no difficulty in adjusting to new taxes, others saw
their overall tax burden rise following the change.242 As a concession to
existing FIEs, the Chinese government agreed to provide refunds to cover
any increase in taxes paid under the new system for a period not exceeding
the term of the joint venture contract or, at most, not beyond the end of
1998.243 On the other hand, while FIEs established after January 1, 1994
are entitled to a refund for their input VAT when their products are ex-
ported, FIEs established prior to 1994 may not receive such a refund.244 In
defense of the disparate treatment between post- and pre-1994 FIEs, the
government argued that the lack of a VAT export refund would not disad-
vantage pre-1994 projects because they received no equivalent benefit un-
241 Many factors might be involved in considering the impact of new turnover taxes on
foreign investors. It was observed:
Foreign businesses that do not add much value in production may benefit from the new
regime, as these businesses now have a means of recovering some of the tax they paid
to acquire the goods they ultimately will sell. If the VAT rate on their purchases of in-
puts is lower than the old CICT rate was, the benefit is even greater. However, compa-
nies making or selling items which were subject to high CICT rates, such as cigarettes,
are likely to find their new combined VAT and [consumption] tax bill is even higher
than their old CICT bill.
Peck et al., supra note 225, at 42.
242 According to one study on FIEs in Xiamen City, of 165 FIEs which were liable for
business tax, the tax bill of 148 rose as a result of the new business tax, largely because tax
rates under the new business tax are higher than those under the old CICT; it was also found
that the more value-added their products were, the more tax FIEs would pay. Sun Longying,
Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye Zengfia Shuifu Fanhuan Ruogan Wenti De Tantao [A Pre-
liminary Discussion on Some Issues Concerning Refunds To Offset Tax Increases for For-
eign Investment Enterprises], Suuiwu YUANJIU [TAx STUDIES], 1995 No. 9, 52, at 52.
243 Decision on Taxes, supra note 229, art. 2; Guowuyuan Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye
He Waiguo Qiye Shiyong Zengzhi Shui Xiaofei Shui Yingye Shui Deng Shuishou Zhanxing
Tiaoli Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi [Notification of the State Council Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Provisional Regulations of the Value-Added Tax, Consumption Tax, Business
Tax and Other Taxes to Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises], effective
Jan. 1, 1994, TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 244; Guanyu Tuihuan Waishang
Touzi Qiye Gaizheng Zengzhi Shui Xiaofei Shui Hou Duo Jiao Shuikuan Ruogan Juti Wenti
De Tongzhi [Notification Concerning Some Concrete Issues of Tax Refunds for Additional
Payments by Foreign Investment Enterprises Subsequent to Their Being Subject to the
Value-Added Tax and the Consumption Tax], issued by State General Administration of
Taxation on April 21, 1994, id. at 511.
244 Guanyu Waishang Touzi Qiye Chukou Tui Shui Wenti De Tongzhi [Notification
Concerning Issues of Tax Refund for Exports by Foreign Investment Enterprises], issued by
the State General Administration of Taxation on February 6, 1995, and retroactively effec-
tive from January 1, 1994, id. at 668 [hereinafter 1995 Notification on FIEs Export Refunds].
Accordingly, only FIEs registered after January 1, 1994 are entitled to the zero VAT rate and
therefore a tax rebate for their exports. Id. As to FIEs established prior to January 1, 1994,
their exports are only VAT exempt. See Dong, supra note 16, at 10. The difference between
VAT-exempt and zero VAT rate goods is that zero VAT rate goods attract rebate upon ex-
port, but VAT exempt goods do not. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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der the old CICT system.245 The disparity has since been narrowed, but not
because pre-1994 projects have gained any tax breaks; instead, post-1994
enterprises have seen their export VAT refund benefits quickly erode. At
the time of the enactment of the new turnover tax system, the input VAT
was wholly refundable; i.e., exporters could get back the full VAT they had
previously paid.246 The Chinese government was soon alarmed by the cost
of this refund system.2 47 There also appeared to be a growing number of
fraudulent claims for export refunds. 24  Consequently, the government de-
cided to abandon the full refund system on July 1, 1995, and introduced in-
stead a partial refund system that allowed exporters to claim back only a
portion of input VAT they had previously paid.249 Another export tax re-
fund cut occurred in 1996.250
When Chinese officials introduced the new turnover taxes, they reas-
sured foreign investors that exemptions and reductions existing under the
old CICT would remain unchanged and continue to apply in cases in which
the new taxes replaced the CICT.251 The government nevertheless soon
took steps to curtail tax benefits. In early 1995, it revoked exemptions from
taxes and custom duties for imports of twenty household and office items
previously enjoyed by foreign businesses.252 The most important move
245 See Sun, supra note 242, at 54. For the Chinese, VAT-exempt exports by FIEs estab-
lished prior to January 1, 1994 were merely the continuation of the previous CICT exemp-
tion for exports. Dong, supra note 16, at 10.
246 1995 Notification on FIEs Export Refunds, supra note 244, art. 2.
247 See Guanyu Tiao Di Chukou Huowu Tui Shui Lu De Tongzhi [Notification Concern-
ing Adjusting and Reducing Tax Refund Rates for Exports of Goods], issued by the State
Council on October 6, 1995, TAx SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 442 [hereinafter 1995
Notification Reducing Export Tax Refunds] (complaining about too many refunds, too little
tax revenue, and heavy financial burden of refund system).248 See Guanyu Jiaqiang Chukou Tui Shui Guanli Yange Shenhe Tui Shui Pingzheng De
Tongzhi [Notification Concerning Strengthening the Administration of Export Tax Refunds
and Strictly Examining Documentation Supporting Tax Refunds], issued by the State Gen-
eral Administration of Taxation, June 30, 1994, TAx SYsTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at
673, 673-74 (discussing illegal efforts to seek export tax refunds through forgery and other
fraudulent acts; serious frauds in Guangdong and other coastal areas); see also Joseph Kahn,
Beiing Struggles to Stem Slide in Taxation Power, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at 4
(export claims increased by 50% in the first half of 1995 compared to the year before and
frauds were suspected).
249 1995 Notification Reducing Export Tax Refunds, supra note 247.
250 See Becky Lai et al., Exporters Face Higher Costs After Changes to VAT Rules, S.
CmINA MORNING POST, Sept. 12, 1996, China Business Review, at 2. According to the latest
change, of the 17% VAT on export sales value, 9% is refunded and the remaining 8% is
charged to the cost of sales and therefore is an additional cost to the business. Id.; see also
Edward Shum, A VATProgress Report, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 43.
251 See New Taxation System Adds No More Burden on Foreign Investors, CHINA TRADE
& INvESTMENT, Apr. 1994, at 6, 6 (citing Jin Xing, Director of the State General Admini-
stration of Taxation, who stated that various CICT exemptions and reductions would be re-
tained).252 See Doing Double Duty, CHINA TRADE REP., Feb. 1995, at 2; Tax and Tariff Reform:
Embattled Enterprises, Bus. CHNA, Mar. 6, 1995, at 5.
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took place in 1996 when major import tax exemptions were repealed for
FIEs established after April 1, 1996. For FIEs established before April 1,
1996, duty free and tax exempt imports would be phased out by the end of
1996 if the FIE had a total investment of less than U.S. $30 million, or by
the end of 1997 if the FIE had a total investment of U.S. $30 million or
above. 254 Various duty free and tax exempt import privileges enjoyed by
PIEs in SEZs and other priority areas were terminated as well.25 5 The Chi-
nese government recently announced reinstatement of import tax exemp-
tions which were intended to benefit certain hi-tech investment projects
like telecommunications and semiconductors. 7 As pressure for extending
preferential treatment for FIEs to DOEs is growing strong, the central
authorities are considering allowing domestic enterprises to enjoy the same
import tax exemptions.5 8
I. POLICY FACTORS
A. Domestic Experiences and Precedents
The Chinese government has long used financial and fiscal policies to
promote the Communist Party's political and economic objectives. 9  In
addition to the revenue-raising function of taxation,260 the government used
253 1995 Notification on Import Taxation, supra note 14 (revocation of duty-free and tax-
exempt imports of capital goods and raw materials previously granted to FIEs as part of their
investment contribution).
2-4 Id. (abolition of duty-free and tax-exempt imports of goods into various specially-
designated areas such as SEZs, ETDAs, HNTITAs, COCs, CEORs, Border Open Cities,
BECZs, Yangtze Riverside Open Cities, Inland Open Cities, State Tourist and Resort Areas
and Shanghai Pudong New District). The government also repealed exemptions from cus-
toms duty and turnover taxes previously granted to importers of machinery and equipment as
part of a processing contract or compensation trade arrangement between Chinese and for-
eign parties. Id.
5z id.
25 6 See supra note 19.
257 Tax Breaks Only on Hi-Tech Imports, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 24, 1997, Busi-
ness, at 7. For a discussion of the latest regulations on import tax exemptions, see infra note
422.
258 Cheung Lai-Kuen, Import Tariff Exemption Hope for Hi-Tech State Enterprises, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24, 1997, Business, at 4.
259 Mao Zedong stated that the economy determines finance and fiscal policies, not the
other way round. Wang Shaofei, Mao Zedong Caizheng Sixiang De Kexue Neihan [The
Contents of Mao Zedong's Finance Thoughts], in MAO ZEDONG CAIZHENG SIXIANG YANJIU
[STUDIES ON MAO ZEDONG'S FINANCE THOUGHTS] 23, 24 (Yang Zhilin ed., 1991).260 In a command economy the government's decisions on economic matters did not de-
pend upon its ability to raise funds through taxation or public borrowing; the state could
move resources directly thanks to its monopoly of political and administrative powers and
state ownership of the means of production. See FRANKLYN D. HOLZMAN, SOVIET TAXATION
- THE FISCAL AND MONETARY PROBLEMS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY 13-18 (1962). In other
words, direct physical controls, rather than government revenue, constituted the foundation
of the state's ability to plan and achieve developmental goals; taxation was, nevertheless,
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taxation to achieve non-revenue objectives.261 During the 1940s and early
1950s, Party class policy and agrarian reform led to the imposition of oner-
ous tax burdens on landlords.6 2 In urban areas, taxation was "a tool to
protect and develop socialist and semi-socialist economies and gradually,
conditionally and discriminatingly use, restrain and transform capitalist in-
dustry and commerce. 263 In 1950, the new regime introduced Gongshan-
crucial to balancing the state's budget and controlling inflation. Id. at 18-21. Chinese
Communist Party leaders learned a lesson in 1949 and 1950, when Party-controlled areas
expanded so rapidly that old tax bases proved to be woefully inadequate to meet urgent
needs for additional resources and the new regime resorted to issuing banknotes to keep ad-
ministrative and military operations afloat. CONTEMPORARY CHINA'S FINANCE, supra note
210, at 36. As a result, the gap between government revenue and expenditures widened con-
siderably and inflation skyrocketed. Id. The destabilizing effect of hyper-inflation on the
economy and social order caused grave concerns among Party leaders like Chen Yun who
soon started to stress the role of taxation in the preparation of a government budget and the
pressing need for more grain acquisition and tax levies. Chen Yun, Kefu Caizheng Jingii de
Yanzhong Kunnan [Overcoming Severe Financial and Economical Difficulties], in 2
SELECTED WORKS OF CHEN YUN, supra note 114, at 9. Challenged by a decentralized tax
system that permitted regional and provincial governments to determine their own budgets
and revenue, the central government was left with few resources to cope with its task of
achieving tremendous economic recovery. As a result, the newly established regime had to
centralize the taxing power and insure state revenue. Quanguo Shuizheng Shishi Yaoze
[Principal Rules for Implementation of the National Tax Administration], adopted by the
Government Administration Council on January 27, 1950 and promulgated on January 31,
1950, 1949-1950 FALING HumIAN 283. In 1950, 14 taxes were adopted including: commod-
ity tax, industrial and commercial tax, stamp duty tax, slaughter tax, stamp tax, salt tax, agri-
culture tax in newly liberated areas; and interest income tax. Id. at 283-84. An urban real
property tax and vehicle license tax were added the following year. While inflation during
1949-1950 was brought under control through a combination of economic, political and ad-
ministrative measures, Party leaders could never afford to forget the danger presented by un-
funded government expenditures, and a conservative fiscal policy that placed heavy
emphasis on balanced budgets was adopted with the aim of suppressing and preventing in-
flation. See PENG KUANG-HSI, WHY CHINA HAS No INFLATION 38-42 (1976) (balanced
budgets were credited for the state's ability to control price rises in the following years);
CONTEMPORARY CHINA'S FINANCE, supra note 210, at 360 (disastrous consequences of
budget deficits on supply and demand of goods). For a discussion of the use of taxes to
contain price rises, see Dwight H. Perkins, Price Stability and Development in Mainland
China (1951-63), 72 J. POL. ECON. 360, 369-70 (1964).
261 See, e.g., WANG CHENGRAO, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI ZHtwI SHUISHOU [CHINA'S SOCIALIST
TAXATION] 54-55 (1986) (finance and taxation not only involved economic issues, but also
political questions).
262 
LI CHENGRUI, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO NONGYESHUI SHIGAO [MANUSCRIPTS
ON THE HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE TAX OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 27-29 (1959)
(in some rural areas taxes on landlords were 37% whereas taxes on poor peasants were 5%).
For general discussion of Party class policy, see, e.g., LARRY M. WORTZEL, CLASS IN CHINA
STRATIFICATION IN A CLASSLESS SOCIETY (1987); RICHARD CURT KRAUS, CLASS CONFLICT
IN CHINESE SOCIALISM (1981). See also Jean-Francois Billeter, The System of "Class
Status," in THE SCOPE OF STATE POWER IN CHINA 127, 145-49 (S.R. Schram ed., 1985)
[hereinafter SCOPE OF STATE POWER] (class status for distributive purposes).
263 WANG, supra note 261, at 57 (quoting Premier Zhou Enlai). For a discussion of
China's Socialist Transformation during the 1950s, see RISKIN, supra note 32, at 53-100.
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gye Suodeshui, or "Industrial and Commercial Income Tax" (ICIT),26
which targeted "capitalist industrial and commercial businesses" in order to
restrict their capital growth and divert their profits to strengthen public
sectors.265  Public or state-owned enterprises paid no ICIT; instead, they
remitted profits to the state treasury under separate regulations.266 In 1958,
the government raised taxes on the profit of private enterprises - including
firms with private capital from overseas - by ten to one hundred per-
cent.267 This tax brought the total income tax rate of private enterprises to
as high as sixty-seven per cent.268 In the early 1970s, the ICT created a spe-
cial category labelled "temporary business" to catch any business activities
that were unregistered or unauthorized.269 In 1977, a circular of the Minis-
try of Finance imposed an ICT penalty of up to one hundred percent against
unauthorized business activities.270 Although the scope of the penalty pro-
vision broadly covered any individuals and units, its primary targets were
non-state and private businesses.27 1
On the other hand, favorable treatment was accorded to industries or
enterprises that met policy criteria. The 1950 ICIT mirrored the Party in-
dustrial policy that favored industries over commerce and heavy industries
over light industries, by providing such favored industries with tax reduc-
tions ranging from ten to forty percent. 72 During the 1960s, the govern-
264 Gongshangye Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Industrial and Com-
mercial Taxes], adopted by the Council of Government Administration on January 27, 1950
and promulgated on January 31, 1950, 1949-1950 FALING HUIBLAN 298 Regulations on In-
dustrial and Commercial Taxes [hereinafter Regulations on Industrial and Commercial
Taxes]. For background discussions of the ICIT, see Pomp & Surrey, supra note 21, at 5-12;
Reynolds, supra note 21, at 59-61; Simon, supra note 21, at 528-31.
265 2 HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TAXATION, supra note 205, at 474.
266 Regulations on Industrial and Commercial Taxes, supra note 243, art. 5.
267 2 HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TAXATION, supra note 205, at 476.
268 See also LI, supra note 207, at 5 (previous tax rate of 34.5% doubled to 67%).
269 See GuoJIA SHUISHOU JIAOCAI BIANXIE ZU [THE NATIONAL TAXATION TEACHING
MATERIALS EDITORIAL GROUP], GUOJIA SHUISHOU [NATIONAL TAXATION] 38 (1979) [herein-
after NATIONAL TAXATION]. A 10% rate was imposed on any "temporary business" but gov-
emnment officials could double that rate. BEIJING JINGJI XUEYUAN CAIZHENG JINRONG
JIAOYAN SmI [FINANCE AND MONETARY SECTION, BEUING INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS], XIN
ZHONGGUO SHUIZHI YANBIAN [THE EVOLUTION OF NEW CHINA'S TAXATION] 153 (1985).
270 WANG, supra note 261, at 51.
271 id.
272 Regulations on Industrial and Commercial Taxes, supra note 264, Tables for Indus-
trial and Sectorial Income Tax Reduction. Accordingly, a 40% income tax reduction applied
to heavy industry machine manufacturers, steel, oil and non-ferrous metal producers, as well
as power plants and producers of heavy transportation vehicles and equipment; a 30% re-
duction was granted to manufacturers of light industry machinery, coal producers, basic
chemical producers, and electronic producers; a 20% income tax reduction applied to pro-
ducers of farming machinery, export producers, import-substitute producers; a 15% reduc-
tion applied to producers of printing machine, rubber and lather products as well as
construction sectors; and finally, light industry, producers of ordinary transportation means,
handcraft sectors, medical sectors, and animal feeding sectors received a 10% income tax
reduction.
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ment lowered the ICIT rates to encourage small businesses to supplement
the public sector and created tax holidays for individual businesses that
formed collectives or cooperatives. 273 To promote Party propaganda ef-
forts, the government exempted publishing houses and printing factories
from ICT for the production and distribution of the works of Chairman
Mao, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as other political materials.274
To upgrade technology and products, the government granted relief from
ICT to enterprises engaged in the development and manufacturing of new
products approved by the state.275 The state also allowed various tax ex-
emptions and reductions for farm-related businesses, such as agricultural
machine repair and leasing, small fertilizer and cement producers, and
newly established enterprises in people's communes.2 76 Tax exemptions
and reductions were also offered to businesses and enterprises encountering
financial adversities.277
Preferential tax measures allocated resources among industries, enter-
prises and even provinces.278 Benefits derived from tax and fiscal measures
provided funds for investment in state-defined desirable areas. Without
such tax and fiscal benefits, enterprises might have had to compete for
funds through the state budgeting process, which was costly and time-
consuming. It was preferable, therefore, to let enterprises retain more of
their profit for business expansion and investment. To prevent diversion of
funds for unauthorized uses, the state required enterprises to place retained279
profit into accounts designated for specific purposes. Moreover, state tax
authorities were given the power to supervise the way tax savings were
utilized. 280 Based on these measures, preferential tax treatment reduced the
273 2 HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TAXATION, supra note 205, at 49 1.
274 NATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 269, at 5 1.
275 Id. Factories using recycled energy or materials were also granted ICT exemptions
and reductions. Id.
276 Id.
277 SHuIwVu GONGZUO SHOUCE [MANUAL OF TAXATION] 54 (Zou Yunfang ed., 1987) (en-
terprises that encountered difficulties in paying turnover taxes as a result of major changes in
their production, operation or price may apply for tax exemptions and reductions with local
tax authorities).
278 LIu, supra note 7, at 456 (noting that tax preferences were used as tools to rationalize
resource allocation among different enterprises, industries and regions since price and profit
could be subject to various irrational factors). Tax exemptions and reductions were also
identified as effective measures to stimulate production as taxpayers retained more money
for business expansion. WANG, supra note 261, at 184-89. Exemptions and reductions were
granted to enterprises in preferred businesses or operations such as new industries, new
product development, and industrial recycling. NATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 269, at 51.
279 The most important of such accounts were designated for enterprises' production ex-
pansion, new product development and scientific research. TIANJIN CAIJING XUEYUAN
KuAuI JIAOYANSHI [ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT, TIANJIN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
INSTITUTE], GUOYING GONGYE QIYE CAiWU KuAI [STATE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING] 289 (1981) [hereinafter STATE ENTERPRISES FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING].
280 Liu, supra note 7, at 469-70.
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nominal revenue of the state, but the government's investment policies were
well-served.28'
In the early years of its opening-up policy, China suffered from serious
image problems due to its previous policies. Among these previous policies
was the discriminatory and prohibitive ICIT,28 2 which still governed busi-
nesses with foreign interest.283 Rather than devising a new set of income
tax rules to govern foreign direct investment, however, the sponsors of the
1979 EJV Law first opted to create preferential tax treatment.284 Just as pu-
nitive rates under the ICIT were the legacy of policies that reflected past
hostility toward foreign and private capital, the promised preferential tax
treatment in the country's first foreign investment legislation since 1949
was testament to a favorable policy change. As domestic experiences dem-
onstrated, the very word "preferences" conveyed a positive message. "Low
tax burden and broad preferences" soon became the leitmotiv of official
statements regarding taxation of foreign investment.28 5  Chinese officials
spent a great deal of time and effort propagating new tax preference provi-286
sions. Widespread dissemination of preferential rules was viewed as a
key to the success of efforts to promote foreign investment . 7
281 In the United States, defenders of tax incentives claimed that tax incentives provided a
desirable way for resource allocation because of less government supervision and less red
tape. See Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 7, at 16. The claim was fallacious according to
critics because government supervision was still necessary in administering incentive pro-
grams. Id. at 17. In China, while government bureaucracy was necessarily involved in ad-
ministering the tax's preferences and use of tax-saving funds, tax measures still provided an
alternative to state direct administrative control and allocation of resources.
282 For a discussion of the ICIT, see text accompanying supra notes 264-268.
283 NATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 269, at 88-89; see also Reynolds, supra note 21, at
59-61.284 EJV Law, supra note 1, art. 7. Flexible approaches had been taken by the Chinese
prior to the adoption of the JVITL, including the reduction of foreign investors' tax burden
through contractual arrangements between the Chinese government and individual foreign
interests. Pomp et al., supra note 21, at 52-53.
285 See Caizhengbu Shuiwu Zongju Juzhang Liu Zhicheng Jiu Zhongwai Hezi Jingying
Qiye Suodeshui Fa He Geren Suodeshui Fa De Gongbu Shixing Da Zhongguo Jingji Xinwen
Jizhe Wen [Answers by Liu Zhicheng, Director for Administration of Taxation, Ministry of
Finance to Questions of Journalists from China's Economic News Regarding the Promulga-
tion and Implementation of the Income Tax Law Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ven-
tures and the Individual Income Tax Law], ZHONGGUO JINGJI XINWEN [CHINA'S ECONOMIC
NEWS] (HK), Sept. 22, 1980, reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO CAIZHENGBU
SHUIWU ZONGJU [ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE], ZHONGGUO
DUrWAI SHUIWU SHOUCE Di YI JI [1 MANUAL OF CHINESE FOREIGN TAX] 113, 114 (1983)
[hereinafter MANUAL OF CHINA'S FOREIGN TAX].
286 Lin, supra note 211, at 790-91 (illustrating propagation of tax laws and preferences
favorable to foreign investment by provincial and local officials).
287 See, e.g., Xi Jing, Zai Gaige Kaifang Zhong Qianjin De Shewai Shuishou Gongzuo
[Foreign Related Tax Works in the Reform and Opening Up Era], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU
[CHINA TAXATION], 1992 No. 20, at 21 (Shanghai tax bureau officials actively propagated
tax preference rules applicable to foreign businesses).
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B. International Practice and Profit Maximization
To make its opening-up policy a success, the Chinese government had
to appeal to foreign business communities by referring to practices and
ideas these communities could easily identify with.288 When explaining tax
preferences for foreign investments, officials drew comparisons with tax in-
centive laws in other countries.289 As the country had no modem corporate
income tax of its own, the government used the experiences of other nations
as references for both normative rules and special treatment to induce the
inflow of foreign capital. 290 Because tax incentives have been used world-
wide to compete for investment funds,291 China felt pressure to emulate
other countries' endeavors.292 Parallels with foreign incentive legislation
were intended to show a true change in the country's policies as well as its
willingness to keep up with international competition for foreign capital.
Chinese officials seemed to have been influenced by the concepts and prac-
tice of using fiscal incentives to attract investments in other parts of the
288 The Chinese explicitly referred to guoji guanli, or international practice, as a guide to
regulate economic activities in China. Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 624; Wang, supra note
69; An Xin, supra note 68.
289 For instance, -when explaining the one-year exemption followed by a two-year 50%
reduction in the 1980 JVITL, the spokesman of the draft bill referred to different tax holi-
days in other countries: some countries provided a one year exemption only, others provided
a one-year exemption followed by a two-year 50% reduction, still others provided a three-
year exemption or reduction; the Chinese chose the middle one. As to preferences for in-
vestment in agriculture, forestry or other low-profit sectors and in remote, underdeveloped
areas, the spokesman noted that some developing countries already had similar tax benefits.
Tax refunds for reinvestment of distributed profit by foreign venturers were also compared
with various benefits for foreign reinvestment provided in other countries' incentive legisla-
tion. Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 626.
290 In the summer of 1979, the Harvard Law School International Tax Program organized
a six-week long seminar on various aspects of international taxation in Dalian, China with
the participation of over 120 Chinese officials from the Ministry of Finance and other gov-
ernment agencies. Pomp & Surrey, supra note 21, at 1. This seminar together with subse-
quent consultations with international accounting/law firms, foreign companies and tax
research institutes helped Chinese officials draft income tax legislation governing foreign
investment. Li, supra note 207, at 5-6.
291 For discussions of various countries' efforts to attract foreign investment through tax
incentives, see, e.g., Paul L. Chen-Young, A Study of Tax Incentives in Jamaica, 20 NAT'L
TAx J. 292 (1967) [hereinafter Jamaica Tax Incentives]; Andrew Kolesar, Note Can State
and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stimulate Economic Development, 44
TAX LAW. 285 (1990) (discussing tax measures by states in the United States); In-Young
Lee, The Effectiveness of Incentives Under the Foreign Capital Inducement Act of Korea, 8
KOREA J. CoMp. L. 110, 122-30 (1980) (discussing use of tax incentives in South Korea).
See generally JACK HELLER & KENNETH M. KAUFFMAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1963) (analyzing developing countries' tax incentives for in-
vestment).292 See, e.g., Wang Xuanhui, Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Gailun [An Introduction to the
Foreign Enterprise Income Tax], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Jan. 15, 1985, at 1, 38 (noting that foreign businesses pressed for tax conces-
sions); Du, supra note 47, at 187 (arguing that the foreign press focused on tax preferences
as signs of improved investment conditions in China).
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world. In the West, the capital arbitrage theory, which suggests that inves-
tors seek to maximize the rate of return, supports tax incentives for invest-
ments.293 According to the theory, "[b]ecause taxes are negatively related
to net profits and therefore negatively related to the net rate of return, it
follows that to increase [foreign direct investment] is to decrease the taxes
on foreign investment income. 2 94 The Chinese government also relied on
the concept of profit maximization2 95 in its decision-making to send the
message that the country had become a friendly and profitable place for
business.296 The government believed that tax breaks were necessary for
luring foreign capital because factors such as state control of the economy
and protection of market were not going to change any time soon.2 97 The
Chinese were aware that access to their immense market was the dream of
many overseas investors and opening domestic markets to foreign investors
could be very attractive, but the Chinese were concerned with the domestic
impact of such a move, especially in the early years. As a result, foreign
investment enterprises had to be outward-oriented and export most of their
products.
Given the many basic differences between FIEs and DOEs, the
authorities enacted separate tax regimes and preference rules for each.298
293 Kojo Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Tax Incentives Within the Framework of the Neoclas-
sical Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEx. INT'L L. J.
365, 379 (1984).
294 id.
295 See, e.g., Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 5-6 (supporting a loosening policy to
allow foreign investors make a profit); Forum on Coastal Cities, supra note 11, at 477 (dis-
cussing preferential treatment for foreign investments as a means of satisfying the profit-
making motivation of foreign investors); ZHANG BINGGUANG, Du1WAI KAIFANGQU JINGI
[EcoNOMY OF OPEN AREAS] 176-78 (1988) (explaining that tax preferences could lower cost
of doing business as well as reduce tax burdens, and therefore provide a satisfactory retum
on capital for foreign investors); FANG, supra note 46, at 43-44 (arguing that tax preferences
were based on theory that capitalists by nature seek high profit, and capital moves to the area
or region where profit can be maximized).
296 See, e.g., FANG, supra note 46, at 44-45 (discussing use of tax preferences to raise for-
eign investors' profitability).
297 Cf. Liu, supra note 94, at 60 (preferential treatment to foreign businesses while con-
trolling market access).
2 98 
See CHu BAOTAI, ZHONGWAI HEZI JINGYIN QIYE FA SHISHI JINGYAN WENDA
[QuEsTIoNs AND ANSWERS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHINESE-FOREIGN EQUITY JOINT
VENTURE LAW] 6 (1983). The Chinese did not rule out, however, the possibility of domestic
sales of goods produced by Chinese-foreign joint ventures, but stringent restrictions were
imposed on such sales. See EJV Implementing Rules, supra note 217, art. 61 (EJVs may sell
products domestically provided that their products are in urgent need in China or are import-
substitutes). Cheap labour was another advantage of investing in China, but, in the early
years, the state's traditional rigid control of the country's employment system had not suffi-
ciently changed to accommodate to foreign-funded businesses. See, e.g., RISKIN, supra note
32, at 327. Adopting tax preferences to foreign investments was a departure from domestic
experiences. The task of socialist enterprises was to contribute to the state and the society at
large. In a communist state, the state must use "profits" from individual enterprises to sup-
port social programs, and since enterprises were state owned and operated, this enlightened
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Foreign investors were thus isolated from tax, finance and accounting rules
governing domestic enterprises which, during the 1980s, still operated ac-
cording to command economy principles.299 Different tax regimes also
gave Chinese policy makers more room for manipulating the illusion of
preferential treatment for foreign investors. As Chinese domestic parties
were governed by stringent rules and restrictions, any relaxation or flexibil-
ity allowed to foreign investors from such "norms" or "normative treat-
ment" could be characterized as "preferences., 300 For instance, exemptions
from import taxes were labelled as preferential measures because domesti-
cally owned businesses had to pay such taxes. While foreign investors re-
ceived special treatment in some tax and non-tax areas, domestic enterprises
were given state subsidies as well as market protection. This "trade-off'
enhanced domestic acceptability for tax preferences to foreign investments.
C. Policy Targets and Changes
Since its inception in the late 1970s, China's foreign investment policy
has been dominated by the pursuit of rapid economic growth. This policy
led to the adoption of a particularistic approach. The government would
first identify particular areas or types of investment that would most likely
make the opening-up policy look successful. Then the government would
adopt tax and non-tax measures to target and promote such investments.
Thus, national tax legislation has been augmented by a myriad of particu-
laristic rules designed for targeted foreign investments, either regionally-
oriented, industry/sector-specific or ethnically-based. SEZs and other pri-
ority areas were created in coastal regions because they were in the best po-
sition to attract foreign business. Overseas Chinese businesses received
sense of "social responsibility" was also imposed on enterprises as part of their objectives.
OGDEN, supra note 35, at 112. To the extent that tax preferences could bring material bene-
fits to enterprise managers and workers, they were rewards for labor and management per-
formance, and not associated with the notion of increased profit or returns on capital. As the
aims of tax preferences for foreign investment were not the same, separate regimes were ini-
tially created for FIEs and DOEs.
299 Besides its allocative and incentive functions, taxation in a planned economy per-
formed other non-revenue generating functions such as price adjustment. See Perkins, supra
note 260, at 369 (discussing the control of the inflationary gap through consumer tax in
China); see also HOLZMAN, supra note 260 (describing and analyzing Soviet experiences
with taxes to control price).
300 Preferences presuppose the existence of norms or normative treatment. See, e.g., Sur-
rey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 229 n.9 ("[t]ax expenditure analysis is based on the con-
cept of a normal or normative tax of the type under consideration"). An example of the use
of "norms" and "preferences" is seen in different customs and immigration treatment of Chi-
nese business people and foreigners. For instance, the customs and immigration regulations
for Chinese business people to go abroad were quite restrictive; a promised simplified pro-
cedure for customs and immigration treatment for foreign business people was described by
the Guangdong SEZs Regulations as preferential treatment. Guangdong SEZs Regulations,
supra note 100, art. 18.
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additional preferential treatment because they were more likely to invest in
the Motherland.
How fast economic development can be achieved through such policies
has been heavily debated. The contending views and their corresponding
concerns dominate the direction of the preference policy and provide am-
biguous or even contradictory results. A case in point is the debate as to
whether hi-tech investment should be given top priority. The leadership
initially endorsed the concept of Chinese-foreign joint ventures because
Chinese enterprises could easily benefit from the technology and business
skills provided by foreign partners. The 1979 EJV Law offered unspecified
income tax exemptions and reductions only to EJVs using advanced tech-
nology by international standards. No preferential treatment was promised
to non hi-tech projects, as they were not a priority. This policy soon
shifted. Most investment in the early days of the opening-up policy was in
labor-intensive industrial projects which relied on imported designs and
materials to manufacture textiles, apparel, shoes, toys and other light-
industry products for export or re-export. 01  Although these investments
fell short of the hi-tech type projects to which the Chinese aspired, they still
contributed to the country's exports and job creation. Chinese decision-
makers realized that the country was more likely to attract labor-intensive
investments than hi-tech projects because of the comparative advantages.30 2
Small projects were also more likely to produce quick results.30 3 The 1980
JVITL extended tax holidays to all new EJVs without conditioning them
301 According to statistics compiled by Guangdong province, between September 1978
and September 1979, over one thousand processing and assembling contracts were signed
between Chinese and foreign investors mainly from Hong Kong and Macau; seventeen of
these took the form of an EJV or CJV with a total foreign investment of US$ 250 million.
Fan Bing, Guangdongsheng Kaizhan Jiagong Zhuangpei Buchang Maoyi De Qingkuang He
Wenti [The Situation and Issues Concerning Processing, Assembling and Compensation
Trade in Guangdong Province], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS],
May 15, 1980, at 2, 2.302 In early 1982, the State Council urged coastal cities to expand export-oriented proc-
essing and assembling industries. Guowuyuan Zhaokai Yanhai Jiu Sheng Shi Zizhiqu Dui-
wai Jingli Gongzuo Zuotanhui [The State Council Called for A Seminar on Foreign
Economic Works in Nine Coastal Provinces, Municipalities and Autonomous Regions],
RENMIN RiBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Jan. 17, 1982, at 2. Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang
supported the adoption, in early 1988, of an export-led development strategy; accordingly,
labor-intensive industries could absorb "the labor surplus in agriculture and at the same time
earn foreign exchange." For an English summary of this strategy, see Yu Yu-lin, Chao Tzu-
yang and Li P'eng. Latent Divergences in Their "Strategies" for Economic Development,
IssuES & STUDIES, Mar. 1988, at 5, 7.
303 Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 5 (early focus was on small and medium invest-
ment projects). This soon became the so-called "placing the two ends of production outside"
strategy according to which China encouraged investment in industrial-processing projects
which relied on imports of designs and raw materials for production of exports. For a dis-
cussion of the strategy, see Chang Chen-pang, Communist China's "Strategy" in Developing
the CoastalAreas, 24 IssuEs & STuDiES, Mar. 1988, at 1.
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upon the use of advanced technology, thereby accommodating labor-
intensive processing projects.
The Chinese have not abandoned their fascination with Western tech-
nology and know-how. The Chinese concept of modernization is closely
connected with images derived from Western technological achievements.
After the adoption of the 1980 JVITL, the government attempted to re-
target technology intensive investments through special treatment. As la-
bor-intensive investments were still welcomed during the 1980s,'04 hi-tech
specific preferences had to take the form of added benefits to existing re-
ductions and exemptions available to non-hi-tech projects. The 22 Articles
promulgated in 1986 promised an additional three-year fifty percent enter-
prise income tax reduction to foreign investment projects qualified as
TAEs, following the expiration of otherwise-applicable tax exemptions and
reductions. 30 5 The Chinese inclination to favor certain hi-tech investments
is highlighted by a recent announcement of new import tax exemptions for
such investments.30 6 The government's policy of favoring capital intensive,
hi-tech investments could produce, however, relatively few benefits for
many Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese investors who engage in labor-
intensive processing projects.0 7 As foreign investment policy has become
more selective in recent years, the government has concentrated on pro-
moting hi-tech and other priority investments; meanwhile non-hi-tech, non-
priority projects, including many Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese in-
vestments, face preference cuts. While the pursuit of fast development led
the government to target the areas and projects most likely to succeed, the
need for regional balance has pulled in another direction. Both the 1980
JVITL and 1981 FEITL demonstrated this countervailing trend, as each
provided extensive tax holidays for investment projects in economically-
backward, remote regions.0 8 The 1991 UTL continued these tax holi-
days.30 9
304 See ZHANG, supra note 295, at 180 (discussing policy in the 1980s which encouraged
high-tech projects, but still sought labor-intensive investments by giving additional prefer-
ences for hi-tech, and maintaining ordinary preferences for labor-intensive projects). In fact,
the 22 Articles simultaneously offered a 50% enterprise income tax reduction to foreign in-
vestment enterprises qualified as PEEs with 70% of the value of their products coming from
exports. 22 Articles, supra note 4, art. 8. PEEs may not necessarily be hi-tech type projects,
though they receive more attractive benefits than tax reductions accorded to TAEs.
305 22 Articles, supra note 4, art. 9.
306 Tax Breaks Only on Hi-Tech Imports, supra note 257.
307 See, e.g., ZHANG MINRU Er AL., SHENZHEN LIYONG WAIZI DE TANsuo [SHENZHEN'S
EXPLORATORY EXPERIENCES WITH FOREIGN INVESTMENT] 25-30 (1993) (noting most foreign
investment projects in Shenzhen SEZ came from Hong Kong and were small-scale and low-
tech); Su Guoyuan & Tang Caibin, Tianjin Waishang Touzi Qiye Kuisun Yuanyin Poxi
[Anatomy of Losses of Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises in Tianjin], CAIZHENG YANJIU
ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], No. 22, Aug. 10, 1993, at 29, 29 (noting that 45%
of foreign investment in Tianjin was from Hong Kong).308 See supra notes 54, 63 and accompanying text.
309 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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D. Capitalist Profit Motive and Chinese Control
According to Deng Xiaoping, China sought foreign capital for the "de-
velopment of productive forces."1 The country used the policy of opening
up and domestic reform to help build "a socialism with Chinese character-
istics. '311 The Chinese authorities had to convince themselves and the Chi-
nese people that the use of tax preferences would benefit the country. The
concept of profit maximization did not resonate well domestically. Ac-
cording to Communist thinking, the capitalist idea of profit was offensive
because it was related to exploitation and cheating, and profit motivation
was synonymous with selfishness and greed. Moreover, there was fear that
purely profit-motivated investment decisions would harm the country's
long term development goals. The leadership feared that such decisions
could lead to chaotic competition with foreign forces for domestic market
shares and threaten Chinese national industries. It was accepted that the
pursuit of profit by foreign investors, while unavoidable, must therefore be
controlled by the state.3 1' Finally, the opening up policy assumed that the
country would receive many benefits, including more tax collections, from
the arrival of overseas capital. 313 However, many feared that because they
received preferential treatment, foreign investors might benefit more from
the country's opening up than the Chinese themselves.314
The Chinese devised accounting and financial mechanisms to hold for-
eigners' profit-seeking behavior in check. The 1979 EJV Law required
EJVs to contribute to a reserve fund and a venture expansion fund from
their after-tax profit, before distribution of any profit could be made to
venture partners.3 5 A portion of tax savings would, therefore, be spent for
reinvestment and joint venture expansion.31-6 The Chinese were also able to
310 Deng Xiaoping, Shehui Zhuyi He Shichang Jingli Bu Cunzai Genben Maodun [No
Fundamental Contradiction Exists Between the Socialism and Market Economy], Oct. 23,
1985, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 89, at 148-49.
311 Deng Xiaoping, Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese De Shehui Zhuyi [Building the Socialism
With Chinese Characteristics], June 30, 1984, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING,
supra note 89, at 62, 63-64 (explaining socialism in terms of developing productive forces);
Deng Xiaoping, Yi Kao Lixiang Er Kao Jilu Caineng Tuanjie Qilai [Unit on the Basis of
Idealism and Discipline], Mar. 7, 1985, id. at 110, 110 (explaining that socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics depends on spiritual civilizations, idealism, ethics, morality, culture and
discipline).
312 See, e.g., Xu Xuehan et al., Guanyu Jingfi Tequ Jianshe Zhong De Jige Wenti [Some
Issues Concerning the Construction of Special Economic Zones], 1983 Y.B. SEZs, supra
note 93, at 634, 635 (necessary to control profit motive of foreign investors).
313 Deng, Talks in Shanghai, supra note 137, at 373.
314 See Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 5 (foreign businesses may take unfair ad-
vantage of the opening up policy).315 EJV Law, supra note 1, art. 7 (after-tax profit must go to the following three funds
first: a reserve fund, a bonus and welfare fund for staff and workers, and a venture expansion
fund).
316 The reserve fund is used to offset any losses of EJVs, increase enterprise capital and
expand production. EJV Implementing Rules, supra note 217, art. 87.
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influence the way profit was used if they controlled the board of directors of
joint venture enterprises.317 Chinese joint venture partners had to hand over
their distributed profits to their superior government department. 18 Certain
tax benefits were explicitly tied to reinvestment by foreign investors in
China.31 9 The profit that foreign investors could actually repatriate repre-
sented only a small portion. 20 China's tax preferences also played a role in
controlling foreign investment through information gathering and other
321monitoring.
IV. CULTURAL FACTORS
The Chinese adoption of tax and non-tax preferences to foreign in-
vestment must also be explained and examined in light of cultural factors.
Tax reductions and exemptions were traditionally associated with the Con-
fucian idea of a virtuous and benevolent government founded on popular
trust and support. The idea, when applied to interactions with foreigners,
required the Chinese government to express largess and hospitality to win a
favorable reputation and trust from foreigners. In return, foreigners were
expected to behave according to Chinese norms. Another cultural trait was
the friendship/relationship approach. Tax and non-tax preferences were
presented as gifts or rewards to overseas investors who were supposed to
reciprocate the gesture. Through the generosity and friendship/relationship
models, the government stressed sincerity and appealed to emotions, sense
of shame and moral obligation. The government believed that its friend-
ship/relationship approach, in addition to the economic incentives, would
stimulate foreign business communities to respond to China's opening-up
policy. Moreover, the model provides a framework by which they can
317 Id. The board of directors of the EJV determines the proportion of profits going to
each of the three funds.
318 Since Chinese joint venture participants are usually state-owned enterprises, their dis-
tributed profits from joint ventures should be remitted to the state treasury. See Liu Yushan
& Xu Yaping, Yanhai Kaifang Chengshi Caizheng Diaoyan Baogao [Report on the Finan-
cial hIvestigation of Coastal Open Cities], CAIZHENG YANJIu ZILIAO [FINANCIAL RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Oct. 15, 1985, at 8, 11.
319 See supra notes 55, 77 and accompanying text.
320 As a government document reassured, in the case of a 50-50 EJV, the portion of profit
the foreign partner could take home would not exceed 30% because 70% would be retained
in China through income tax, profit repatriation tax, distribution of Chinese share of profit,
enterprise reserve and other funds. Guowuyuan Pizhuan Guojia Jingwei Duiwai Jingji
Maoyi Bu Guanyu Jinyibu Banhao Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye De Baogao [Approval and
Issuance by the State Council of the Report of the State Economic Commission and Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade Concerning Further Improving Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Ventures], Mar. 16, 1983, in LAWS OF ECONOMIC OPEN AREAS, supra note 5, at
766, 770.
321 Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilem-
mas of State Control, CHINA QUARTERLY, Mar. 1995, at 155, 173 ("the Chinese state seeks to
strengthen its capacity to obtain information on the financial condition, sales activities and
technology base of foreign investment projects" through tax preferences).
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blame any lack of enthusiasm on the part of foreign investors on their in-
sensitivity. Finally, moral superiority would give the Chinese a strong justi-
fication for responding to foreigners' misbehavior.
A. Tax Leniency and Trust
An editorial published in the August 1982 issue of Hongqi, or Red
Flag, the official magazine of the Communist Party Central Committee,
stated that, when dealing with foreigners who "are sincerely seeking coop-
eration, and using legitimate means, to do business with us," the Chinese
should "give them a welcome, treat them with 1i (rites), and stress friend-
ship, even though no deal is concluded in the end. 322 Because foreigners
came for material gains, the country would "loosen policies and permit
profit to be made" 32 - a reference to the adoption of tax and non-tax pref-
erences. The editorial urged people to take efforts to win "reputation and
trust" from foreign businesses. 24 The Party Secretary in the Fujian Prov-
ince made the point more explicitly in the early 1980s by arguing that tax
and other preferential measures were a capital investment on the part of
China to build reputation and trust with potential investors.
32
Conforming to 1i and winning trust through tax leniency are typically
Confucian ideas. While the Chinese monarch possessed absolute powers
according to the concept of Mandate of Heaven,326 the exercise of that
power was under moral constraints. According to Confucian teachings, the
state was analogous to a family and the ruler played a role similar to that of
the head of the family.32 7 The relationship between the ruler and his sub-
jects then followed kinship ethics and power structures. 28 The ruler was
322 Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 5.
323 id.
324 Id. at 4-5.
325 Xiang Nan, Tequ Yao Shixing Si Te [Implementing Four Special Characteristics in
Special Economic Zones], in 1983 Y.B. SEZs, supra note 93, at 113, 114.326 In Imperial China, "all under the heaven belonged to the emperor." See RAY HUANG,
TAXATION AND GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MING CHINA 6 (1974).
For a discussion of the Mandate of Heaven, see C.K. YANG, RELIGION IN CHINESE SOCIETY
127-29 (1967). The Chinese word tian or Heaven has a number of meanings and origins.
See generally ROBERT ENO, THE CONFUCIAN CREATION OF HEAVEN: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
DEFENSE OF RITUAL MASTERY (1990); GIANCARLO FINAZzO, THE PRINCIPLE OF TIEN: ESSAY
ON ITS THEORETICAL RELEVANCY IN EARLY CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY (1967). This idea linked
the ascendency to the throne or change of dynasties to supernatural forces, and provided an
acceptable explanation for the origin of monarchical power, based on "the awe and respect
of the supernatural" of common people. YANG, supra, at 132. It sanctified the supreme
power and utmost privileges enjoyed by Chinese rulers. Id. at 128.
327 For a comparison of the ruler of the state with the head of a family, see Hsu CHO-YuN,
ANCIENT CHINA IN TRANSITION: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY 722-222 B.C. 78-79
(1965).
328 See, e.g., ETIENNE BALAZS, CHINESE CIvILIsATION AND BUREAUCRACY: VARIATIONS
ON A THEME 18 (H.M. Wright trans., 1964) (discussing kinship virtues of "respect, humility,
docility, obedience, submission, and subordination" as state ideology).
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supposed to lead, protect, and take care of the welfare of his subjects just as
the head of a family should do for his members. 29 In turn, the people owed
loyalty and obedience to the state just as family members did to the fam-
ily.330 The kinship analogy operated as a check on the theoretically unbri-
dled imperial power. While the Chinese State did not tolerate popular
claims to rights, it had to show sympathy and pity to the people.331 The
Mandate of Heaven was bestowed to "the office of the throne, rather than in
the person of the ruler,, 332 and it could be revoked if the ruler was no longer
virtuous and benevolent.333 Confucian texts supplied examples of how a
good ruler should treat his subjects. Mencius, when advising the King of
the state of Liang, associated virtue and benevolence with, among other
things, "reducing taxes and levies. 334 While the state power to collect land
tax and levies 33 was theoretically unrestrained, it had to be exercised leni-
329 See also ROGER T. AMES, THE ART OF RULERSHIP: A STUDY IN ANCIENT CHINESE
POLITICAL THOUGHT 158-59 (1983) (the relationship between the ruler and his subjects is
that of parent and child, the welfare of the child being the parents' most vital concern).
330 As it was noted,
The traditional family served as the paradigm for the moral life, but the moral life
did not end with family obligations. There were obligations to society as well: obliga-
tions modeled on the structure of the family.
PHILIP J. IVANHOE, ETHICS IN THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION: THE THOUGHT OF MENCIUS AND
WANG YANG-MING 5 (1990).
Professor Arthur Wright also noted that the norms of proper social behavior in Chinese
society started with one's family and "would in turn foster social virtues: filial submission,
brotherliness, righteousness, good faith, and loyalty." Arthur F. Wright, Values, Roles, and
Personalities, in CONFUCIAN PERSONALITIES 3, 7 (Arthur F. Wright & Denis Twitchett eds.,
1962). For a further discussion of the influence of filial piety, a key concept in Chinese
family ethics on the social relationship, see Hsieh Yu-wei, Filial Piety and Chinese Society,
in THE CHINESE MIND: ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 167, 174-75
(Charles A. Moore & A.V. Morris eds. 1967).
331 In China, "[a] form of paternalism was the highest ideal of government, and every-
thing was done to envelop transactions between government and the public in layers of dif-
fuse human emotion. Citizens never demanded their rights; they sought instead the
sympathy, and indeed the pity, of those more powerful than themselves." LUCIAN W. PYE,
THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE POLITICS 19 (1992). For another discussion of individual rights and
state power in China, see Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights
in China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359 (1995).
332 YANG, supra note 326, at 133.
333 As a Chinese writer put it, "[h]eaven, being not a selfish god who cared only about his
'first son', had the well-being of the people on his mind and was ready to change his man-
date any time 'his son' did not behave." CHANG CH'I-YUN, CONFUCIANISM: A MODERN
INTERPRETATION 162-63 (1980). As Mark Mancall describes, the Chinese emperor had two
personalities: one was the "embodiment of virtue" with the title of "son of heaven", and the
other was "the man at the apex of organized civilization"; and in the latter personality he
could "stray from the path of true virtue, betraying his role as son of heaven and causing dis-
harmony in the universe" MARK MANCALL, CHINA AT THE CENTER: 300 YEARS OF FOREIGN
POLICY 22 (1984).
334 MENCIUs 31 (Zhao Zhentao et al. trans., 1993).
335 During the first two hundred years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the land tax sup-
plied more than 75% of the government revenue, EDWIN GEORGE BEAL, JR., THE ORIGIN OF
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ently.336 Tax leniency became the litmus test of the ruler's virtue, and lower
tax rates and fewer levies coupled with generous exemptions and reductions
were the hallmarks of a humane government.337 Excessive taxation, on the
other hand, demonstrated "widespread dissatisfaction and confusion, and..
. the downfall of the dynasty."338 Tax leniency was specially urged in times
of need such as crop failures.
339
Tax reductions and exemptions were considered to be favors granted
by the ruler. The Chinese word en, or "favor," usually goes hand in hand
LaIN, 1853-1864 3-4 (1958); it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that
other forms of taxes and levies, especially new taxation on trade and industry, surpassed the
land tax and became the major sources of revenue. Id. at 3-5. Land, as the most important
form of wealth in a predominantly agricultural society, belonged to the emperor. Although
there were forms of private land ownership in the sense that land could be bought and sold
between individuals, "the lands in China before the Republic were considered as belonging
to the emperor.... [t]hroughout the various dynasties, at least from Ch'in on, this theory of
absolute ownership of land by the sovereign had found expression in the decrees, edicts,
memorials and other state papers." HAN LIANG HUANG, THE LAND TAX IN CHINA 71 (Ams
ed. 1968). Private ownership in traditional China was different from private ownership in
the West. Chinese traditional form of property was identified as the "Asiatic" or "Oriental"
form founded on "tribal or common property" with the community as the "hereditary posses-
sor," but subordinated to the state, which is "the real owner, and the real precondition of
common ownership." KARL MARX, PRE-CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMATIONS 69-70 (Eric
Hobsbawm ed., 1965).
As an old Chinese saying goes, "All the land under heaven is the property of the sover-
eign; all the dwellers on the land are the subjects of the king." HAN LIANG HUANG, supra, at
71. 336 Mencius was one of the most influential advocates for lenient tax policy and identified
low tax burdens with the virtue and benevolence of the state; he believed that after tax, peo-
ple should be able to support their parents, wives and other family members; in other words,
the state should only tax the surplus of what people have left after satisfying their normal
needs. WANG CHENGBO ET AL., ZHONGGUO FusHuI SIXIANG Si [A CHINESE HISTORY OF
IDEAS ON TAXATION] 74 (1995); see also Hu JICHUAN & TAN MIN, ZHONGGUO CAIZHENG
SDUANG SHI [A CHINESE HISTORY OF THOUGHTS ON FINANCE] 51-55 (1989).
337 For a discussion of tax leniency throughout Chinese history, see WANG ET AL., supra
note 336, at 127 (Ian Dynasty), 238-43 (Tang Dynasty), 312-13 (Song Dynasty); 457-60
(Ming Dynasty); 522-23 (Qing Dynasty). While the extent to which Confucian teachings
about morality played a restraining role in the imperial exercise of taxing powers was always
difficult to measure, some effect should be expected; as one author noted, "considering the
unlimited power at the disposal of the crown, one might wonder what would have happened
had this power never been subject to any moral restraint." HUANG, supra note 326, at 7.
Other evidence of the effect of the Confucian teachings on tax policy can be found in the fact
that proponents of higher taxes and levies were usually forced into a defensive posture.
BEAL, supra note 335, at 59 (officials in Qing Dynasty tried to justify a new tax on grounds
that it was "absolute necessity" and, if properly administered, "would never have become a
burden upon the people").338 HAN LIANG HUANG, supra note 335, at 54.
339 Usually, tax exemptions and reductions were granted when there were crop failures.
See, e.g., WANG ET AL., supra note 336, at 114, 245 (different tax reliefs depending on the
seriousness of natural calamities during Han and Tang Dynasties).
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with the word de, or "virtue., 3 40  The ruler's willingness to grant favor
showed his care for the people. Modelled on these family and kinship pat-
tems, the Chinese State traditionally was responsible for the economic wel-
fare of its subjects.' 4  Chinese people tended to depend upon the state for
food and other handouts.342 A key Confucian element of government was
confidence or trust of the people.343 To have popular trust - which Confu-
cius ranked higher in priority than economic self-sufficiency and military
prowess344 - the ruler must consult and care for the interest of the peo-
ple.345 The parallel between the family and state fostered a sense of "fidu-
ciary community." 346 Favors were evidence of the ruler's sense of
responsibility for the people and "community." In spite of its ruthless
side,347 authority in China was also seen as "subtle, wise, and the source of
340 For instance, the Chinese expression Da En Da De or "big favor, big virtue" means
the bigger the favor one gives, the more virtue he possesses.
341 As Professor Jacques Gemet put, the Chinese State always had "the social responsi-
bilities," made "constant interventions to maintain the equilibrium between factors such as
money and food supply, or surplus and penury" as well as played a role "in shaping the envi-
ronment (canals, roads, fortifications)." See Jacques Gemet, Introduction, in SCOPE OF
STATE POWER IN CHINA, supra note 262, at xxvii, xxxi.342 See PYE, supra note 331, at 104 ("the Chinese manifest a very striking form of oral
dependency in which authority is seen as a nurturing force, anxious to provide food, and al-
ways ready to sooth the disturbed by feeding them").
143 Book 12, in THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 197, para 7 (Lao An trans., 1992). The en-
tire passage reads:
Zigong asked Confucius how to practice government. Confucius said: "Provide suffi-
cient food and ready troops and weapons, and then the people will have confidence in
the goverment." Zigong asked again: "Suppose you were forced to give up one of thet ree, which would you let go first ?" Confucius replied: "the troops and weapons."Zigong asked again: "If you were still forced to further give up one of the remaining
tvo, which vould you let go ?" Confucius said: "Food. For from of old death has been




34- See, e.g., RAYMOND DAwSON, CONFUCIUS 64-65 (1981).
346 The expression "fiduciary community" refers to the Confucian idea of a good society
which was the one of harmony, and dependency. Tu Wei-ming, Confucianism: Symbol and
Substance in Recent Times, in VALUE CHANGE IN CHINESE SOCIETY 21, 46 (Richard W. Wil-
son et al. eds., 1979).
347 While Confucius was reluctant to discuss the use of state forces to achieve order and
harmony, the Legalists favored strengthening state power through war, strict enforcement of
law and discipline. WM. THEODORE ET AL., SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 136-38 (1963).
Although it was its rival Confucianism that became the common ideology among the general
public for centuries, Legalism supplied the most justifications for the actual exercise of state
power by rulers. VITALY A. RUBIN, INDIVIDUAL AND STATE IN ANCIENT CHINA -- ESSAYS ON
FoUR CHINESE PHILOSOPHERs 55 (Steven I. Levine trans., 1976) (citing LEON
VENDERMEERSCH, LA FORMATION DU LEGISME 277 (1965)). Imperial Confucianism thus is
distinguished from classical Confucianism as "an amalgam of classical Confucian and Le-
galist ideas." Charles 0. Hucker, Confucianism and the Chinese Censorial System, in
CONFUCIANISM IN ACTION 182, 184 (David S. Nivison & Arthur F. Wright, eds. 1959). Un-
der imperial Confucianism, "[t]he Legalist form of law was retained, but the laws were in-
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morality. 3 48 The Confucian way of government stressed moral examples
and persuasion rather than the use of physical force.349 In the ideal Confu-
cian order, "[t]he good ruler and his ministers would, on the one hand, pro-
vide the people with an example of proper behavior according to li," and on
the other hand "educate the people in li."'350 Li, a key Confucian concept,
referred to "the rules governing the behavior of the individual in his own
social role and governing his behavior toward others in their social
roles. 3'' Handing out tax reliefs and other forms of favor was an indica-
tion that the ruler conducted himself according to li.352 The people then
"should be positively motivated by li, to do that which they ought,"
353
namely "render[ing] loyalty and willing obedience" to the ruler.3 4 The
ruler could grant tax preferences discriminately, depending on the nature
and extent of loyalty and support that he was seeking. Just as his subjects
were classified according to different status and categories, the ruler could
grant special preferential tax treatment to nobility, officials, and bureaucrats
as rewards to further distinguish them from the rest of society.355 As they
were treated more favorably than the rest of society, those beneficiaries
owed commensurately greater duties to the ruling house. This was the ap-
plication of Chinese particularism to taxation. Chinese rulers used tax re-
ductions and exemptions as tools to win the acceptance and allegiance to
newly conquered areas. 6
After 1949 the leadership continued to win popular trust through state
favor. For political and ideological reasons, though, new slogans replaced
Confucian vocabulary. 7 The Stalinist political and economic system
fused with a Confucian spirit. Confucian ideas were consistently brought into the battle to
'temper the rigor of the law' by injecting into juristic considerations the classical Confucian
emphases on ethics and li, propriety. Thus, law, though elaborately codified, remained the
instrument of morality." Id. at 185.348 PYE, supra note 331, at 86.
349 See Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in MILTON KATZ,
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 27 (1957), reprinted in JEROME ALAN
COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN
INTRODUCTION 62, 63-64 (1968).
350 Id. at 64.
51 Id. at 63.
352 In China, "the granting of presents by superiors has belonged to the ritual of power";
and "[g]enerosity is the service in return for the privileged position." HEINER RoErs,
CONFUCIAN ETHICS OF THE AXIAL AGE: A RECONSTRUCTION UNDER THE ASPECT OF THE
BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD POSTCONVENTIONAL THINKING 88 (1993).353 Herrlee Glessner Creel, Legal Institutions and Procedures During the Chou Dynasty,
in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION 26, 39 (Jerome Alan Cohen et al. eds., 1980).
314 Id. at 39.
355 Early tax benefits of this kind could be traced to Zhou Dynasty (1122-770 B.C). See
WANG ETAL., supra note 336, at 18.
356 Id. at 119 (tax exemptions and lower levies in the south and southeast for newly con-
quered ethnic minorities).
357 Contemporary Chinese intellectuals and political figures expressed vehement anti-
Confucian sentiments, and the explanation was "cultural iconoclasm," a desire to see China's
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China adopted in the 1950s was characterized by state ownership of land,
means of industrial production and financial institutions. The leadership
changed its rhetoric as well, carrying out its actions in the name of "the
People" rather than "Heaven." This new system gave the Party and state
powers to command and allocate resources, and therefore practice state fa-
vor, that were at least as broad as those of previous dynasties. In Maoist
China, the Party and state dictated investment, production and distribution
policies, and engaged in day-to-day management of hundreds of thousands
of state enterprises. Forms of state favor ranged from the "iron rice bowl"
life-time job guarantee to subsidized housing, health care and public trans-
portation - from approving college admissions to granting library cards.
The state's monopoly of political and economic power made the ubiqui-
tousness of state favor not only possible, but also inevitable. Any achieve-
ments in the country were inexorably attributable to the wisdom and
correctness of Party policy. In return, the Chinese people were expected to
love and trust the Party leadership.
Since the communist state already had a variety of means at its dis-
posal to show its care for the people, it was not as dependent on tax reduc-
tions and exemptions to build reputation and popular support. 8 Moreover,
the Party viewed taxation as a means of proletarian dictatorship to effect so-
cial and economic changes.5 9 It had to defend the tax policy's social and
economic objectives and castigate the belief that state taxation should con-
form to the Confucian idea of benevolent government.360  On the other
hand, the government intended tax preferences to strengthen the relation-
ship between the state and those who derived benefit from state favor. In-
creased investment funds as a result of tax saving aggrandized the power
"cultural values supplanted by new ideas imported from the West." Tu, supra note 346, at
36. Meanwhile, Confucianism continues to exert an undeniable influence on modem China,
and "[t]he pervasiveness of Confucian symbols in Chinese culture is certainly the main rea-
son why the unprecedented change in China since the Western impact of mid-nineteenth
century has brought about many waves of anti-Confucian campaigns." Id. at 39. In any
event, Confucian ideas are very relevant in identifying substantive issues in contemporary
China. Id. at 42-47. After 1949, many changes appeared to be more rhetorical than substan-
tive; the Confucian concepts of virtue and benevolence were carefully repackaged under
communist ethics and morality. Cf. OGDEN, supra note 35, at 188 (while post-1949 commu-
nist leaders relied on cultural values, they were reluctant to admit it).
358 The communist state's taxing power remained as absolute as ever before; however,
contemporary Chinese literature on taxation usually describes the nature of state taxing
power as qiangzlixing or compulsory, wuchangxing or non-compensatory and gudingxing or
fixed. See, e.g., Zou, supra note 277, at 3-4; YrN ZUORAN ET AL., GUOJIA SHUISHOU [STATE
TAXATION] 1-2 (1995). The compulsory nature of taxation means that "the state, in reliance
on its political power, forces taxpayers to pay taxes according to law." Zou, supra note 277,
at 3.
M NATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 269, at 7.
360 See LI, supra note 262, at 23 (attacks on government tax policy on grounds of be-
nevolence were associated with landlords and bourgeois viewpoints); see also Wang, supra
note 259, at 25 (Mao Zedong refused to link tax and finance policy to the traditional idea of
benevolence of the government).
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and sphere of influence of department bureaucrats and enterprise managers.
Tax treatment affected the balance sheet of an enterprise and fewer taxes
were translated into a higher profit on paper. Profitability was a measure-
ment of managers' and workers' performance, and high profits entitled
36136them to political and social honors,  as well as material rewards.362 By
giving benefits to bureaucrats, enterprise managers and even workers, the
state could claim trust and support from them.363 The overnment also used
tax benefits to demonstrate care for ethnic minorities.
B. Expression of Largess and Hospitality
The idea of 1i also applied to foreigners. The Confucian way of deal-
ing with foreigners was to be "generous with gifts without calculating the
value of tribute and to grant them honors without making heavy de-
mands., 365 The Chinese believed that by showing generosity and hospital-
ity they could exert moral influence on non-Chinese and lead them to
"participate in the benefits of (Chinese) civilisation.' 366 This view on for-
eign affairs was an extension of:
the Confucian doctrines by which Chinese rulers gained an ethical sanction for
their exercise of political authority... Just as the virtuous ruler by his moral
example had prestige and influence among the people of the Middle Kingdom,
361 Non-material rewards for managers and workers included "recognition by their work
units, a big red ribbon, and perhaps a promotion." OGDEN, supra note 35, at 108; see also
RISKIN, supra note 32, at 122 (non-material external incentives like "emulation campaigns,
the designation of model workers and work teams, and the publicizing of accomplishments
and faults by means of dazibao (wall posters)"; internal incentives like "job enlargement and
worker participation in management").
362 Allocation of enterprise profit for welfare purposes was subject, however, to state
regulations and supervision. See STATE ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING, supra note
279, at 288-89. In Maoist China, Party leaders were divided on whether economic incen-
tives should be used in a socialist system; the radical faction of the Party, which prevailed
during the years prior to the death of Mao Zedong, insisted on the importance of ideological
works and administrative controls and the use of economic incentives was brandished as po-
litical deviant. See, e.g., RISKIN, supra note 32, at 122 (individual material incentives were
attacked and many of them were eliminated in late 1950s).
363 Tax exemptions and reductions granted to individual businesses were labelled as
zhaogu or care by the state. Liu, supra note 7, at 454. As an official tax treatise stated, "tax
preferences have already existed in everyday life and benefited the way we dress ourselves,
eat, live and move around." Id. at 455.
364 See, e.g., Wang et al., supra note 167, at 28 (tax preferences have always been given
to ethnic minorities).
365 Wang Gungwu, Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay, in
THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER 34, 47 (John King Fairbank ed., 1968) [hereinafter CHINESE
WORLD ORDER].36 J. K. Fairbank & S. Y. Teng, On the Ch "ing Tributary System, in JOHN K. FAIRBANK &
Ssu-Yu TENG, CH'ING ADMINISTRATION: THREE STUDIES 107, 110 (1960).
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so he irresistibly attracted the barbarians who were outside the pale of Chinese
culture1
67
The tribute system368 is a good illustration. Formally, the system referred to
foreign rulers' periodical visits bringing local produce to the Chinese em-
peror who gave gifts and instructions in return.6 9 In substance, it described
a particular relationship between China and foreign countries under which
"non Chinese people were expected in theory to participate in the Chinese
world order by observing the appropriate procedures and ceremonies in
their contact with the Son of Heaven., 370 For foreigners, the tribute system
was "a formality connected with trade." 371 For the Chinese, however, the
system had important non-economic objectives such as "peace and secu-
rity., 372 The Chinese assumed that the foreigner was so bound by and de-
pendent upon trade with China 7 3 and that the Chinese could "use the lure of
trade and profit to meet the foreigner's desires and thus appease him and
avoid military conflict. '374 Thus, economic benefits were not a major con-
cern:
The imperial gifts bestowed in return were usually more valuable than the trib-
ute.... On China's part the permission to trade was intended to be a mark of
imperial bounty and a means of keeping the barbarians in the proper state of
submissiveness.375
In a Sinocentric world, the emperor of the Middle Kingdom "at the apex
treats the rulers of peripheral peoples with an overwhelming benevolence
(ien) and thereby ensures their allegiance and subordination. 376 The arri-
367 JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE UNrrED STATES AND CHINA 158 (4th ed. 1979). For dis-
cussions on historical Chinese views on foreigners and foreign relations, see Yen-p'ing Hao
& Erh-ming Wang, Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations, 1840-95, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA: LATE CH'ING, 1800-1911, PART 2, 142 (John K. Fairbank &
Kwang-Ching Liu eds., 1980); MANCALL, supra note 333, at 13-39. For a discussion of the
incorporation of virtue in Chinese views on foreign relations, see Wang in CHINESE WORLD
ORDER, supra note 366, at 111.
368 For a summary of the tribute system, see FAIRBANK, supra note 367, at 158-63. For
more elaborate discussions of the system, see Fairbank & Teng, supra note 366; CHINESE
WORLD ORDER, supra note 365.
369 In fact, "the concept of the 'tribute system' is a Western invention for descriptive pur-
poses." Mark Mancall, The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay, in CHINESE
WORLD ORDER, supra note 365, at 63, 63.370 Hao & Wang, supra note 367, at 144.
371 Fairbank & Teng, supra note 366, at 112.
372 Id. (quoting T. F. Tsiang, China and European Expansion, 2 POLITICA No. 5, Mar.
1936, at 1, 3-4).
373 See Hao & Wang, supra note 367, at 154 (during the Opium War period, there was a
firm belief that "the foreigners needed tea and rhubarb so much that if the supply were cut
off, they would become blind and subject to diseases of the intestines").374 Id. at 151.
375 Fairbank & Tseng, supra note 366, at 112 (quoting T. F. Tsiang, China and European
Expansion, 2 POLMCA No. 5, Mar. 1936, at 1, 3-4).
376 John K. Fairbank, The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order, in CHINESE
WORLD ORDER, supra note 365, at 257,264.
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vals of foreign tribute bearers were interpreted as "a sign of great virtue" of
the Chinese empire.377 The tribute system crumbled when Western powers
forced their way into China in the mid-nineteenth century and rejected Chi-
nese condescension and hierarchical inequality as symbolized by the tribute
system.378
Traditional ideas and attitudes nevertheless live on. Not surprisingly,
the August 1982 Red Flag editorial spoke of li, reputation and trust and al-
luded to the idea of generosity. Li referred to proper ways of dealing with
foreigners. As the Chinese were seeking to gain reputation and trust from
foreign business communities, they had to demonstrate virtue through acts
of sincerity and generosity. Tax and non-tax preferential treatment were
modem expressions of Chinese sincerity and generosity, used to win a good
reputation among foreigners. Only with reputation and trust would the
country be able to attract overseas capital and technology. Reliance on
these traditional ideas added a non-economic dimension to tax and other
preferential policies and brought comfort and assurance to the Chinese.
From a purely economic point of view, investors would come to do busi-
ness only if the host country matched their profit expectations. Therefore, it
was the host government's responsibility to adjust its tax and preferential
rules to suit foreign business expectations. According to Chinese ideas of 1i
and generosity, however, it was not necessary to match exactly foreigners'
economic expectations (in fact the Chinese admitted that they were not able
to do so). Instead, it was of utmost importance to show sincerity and gen,
erosity to motivate foreigners. If foreigners failed to respond, it would
demonstrate their insensitivity because they failed to appreciate Chinese
virtue.
The August 1982 Red Flag editorial identified two common attitudes
among contemporary Chinese toward foreigners. Some worshipped every-
thing Western and suffered from an intolerable cultural inferiority complex,
while others resisted opening up and held to the belief that things would be
better with little or no foreign contacts. 379 Both attitudes were harmful to
the objectives of the country's opening up and promotional efforts such as
tax preferences. For those who believed in autarky and xenophobia, tax and
other preferential treatment amounted to kowtowing to foreign interests.
Those who suffered from the inferiority complex feared that the adoption of
tax preferences could aggravate the perceived inferiority and cause a com-
31 Chusei Suzuki, China's Relations With Inner Asia: The Hsiung-Nu, Tibet, in CHINESE
WORLD ORDER, supra note 365, at 180, 184. The tribute system was "the mechanism by
which barbarous non-Chinese regions were given their place in the all-embracing Chinese
political, and therefore ethical, scheme of things." Fairbank & Teng, supra note 366, at 111.
378 The tribute system began to disintegrate with the establishment of a treaty system in
the mid-nineteenth century, FAIRBANK, supra note 367, at 163-71, although underlying con-
cepts persisted for many years. Fairbank, supra note 376, at 257.
379 Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 4.
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plete loss of faith in the country's system and future.38 ° References to 1i and
generosity were therefore necessary to convince the domestic audience that
tax preferences were not only consistent with, but even compelled by Chi-
nese tradition, and being generous was not weakness, but virtue. Such tra-
dition would boost self-confidence and assurance; as a result of Chinese
generosity and reputation foreigners would have trust in the country and
would therefore rush to China to do business.
C. Generosity, Moral Example and State Coercion
For the Chinese State, generosity would not only win reputation and
trust, it would also show virtue and set a moral example to be followed by
others. Tax leniency had been a familiar form of state favor and set a moral
example for the Chinese people.3 81 This tradition has gained favor in recent
years. Domestically, a decade-long economic reform has diminished the
leadership's ability to grant favors because the government's role in eco-
nomic management and provision of subsidies has been significantly re-
duced. The state no longer claims absolute control over the country's
economic life. Dependency on state financial support is no longer encour-
aged. Decentralization of economic responsibility, while necessary for the
country's long-term performance, has created uncertainties in society and in
people's lives. On the other hand, the state taxing power has not been de-
centralized. Taxation is one of the last few tools under the firm control of
the state, which can be used to influence business decisions and the welfare
of the people. The importance of taxation is only heightened by loosening
government control in other areas. Popular pressure now focuses on the ex-
ercise of the taxing power for welfare purposes. As the role of the state in
the economy has diminished in other areas, tax reliefs and concessions have
become significant benefits to individuals and businesses. Party leaders
have turned to the so-called "socialist spiritual civilization" to counter the
trend of materialism that was unleashed by economic reform. 38 2 Mean-
while, state favor, like tax leniency, is given in exchange for compliance. 83
380 Sensing the importance of national dignity and pride in the maintenance of political
faith, Deng Xiaoping declared that the Chinese people would never become dependent on
any foreign powers, nor accept any infringement upon their national interest. Deng Xiaop-
ing, Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shier Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Kaimuci [Speech at the
Opening Ceremony of the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], Sept. I,
1982, in 3 SELECTED WoRKs OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 89, at 1, 3.
381 Supra Part IV.A.
382 Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently said: "Developing socialist spiritual civiliza-
tion is related to the fate and prospects of the party and the nation and to the Chinese people
proudly towering among the people of the world." Jiang Praises Tough Drive on Morality,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 27, 1997, at 9.
313 The central govemment recently promised, for instance, that farmers' taxes would not
be raised before the end of the century in order to quiet rural discontent, but then required
farmers not to use farmlands for other purposes. Farmers' Tax Freeze to Avoid Risk of Ri-
ots, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Apr. 2, 1997, at 10.
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Similarly, preferential tax and non-tax treatment for foreigners has
manifested the Chinese virtue to foreigners. Tax and non-tax benefits serve
as a reminder that the welfare and profitability of foreign investors depend
on the Chinese State's generosity. The country is craving advanced tech-
nology and expertise, but hi-tech foreign investments can be seen as posing
a competitive threat to domestic technological development efforts.
384
Viewing tax and non-tax benefits as a moral example of the Chinese State
is, again, the Confucian way of solving the dilemma. The government of-
fers economic benefits to induce hi-tech foreign investments and, at the
same time, to motivate or shame foreign investors into behaving properly.
Foreign businesses are expected to conform with their proper role, which is
to help China's modernization by bringing in the capital, technology and
expertise the country needs. They must refrain from doing harm to the
Chinese by relentlessly taking market shares from DOEs. Just as the West
can influence the Chinese society with modem ideas such as the rule of law
and human rights, the Chinese believe their virtue and moral example can
have a universal validity or, at least, should be learned and assimilated by
foreigners doing business in the country. If foreigners "held ulterior mo
tives, or used illegitimate means," as the August 1982 Red Flag editorial
warned, "they should be vehemently resisted by the Chinese people and
even face court trial according to law., 386 Showing virtue and moral exam-
ple is the prelude to the state exercise of coercion. Voluntary compliance
may be obtained through use or threat of use of coercive force. 87
The Chinese State makes clear that overseas investors are subject to its
power,388 and law and state machinery are legitimate means of control.
389
384 See, e.g., Xiao Yu, Feeling the Downside of Foreign Capital, S. CHNA MORNING
POST, July 13, 1997, at 5.
385 The Chinese government recently even urged Western advertisers to promote Party
propaganda for Marxism and socialist morality. Tom Korski, Western Advertisers Urged to
Push Ethics, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, May 14, 1997, at 8.
386 Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 5. The Chinese tend to make a simplistic dis-
tinction between friends and foes among foreigners which seems to be the legacy of diverse
traditional attitudes towards foreigners ranging from "an idealistic 'Mencian' view that bar-
barians could be easily 'transformed' (hua) by simple exposure to Confucian culture" to
"views that compared the barbarians to beasts and birds doomed to eternal inferiority." Ben-
jamin I. Schwartz, The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present, in CHINESE
WORLD ORDER, supra note 365, at 276, 281.
387 Chinese scholars referred to the Confucian and Legalist traditions and advocated a
combined use of moral education and legal rules. See, e.g., Cao Jianming & Li Ran, Lun
Shehui Zhuyi Jingshen Wenming Yu Fazhi Jianshe [On Building Socialist Spiritual Civiliza-
tion and Legality], FAxuE [SCIENCE OF LAW], 1996 No. 12, at 4.
... When speaking of the principles governing enterprise income taxes on EJVs and other
forms of foreign investment, officials and commentators referred to China's sovereign power
over foreigners doing business in the country. See Gu Ming, supra note 52, at 624 (JVITL
made in accordance with the "principle of state sovereign right and interest"); Xie Ming, su-
pra note 63, at 621 (same); see also Niu, supra note 47, at 159; Wang Xuanhui, Qiantan
Woguo Shewai Shuizhi Jiangshe Suo Yixun De Yuanze [A Preliminary Discussion on the
Principles Governing Foreign Related Taxation in Our Country], SHtIWU YANJIU
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The authorities have insisted on yifa zhishui, or "taxing according to
law, 390 and taxpayers are bound by their legal duties to pay taxes.391 The
government does not spare foreign businesses from its increasing legal and
administrative control. FIEs are Chinese legal entities and subject to the
state power just like other domestic concerns. In fact, the Chinese govern-
ment seems to be more willing to sanction foreign investors who violate the
law. In a publicized case involving a joint venture golf club in Shenzhen,
the Chinese tax authorities accused a Japanese investor of evading seventy-
seven million yuan in tax payments since 1988. 393 They froze the club's
assets and claimed that the taxpayer was "resisting to pay tax" which, under
Chinese criminal law, carries a maximum of seven years' imprisonment.3 94
The Japanese joint venturer deserved punishment for flagrantly disregarding
Chinese norms.395 The case showed other foreign firms the undesirable yet
[TAXATION RESEARCH], No. 4, 1993, at 53, 53. Even as the Chinese refer to international
practice and foreign experiences when enacting substantive tax rules and preferential meas-
ures, they have insisted on the independent exercise of tax sovereignty. See Wang, supra.
The insistence on tax sovereignty might be an allusion to the Chinese State's absolute power
to impose taxes and levies. The Chinese emphasis on the sovereign power to tax also aims
to reassure those who were skeptical about the arrival of foreign capital and who were con-
cerned about the exploitation of the Chinese people by foreigners. LI, supra note 207, at 9.
References to China's independence in exercising its sovereign power to tax also assured
that no interference with the country's taxing power by foreigners was allowed. Niu, supra
note 47, at 160.
389 See Deng Xiaoping, Gaige Shi Zhongguo Fazhan Shengchanli De Biyou Zhilu [Re-
form Is the Only Path for China to Develop Productive Forces], Aug. 28, 1985, in SELECTED
WoRKs OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note 89, at 136, 139 (threats from foreign investment
could be controlled by Chinese State machinery).
390 Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Shenhua Shuishou Zhengguan Gaige De Fangan [Plan
of the State Administration of Taxation Concerning Deepening Reform on Tax Collection
and Administration], ZHONGGUO SIunvu [CHINA TAXATiON], 1997 No. 4, at 4,4.
391 Benkan Pinglunyuan [Commentator], Renzhen Xuexi Guanche Fangan Buduan
Kaichuang Woguo Shuishou Zhengguan Kaige De Xin Jumian [To Earnestly Study and Im-
plement the Plan and Continue to Bring About New Situations of Reform on Tax Collection
and Administration of Our Country], ZHONGGUO SHuInvu [CHINA TAXATION], 1997 No.7, at
8,9.392 For an example of increasing legal control of foreign investment, see Julia Epley Klee
& Felicity C. Thomas, An Evolving Environmental Framework, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan. 1 I,.
1997, at 34 (the Chinese government increased regulations on environmental matters as new
burdens on foreign firms). Premier Li Peng in his annual government report stressed "su-
pervision of foreign-funded enterprises with an emphasis on tax collection and manage-
ment." Li Peng, Report on the Work of the Government -- delivered at the Fifth Session of
the Eighth National People's Congress on March 1, 1997, BEIJING REv., Mar. 31 - Apr. 6,
1997, supplement, at I, VI-VII.
393 Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Golf Club in Tax Row Says Investors May Take Fright, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1997, at 10.
394 id.
395 See He Guanghuai, Shenzhen Baori Teda Shewai Toushuian Yuanhe Yanbiancheng
Yanzhong Kangshuian [Why Did A Major Foreign Tax Evasion Case Involving Shenzhen
Baori Become A Serious Case of Resisting To Pay Tax], LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], 1997 No.
20, at 26, 26-27.
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unavoidable consequences they would face if they failed to behave the way
the Chinese expect.
396
The generosity, moral example and state coercion paradigms provide
justification for recent preference rule changes in response to policy shifts
against tax benefits to foreign investment. FIEs have been accused of tax
evasion and abuse of preferential treatment,397 as well as falsifying claims
of losses and hiding profit.398 Other alleged abuses and illegalities include
failures to make capital investment as promised, lack of business activity
after registration, and refusal of government supervision.399 Some have ar-
gued for a reduction or elimination of tax benefits to foreign investments
based on these allegations. In particular, critics of broadly-available tax
benefits such as the two-year income tax exemption and three-year fifty
percent reduction holidays,400 and five-year carry-over loss40 1 have argued
for cuts on those benefits based on reports that some FIEs evaded tax by
claiming continuous losses.40 2 There are no greater arguments in support of
preference cuts than the faults of foreign investors themselves. This argu-
ment is in line with the Chinese belief in the power of moral example and
shame. It is worth noting that Chinese generosity and virtue can hardly be
tested by objective criteria while foreigners' morality and intention are
judged on the basis of their economic behavior. The Chinese could present
almost any kind of benefits as the expression of their virtue and moral ex-
ample. On the other hand, if foreign businesses appear to be too calculat-
396 The Chinese understood the importance of threats of force, as the old tribute system
was possible only with backing of coercive power. See, e.g., Suzuki, supra note 377, at 183-
85.
397 See, e.g., Huang Jianqing, Fujiansheng Sanzi Qiye De Fazhan Xianzhuang Wenti He
Duice [Development of Foreign Investment Enterprises in Fujian: Current Situation, Prob-
lems and Solutions], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Mar. 10,
1994, at 19, 21 (serious tax evasions by FIEs in Fujian); Wu Youdong et al., Kuishun Shuyu
Guanli Chulu Zaiyu Wanshan [Losses Were Due to Loose Management and Solution Resides
on Improvement], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Feb. 28,
1994, at 30, 34 (abuses of tax preferences by FIEs in Hubei Province); Su & Tang, supra
note 307, at 29 (abuses of tax law by FIEs in Tianjin); Liu & Xu, supra note 318, at 13
(abuse of tax preferences).
391 From 1988 to 1993, 35% to 40% of FIEs were reportedly making a loss, and the num-
ber of FIEs in the red went up from 50% to 60% in 1994-95. It was believed that many of
the loss-making cases were attributable to transfer pricing, heavy debt, or other abuses.
Waiqi Kuisun Guoban Wei Xu [More Than Half of Foreign Investment Enterprise Loss-
Making Cases Are False], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Nov. 13, 1996, at A13.
399 See, e.g., Henan Diaoxiao 82 Waizi Qiye Zhizhao [Henan Province Revoked 82 Li-
censes of Foreign Investment Enterprises], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Aug. 10, 1995, at
C2 (FIEs licenses were withdrawn for abuses and illegalities).
'00 For such tax holidays under the present law, see text accompanying supra note 70.
401 For such benefits under the present law, see text accompanying supra note 72.
40 2 XiN BIAN BISHui Yu FAN BIsHuI SHmwu QUANSHU [GUIDE TO TAX EVAsIoN & ANTI-
EVASION] 116-17 (Zhang Zhongxiu et al. eds., 1995) (as foreign businesses may have at-
tempted to avoid enterprise income tax because of losses and/or tax holidays, such prefer-
ence rules should be restricted).
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ing, the government can imply bad faith, "ulterior motives" and even ille-
galities.
D. Image and Substance
The Confucian tradition stresses rituals and an image of sincerity and
generosity. The Chinese government typically made generous but vague
promises of benefits through its preference legislation and regulations,
without spelling out the exact conditions and limitations on these benefits.
For instance, the government promised turnover tax exemptions and reduc-
tions to FIEs in financial difficulty,40 3 but failed to clarify what would con-
stitute financial difficulties. Similarly, the government promised special tax
treatment to Overseas Chinese investors4°4 without explaining exactly
which investors qualified, or whether an investment needed to be wholly-
owned and controlled by a qualified Overseas Chinese investor. Chinese
tax authorities and government agencies usually refused to issue formal tax
rulings in advance4° because rulings are case specific; they can look eco-
nomically calculating and contrary to the message of generosity. On the
other hand, policy considerations impose conditions and restrictions in par-
ticular cases, 40 6 and might, therefore, give rise to discrepancies between
Chinese rhetoric and practice.
Some foreign companies used the names of Overseas Chinese they
hired or contracted for registration purposes in China in order to get special
preferential tax treatment granted to Overseas Chinese investments. 0 Be-
cause the law did not adequately explain which investors were eligible (ex-
cept for the vague term "Overseas Chinese"), or the required form of
ownership and registration of the invested capital, an investment project in
the name of an ethnic Chinese person residing abroad was arguably cov-
ered. From the policy point of view of the Chinese government, however, it
was wrong to grant special tax treatment in those cases.40 8 Special treat-
ment for Overseas Chinese investors was intended to either promote or re-
ward them for their patriotic deeds. Special treatment was also intended to
promote investment by a group of people more susceptible to the influence
of the Chinese State and therefore not as threatening to the state as other
foreign businesses. Investments which used the name of Overseas Chinese
but were in reality controlled by non-ethnic Chinese investors circumvented
these policies. Nevertheless, for the sake of image, the law did not contain
403 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
404 See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
405 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at 205.
406 Chinese tax officials insisted that joint ventures' tax status be examined only after the
joint venture contract is in effect or at least signed. In either case, "it is then too late for a
foreign investor vho is disappointed with the tax treatment to change his mind about the
project." Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at 205.
407 U LING, Bisin Yu FANGFAN [TAx AVOIDANCE AND PREVENTION] 15 (1994).
408 a
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more specific restrictions, 40 9 and officials had to grant tax preferences when
the investors had abided by the letter of the law but not the spirit. This law
gave rise to complaints of abuses and of the bad faith of foreign inves-
tors.
410
For the Chinese, a business arrangement that is not legally prohibited
and may be based on a reasonable interpretation of the law can nevertheless
be condemned as an arrangement in bad faith because it was either not in-
tended to be permitted or incompatible with the law's policy goals. The
fact that an arrangement is not specifically prohibited by regulation does not
make it permissible. Western foreign investors may be tempted to fully ex-
ercise their individual (or business) rights, as they understand them, and
conduct business within a strict reading of the law. However, the Chinese
tend to also consider policy and moral considerations; the written law does
not preclude the use of moral or other standards. 411 Foreign businesses can
be charged for misconduct although there may not have been illegal activity
in a technical sense.
However, keeping an image of generosity is always important. As
long as the Chinese seek foreign investment,412 they cannot dispose of sin-
cerity and generosity. In order to reconcile the idea of generosity with the
changes and reductions in preference law that were mandated by policy
shifts, the authorities have tried to divert attention away from tax treatment;
instead, they have emphasized non-tax incentives such as national treat-
ment.413. While foreign investors have long enjoyed preferential tax treat-
ment not available to Chinese businesses, they have also been subject to
discriminatory charges and fees for goods and services ranging from power
and water supplies to airplane tickets.4 14 Pressure has gone up for China to
409 Another important advantage of broad promises and refusal to issue advance rulings is
flexibility in tax treatment administration. The Chinese wanted flexibility in making a case-
by-case determination as special treatment may be warranted for certain non-ethnic Chinese
controlled projects or borderline cases.
410 Some FIEs received tax reduction and exemption for enterprises in financial difficul-
ties by taking advantage of the lack of a definition as to what constituted financial difficul-
ties and by appealing to tax officials' sympathy. Such cases were criticized as abuses. LI,
supra note 407, at 80.
41 Chinese writers argued that whether a particular foreign investor's move to avoid or
minimize its Chinese tax liability was legitimate or not should be determined not only in
light of law as written but also according to "social morality and behavioral norms." Liu
Yunguo, Guanyu Woguo Waizi Qiye Bishui Wenti De Zaisikao [Reflection on Issues Con-
cerning Tax Avoidance by Foreign Investment Enterprises in Our Country], SHUIWU YU
JINGJI [TAXATION AND ECONOMY], 1995 No. 3, at 35, 37; Li, supra note 407, at 189.
412 The Chinese government has stated that it will "continue to use foreign funds actively,
rationally and effectively." Li, supra note 392, at VI. The focus of China's foreign invest-
ment policy is now to seek investments in "the comprehensive development of agriculture,
infrastructural facilities, comprehensive utilization of resources, industries using high and
new technologies as well as in the central and western parts of China." Id.
4 13 See Sun, supra note 16, at 10-11 (gradually granting national treatment to FIEs).
414 Id. at 11 (admitting that foreigners paid higher fees for airlines, transportation, public
park admission, and foreign firms also paid extra fees to the state as food subsidies for em-
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get rid of its double standard treatment,415 and, in response, government of-
ficials have created regulations that apply domestic charges to foreign busi-
nesses and nationals4 6 and give them access to China's huge domestic
market.417 Such non-tax benefits help maintain the image of generosity.
On the other hand, there are limits on how far non-tax measures can go.
Despite promises for easing market access, for instance, serious barriers,
such as the government pricing policy, persist in key industries, like en-
ployees). To fly on Chinese domestic airlines, for instance, non-Chinese nationals have paid
double the price that the Chinese are charged. Zhongguo Minhang Dafu Xuejian Waibin
Cheng Neilu Jipiao Jia [Chinese Airlines Greatly Reduce Airline Ticket Prices for Foreign-
ers], DONGFANG RIBAo [ORIENTAL DAILY NEVS] (HONG KONG), Feb. 5, 1997, at A13.415 See, e.g., European Companies Complain of "Incomprehensible" Regulations, S.
CHINA MORNING POsT, Apr. 25, 1997, Business, at 4 (European firms complained about the
application of different rules to Chinese and foreign companies, dual pricing systems which
mean expatriates pay higher rent and energy bills than the Chinese, and problems of market
access). One reason for the Chinese to consider national treatment for FIEs is China's appli-
cation for membership in the World Trade Organization. See Sun, supra note 16, at 10. The
World Bank has also argued for non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investment. 1995
World Bank Paper, supra note 17, at 7. Double standard treatment has heretofore been justi-
fied on grounds that the government subsidized such good and service consumption and
therefore only Chinese individuals and businesses who bore the cost through payment of
high taxes and other forms of contribution should enjoy their benefits. Cf. Xin Bochun,
Shixing Guomin Daiyu Yu Fazhan Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingii [Implementation of Na-
tional Treatment and Development of the Socialist Market Economy], LILUN TANTAO
[DIscussIoN ON THEORY], 1997 No. 2, at 57, 57 (state subsidy to enterprises in a planned
economy not applicable to foreign investors). If tax gaps close up, justification for the appli-
cation of a double standard may no longer hold up.
416 According to a set of regulations issued by Shenzhen officials in August 1996, starting
from 1997, foreigners including Chinese from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan would be
charged the same fees as Chinese nationals for purchasing or renting real properties, power
supplies, medical treatment, tourist visits and other services. Waishang Zai Shenzhen
Xiaofei Xiang Guomin Daiyu [Foreign Businesses Enjoy National Treatment for Consump-
tion in Shenzhen], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Aug. 23, 1996, at AIO. National treatment
measures announced by Hainan Province include the extension of domestic charges to FIEs
in the areas of water and power supplies, transportation, communication, hotel and other
services, allowing foreign investors to enter service sectors such as information consultancy,
accounting and legal services, retail businesses, and permitting more domestic sales by FIEs.
Hainan Yu San Zi Guomin Daiyu [Hainan Gives Three Forms of Foreign Investment Na-
tional Treatment], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Nov. 12, 1996, at A15. Liaoning Province
decided to abolish 118 types of charges and fees on foreign investment firms, Foreign Funds
Flood Liaoning Industrial Hub, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27, 1997, Business, at 4. It
was also reported that charges would be uniform for tourist spots and airline tickets. Min
Hang Liang Zhong Piaojia Jiang Binggui [Double Pricing for Airline Tickets Will Merge],
XIANGGANG SHANG BAO [HONG KONG COMMERCIAL DAILY], Feb. 6, 1997, at B8.417 Guangdong Province allowed more domestic sales by FIEs. Guangdongshen Fang-
kuan Waizi Qiye Chanping Neixiao Bili [Guangdong Province Relaxes the Ratio of Domestic
Sales for Products of Foreign Investment Enterprises], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC
JOURNAL), Sept. 13, 1996, at 29.
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ergy418 and automobile manufacturing.419 Unreliable distribution systems
and lack of information also inhibit market access. 420 Many of those prob-
lems are structural and systemic. Quick solutions are unlikely. By com-
parison, tax preferences remain familiar and easily convey the message of
generosity. Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji's September 1997 promise to rein-
state certain import tax exemptions, which were abolished a year before was
the government's latest attempt to claim sincerity and generosity.421 Con-
sistent with the Chinese practice of underscoring generosity and averting
unpleasant limitations and restrictions, the promise was announced without
any necessary details, such as eligibility or time of implementation.422
E. Friendship/Relationship Approach
The August 1982 Red Flag editorial also stressed "friendship. ')A23 As
observed, the Chinese in international commercial negotiations have placed
a repeated emphasis on friendship,424 because of the belief that true friends
of China would commit themselves to assist the country's modernizations.
The Chinese sought friendship in a manner similar to the way in which they
built relationships.425 The Chinese are known for their dependency on rela-
tionships, or guanxi,426 rather than on legal rules and institutions. A guanxi
418 See Tom Korski, Beiing Needs US$20b to Meet Energy Target by 2000, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 1996, Business, at I (artificially low state-set prices for resources
and efforts to restrict investors' returns hindered foreign investment in energy sectors).
419 See Government Pricing Policy Puts Pressure on Bottom Line at Shanghai Volks-
wagen, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Jan. 20, 1997, Business, at 4.
420 Wang Xiangwei, Distribution Hiccups Slow Foreign Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 27, 1997, Business, at 3.
421 See supra note 19.
422 It was not until three months later and in the last two days of 1997 that the Chinese
government formally introduced new import tax exemptions with restrictions and limita-
tions: the exemptions are available only to FIEs engaged in projects classified by the state as
"encouraged" or "restricted-Class B," which would include aircraft parts, catalytic convert-
ers, machinery and medical equipment manufacturing projects, health clinics, amusement
parks, and electronic publications, but exclude pharmaceuticals, household appliances, and
automobile components. Under the policy, qualified FIEs must obtain a certificate from the
State Planning Commission stating that FIEs are "nationally-encouraged" projects; each im-
port shipment must be pre-approved by the State Administration for Import and Export
Commodity Inspection. Furthermore, duty-free imports must satisfy three additional condi-
tions: (1) they must involve a transfer of know-how; (2) the value of the equipment must fall
within the enterprise's total amount of declared investment; and (3) the equipment must be
used within the enterprise and no resale or transfer is permitted. The policy entered into ef-
fect on January 1, 1998. Latest Capital Imports Tax Exemption Policy, CHINA L. FOR Bus.,
Mar. 1998, at 2, 2.
" Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 4-5.
424 PYE, supra note 187, at 102.
425 Id.
426 Guanxi "can be described as a special relationship individuals have with each other in
which each can make unlimited demands on the other." Id at 101. For a discussion of the
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relationship is possible when a basis for familiarity exists between the par-
ties.427 Closeness starts with shared characteristics like common birthplace,
lineage, or surname or shared experiences like schooling or working to-
gether.428 On the basis of objective criteria of commonalities, one party to
the relationship can then tax the other repeatedly as long as the latter is in a
position to help.429 For those without common characteristics, familiarity
may be based on intermediates such as a third party430 and gift or favor ex-
changes.431 One may also establish a relationship with another through
symbols and gestures like showing of elaborate courtesy, self-
deprecation,432 loyalty or friendship.433 The recipient must then decide
whether to accept the offeror's initiative and build a relationship. 434 The
Chinese usually accept a person's initial attempts to build a guanxi relation-
ship because the established relationship would presumably benefit all par-
ties sooner or later.435 In fact, even where commonalities like family ties or
a shared birthplace already exist, exchanges of gifts are the usual practice to
enhance ganqing, or "affection between the parties." Guanxi then provides
a basis for reciprocal obligation.436 The principle of obligation "comple-
meaning of guanxi in the Chinese culture, see MAYFAIR MEI-HUt YANG, GIFTS, FAVORS, AND
BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA 49-74 (1994).
427 See, e.g., YANG, supra note 426, at 111. In the Chinese culture, of course, family con-
stitutes the most important relationship binding on an individual. MICHAEL HARRIS BOND,
BEYOND THE CHINESE FACE: INSIGHTS FROM PSYCHOLOGY 56 (1991).
428 YANG, supra note 426, at 111-19; see also J. Bruce Jacobs, The Concept of Guanxi
and Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting, in SOCIAL INTERACTION IN CHINESE
SOCIETY 209, 210-20 (Sidney L. Greenblatt et al. eds., 1982) (bases for closeness include
common locality, kinship, co-worker, classmate, sworn brotherhood, surname, teacher-
student, business, and public/bureaucratic).
429 PYE, supra note 187, at 102. At the same time, the principle of indebtedness or reci-
procity acts as a safeguard against guanxi abuses, as one cannot always take without giving.
YANG, supra note 426, at 142.
430 See BOND, supra note 427, at 59 (indirect relations can be established by "pulling" on
one's direct relationship with a third party who knows both); YANG, supra note 426, at 123-
26 (using intermediaries to expand one's guanxi network); Jacobs, supra note 428, at 231-32
(pulling guanxi through reliable third party).
431 Michael Harris Bond & Kwang-kuo Hwang, The Social Psychology of Chinese Peo-
ple, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE 213, 225 (Michael Harris Bond ed., 1986);
see also YANG, supra note 426, at 126-30 (discussing gift exchanges in guanxi relation-
ships).
432 Deferential acts and modest speeches are important elements in the art of guanxi.
YANG, supra note 426, at 109.
433 Although a friendship is not the same as a guanxi relationship, the former can serve as
a basis or potential tie for guanxi practice. Id. at 111.
434 Id. at 131.
435 The author mentions two additional reasons the Chinese tend to accept an offer: ac-
ceptance prevents losing face and avoids insulting the offeror. Id.
436 For the Chinese, once a relationship is believed to be established, the obligation to
help each other would arise. The Chinese notion of reciprocation based on guanxi differs
from Western reciprocity which relies on a "natural give-and-take." Lucian W. Pye, The
China Trade: Making the Deal, in THE ART OF BusrNEss NEGOTIATION 79, 83 (1991).
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ments the principle of 'familiarity' and the orientation toward relying on
others." 37 One's attempt to renege on a reciprocation duty leads to loss of
face in the eyes of the public.438
Private practice of guanxi in the domestic context was denounced in
official state discourse because it was thought to undermine state power.439
The Chinese also avoided mentioning the subject because they felt cultur-
ally erhibarrassed about its feudal origin. They have, however, lavishly
talked about friendship with foreign businesses since the country's opening
up in the late 1970s. Tax preferences were part of Chinese efforts to seek
friendship and closeness. By referring to international practice and the
capitalist concept of profit, the Chinese could get closer to foreign busi-
nesses. Tax benefits were seen as gifts which could be used to build a rela-
tionship. Whether foreign investors actually came to China or even
expressed an interest in doing business with the country, the Chinese
claimed them as friends and hoped to tap foreign capital and technology
continuously. Investors could interpret tax reductions and exemptions as
reciprocation for their friendly acts of investing in the country.44 In any
event, foreign investors were expected to take into consideration their Chi-
nese friends' interests and concerns and refrain from behaving as if they
were solely profit-motivated.
Like generosity, guanxi values the importance of rituals and gesture.
Both traditions stress sincerity and appeal to the sense of obligation rather
than pure profit motivation. If the parties were solely profit-motivated, they
could only have "impersonal money relations." 42 Those involved in an
impersonal money relation only valued the exchange rather than the parties
themselves. The gift in a guanxi relationship was, on the other hand, "a
medium for introducing the personal substance of its donor into the person
of the recipient."" 3 The instrumentalist nature of the gift was so carefully
disguised that the parties would pay very little attention to its economic
benefit; instead the the recipient was to appreciate the donor's sentiments
437 YANG, supra note 426, at 139.438 Id. at 140. Another important reason cited for the obligation to repay is a sense of
self-interest as someday one may need to rely on that relationship again. Id.
439 YANG, supra note 426, at 58-64, 173-208. Guanxi was practiced, though, by commu-
nist leaders themselves. See Li Xiaodong & Wu Qinghua, Guanxi Lunlixue [Ethics of the
Art of Guanxi], in ZHONGGUO GUANXIYUE [THE ART OF GUANXI IN CHINA] 12, 39-54 (Chang
Chak Yan ed., 1996) (analyzing Mao Zedong's and Deng Xiaoping's use ofguanxi).
440 In his studies on business negotiations between the Chinese and Westerners, Professor
Pye has found a strong cultural influence of the guanxi approach. See PYE, supra note 187,
at 101-04; PYE, supra note 436, at 80-83.
441 Tax benefits accorded to economically depressed foreign investment projects were
presented, for instance, as an indication of Chinese chengyi or sincerity to foreign busi-
nesses. ZHANG, supra note 295, at 178.
442 YANG, supra note 426, at 123.
443 Id. at 195.
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that the gift expressed. 444 After showing their sentiments, the Chinese ex-
pect reciprocation. Like the idea of generosity, the friendship/relationship
approach shifts the blame of the foreigners' lack of enthusiastic response to
the country's opening up to the foreigners themselves. Again, there is no
way to objectively measure the friendship/guanxi building efforts. Only the
Chinese can declare when their efforts were sufficient or when such friend-
ship came into being.
The relationship approach may have a special appeal to businesses
with ethnic Chinese backgrounds.44 Familiarity with the approach already
existed through common ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Because Over-
seas Chinese businesspeople were affected by the Communist Party's pre-
vious harsh policies, gestures such as granting preferential treatment acted
as implied apologies and compensation for past ill-treatment. Once the
government made those gestures, it believed ethnic Chinese were likely to
respond. They were supposed to show a strong attachment to their ancestral
land even after they had lived elsewhere for years, decades or even genera-
tions. In fact, after the country was opened up in the late 1970s, Overseas
Chinese returned to their native villages and hometowns for sentimental as
well as business reasons. The feeling was mutual. Provincial and local of-
ficials similarly preferred to deal with native sons and daughters. The 1985
Regulations on Preferences for Overseas Chinese Investment sanctioned lo-
cal efforts to beef up guanxi with Overseas Chinese by authorizing provin-
cial and local authorities to adopt detailed measures implementing special
tax preferences for Overseas Chinese investors.446  Special treatment
seemed natural also because ethnic Chinese businesses probably expected
the country's government to offer rewards for their patriotic deeds of in-
vesting in their home country.
While the generosity, moral example and state coercion paradigms are
unilaterally based on the Chinese State, friendship/relationship depends
more on the emotion and familiarity of both of the parties. The investors
are expected to confer special advantages upon local governments and offi-
cials. The friendship/relationship approach helped promote the regional de-
velopment strategy. During the 1980s and early 1990s, foreign investment
was introduced on a regional priority basis to produce quick results that ad-
dressed political and social stability concerns. Consequentially, the gov-
ernment spawned various regionally-based preferential schemes. Under the
Chinese tax system, only the central authorities have the power to adopt and
44 The value of the good and service given by one party to another in a guanxi relation-
ship is often very subjective, and a number of elements must be taken into account, including
the timing and availability of gifts and the status of the person making gifts. Id. at 143.
445 For Hong Kong business people's use of guanxi when doing business in China, see
T.K.P. Leung et al., A Study of Hong Kong Businessmen's Perceptions of the Role [o]
"Guanxi" in the People's Republic of China, 15 J. Bus. ETHIcs 749 (1996).
446 1985 Regulations on Preferences for Overseas Chinese Investment, supra note 4, art.
9.
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amend tax law, including preferential tax treatment.447 Centrally-issued tax
measures were inadequate, however, to build a relationship with foreign
businesses because localities could claim and depend upon the businesses
for their own benefit. In relationship building, gifts or gestures of friend-
ship symbolized the donor's "regard," "sentiment" or "spirit" and those
symbols were tied to the person of the donor.448 Tax preferences announced
by Beijing represented the "sentiment" or "spirit" of the central govern-
ment, not necessarily that of locals. It was therefore important for local
authorities to express their own "sentiment" or "spirit" to potential inves-
tors. After Beijing's approval of a new regional priority and preference
scheme, it was almost a ritual for the provincial and municipal authorities to
announce their own regulations which incorporated centrally-promulgated
preferential treatment. Many of the provincial and municipal tax prefer-
ences were technically redundant and legally unnecessary,449 but they were
indispensable symbols of local sentiments to foreign businesses. 450 The na-
tional and local authorities have routinely promised similar and overlapping
preferences.45' Repetitive preference rules and regulations not only en-
hanced the image of generosity but also contributed to the building of
447 This centralized tax system was established in 1950 by the Principal Rules for the Im-
plementation of the National Tax Administration (Quanguo Shuizheng Shishi Yaoze),
adopted by the Seventeenth Session of the Government Administration Council on January
27, 1950 and promulgated on January 31, 1950, available in 1949-1950 FALING HuMrIAN
283. Previously, tax legislation and collection powers had been invested with regional gov-
ernments. The Chinese centralized tax power as established in 1950 applies to both national
taxes and local taxes. Issues concerning the types of local taxes and the way they should be
collected fall within the central government's authority. The central government may
authorize, however, local governments to act with regard to specific local tax matters. For
instance, the 1991 UTL authorizes provincial governments to waive or reduce local income
tax of FIEs. UTL, supra note 67, art. 9. In practice, local governments can issue rules and
regulations on tax matters. If local rules and regulations conflict with the central power, they
are technically invalid. See John S. Mo, Taxation Power and Invalidity of Certain Local Tax
Concessions in China, 26 INT'L LAw. 933 (1992). The central government may tolerate
technical violations if locally-provided tax benefits are supported by local revenue. Zhang
Fuzhen, Woguo Shewai Shuishou De Yuanze Ji Tedian [Principles and Characteristics of
Foreign Taxation in Our Country], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Aug. 10, 1993, 19, 20 (local tax preferences in violation of national law could
be tolerated if they took the form of reimbursement from local revenue).
448 YANG, supra note 426, at 195.
449 As far as FIEs are concerned, only exemptions from or reductions in local taxes fall
within the provincial or municipal government powers and local regulation to that effect is
legally required. See UTL, supra note 67, art. 9.
450 The fact that provincial or municipal authorities can issue preferential measures in
their own names denotes local autonomy to deal with foreign businesses. This provides an
additional reason for those who appreciated Chinese guanxi practice to enter into a local re-
lationship. A good guanxi relationship does not always depend on whether the other party is
a high ranking official, but more on whether the person is directly in charge and, therefore,
in a better position to help. See YANG, supra note 426, at 73-74.
451 For examples of overlapping national, provincial and local preference regulations, see,
e.g., supra notes 100-103 (SEZs); note 139 (Pudong); note 181 (PEEs and TAEs).
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guanxi, because relationships in the Chinese context must be reaffirmed
time and time again. The act of reaffirmation reminds foreign businesses of
friendship and good feeling between the parties and also, of course, how
foreign investors should behave towards their Chinese friends.45 2
The friendship/relationship approach has not been without its prob-
lems, however. Particularistic treatment in favor of ethnic Chinese inves-
tors might create diplomatic implications4 3 and has certainly resulted in
administrative confusion.454 For these reasons the government has avoided
special tax treatment for ethnic Chinese investors in recent years, at least at
the national level 45  Moreover, local officials attempted to build ties with
foreign businesses, which might work against the state's interest. The lure
of benefiting from a regional development priority scheme was irresistible
and the over-enthusiasm of local authorities could undermine the national
leadership's strategy.456 Self-proclaimed tax preferences by local officials
threatened the central government's political authority as well as its revenue
base.45 7 Autonomy emboldened localities to act without regard to national
45 2 As Professor Pye commented on business negotiations between U.S. and Chinese
businesspeople, the reaffirmation of a relationship as part of the Chinese rules enhances the
Chinese claim for friendship to exact more favors from foreign parties. See PYn, supra note
436, at 80-81.453 See supra note 195.
45 It was complained that the 1985 Regulations on Preferences to Overseas Chinese In-
vestment created confusion as overseas Chinese investors, no matter where they invested,
received more tax benefits than foreign investors even in SEZs. It was also difficult to dis-
tinguish overseas Chinese investment from other foreign investment as many investors were
companies, rather than individuals. Ruhe Jianli Jingfi Tequ He Shewai Shuizhi Tixi De Yan-
flu Baogao [4 Study Report on How to Establish Special Economic Zones and Foreign Re-
lated Tax System], CALZHENG YANJIu ZILIAo, Feb. 6, 1987, at 38, 42-43.
455 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
456 Local officials have sought priority status by proclaiming the establishment of local
economic and technological development zones and promising tax preferences for foreign
investment within their jurisdictions. In the early 1990s, 26 provinces and municipalities
self-proclaimed 2025 economic and technological development zones covering a total area
of 9558 sqaure kilometers. See Hu, supra note 183, at 210. Local initiatives irritated the
central government as the proliferation of preferences could divert attention from SEZs,
ETDAs, OUDs and other existing preferred areas, and thwart the objectives of the regional
development strategy. As a result, the central government took steps to crackdown on local
economic and technological development zones. Notification of the State Council for
Strictly Controlling the Approval and Earnestly Cleaning Up Various Development Zones
(Guowuyuan Guanyu Yange Shenpi He Renzhen Qingli Gelei Kaifaqu De Tongzhi), Apr.
28, 1993, in 1994 Y.B. SEZs & OPEN AREAS, supra note 89, at 52. Only 470 local economic
and technological development zones covering a total area of 3238 square kilometers sur-
vived the crack-down. Hu, supra note 183, at 210; see also Verma, supra note 157, at 22
(the State Council in early 1994 closed about 1,000 local industrial zones).
457 Cases of self-proclaimed tax preferences included the reduction of enterprise income
tax to five percent for productive FIEs, extension of tax holidays for one or more years, and
promised tax exemptions through the end of JV contracts. See Lin Rongsheng, Shiying Dui-
wai Kaifang Xin Xingshi Jinyibu Zuohao Duiwai Shuishou Gongzuo [Adjusting to the New
Situation of the Opening Up and Further Improving Foreign Taxation Works], in
COLLECTION OF TAXATION DOcUMENTs, supra note 211, at 904, 908.
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directives.458 It was believed that foreigners' misconduct was made possi-
ble because of the localities' failure to stick to the central policy and main-
tain an appropriate degree of control.459  There were even signs of
"conspiracy" between local officials and foreign interest to the detriment of
the state. In foreign dealings, just as in the domestic context, guanxi cuts
across the authority of the state - more precisely, that of the central gov-
ernment. The priority status and "special policies and flexible measures"
were sometimes used for the benefit of the localities only 61 and, even
worse, turned "state power" into "official power," exercized for the gain of
an individual local official.462 The central government also feared that for-
451 Some local officials were eager to attract foreign investment and went so far as to
suggest that the very existence of taxes hampered foreign investment and technology trans-
fer. Thus, they set obstacles to tax collection. In one case, a city official prevented collec-
tion of taxes from a foreign investment project for over a year. Id. at 792.
459 Local officials were blamed for failing to supervise and control FIEs and turning a
blind eye to illegal activities. Pan Liyun, Dui Lianyungangshi Zhongwai Heying Qiye Faz-
han Wenti De Tantao [A Preliminary Discussion on Development Issues of Chinese-Foreign
Joint Ventures in Lianyungang City], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Nov. 8, 1986, at 15, 17-18 (lax tax supervision in Lianyungang City); Niu
Guoqi, Wenti Yu Jianyi [Problems and Suggestions], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE
RESEARCH MATERIALS], Oct. 15, 1985, at 14, 17 (lack of tax control in SEZs).
460 One serious problem identified by the Chinese concerning foreign investment has
been the low ratio between the agreed-upon investment amount and the actual investment
amount. According to one account, the ratio between the agreed-upon investment amount
and the actual investment amount was 100:62.3 in 1987 and fell to 100:18.98 in 1992. Waizi
Da Baitiao Yinqi Guanzhu [IOU by Foreign Investors Raises Concerns], SHEWAI SHUIWU
[FOREIGN TAXATION], 1994 No.1, at 47, 47. One reason for this ratio was that local and de-
partmental officials relied on the agreed-upon investment amounts to boost the record of
their performance, and even conspired with foreign investors for personal benefits. Id.; see
also Yin Cui & Ding Ying, Hezi Chao Zhong De Biduan Ji Duice [Disadvantages and Solu-
tions for Joint Ventures], CHANGZHANG JNGLI RIBAO [FACTORY MANAGERS DAILY], Oct. 15,
1996, at 10 (Chinese officials and cadres helped foreigners by "pulling" guanxi, disclosing
sensitive information). It was reported that local officials forced domestic enterprises to
form joint ventures without regard to the outcome of feasibility studies. Liu & Xu, supra
note 318, at 12. Misconduct of local officials also included promised tax treatment in con-
tracts with foreign businesses, which was a violation of tax law. Wang, supra note 292, at
37-38; Du, supra note 47, at 190-91.
461 From the beginning, there was a divergence between the interest of localities and the
priorities of the central government. Supra note 132. As a result, the 1984 decision to open
14 COCs to foreign capital permitted the creation of ETDAs to accommodate local yearn-
ings for hi-tech and modem sectors. This also allowed measures to help urban areas of those
cities. However, a State Council's circular stressed the priority given to the renovation of
state-owned enterprises in old city districts. Opening Up of Coastal Cities, supra note 118.
462 There are important differences between "state power" and "official power." As May-
fair Mei-hui Yang noted:
State power is a form of state rationality whose scope of operation and concern extends
beyond the narrow class interests of official power. These two types of power forma-
tion do not represent two separate groups or institutions, but are two dimensions of
power, often exercised by the same people. Officials may serve state power in carrying
out its edicts, seeing to social control, and disciplining wrongdoers and even other offi-
cials. The same officials may also employ guanxi methods to promote their private
gain, for they too are subjects of the state.
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eign businesses might have been trying to build relationships with local of-
ficials for their own advantage.463
Because local officials used tax preferences as a way to build and ce-
ment ties with overseas businesses, attempts by the central government to
change preference rules encountered resistance.464 SEZs and other priority
cities in coastal areas have been zealously defending their status.465 The
Shenzhen Party secretary argued, for instance, that SEZs should be able to
continue developing themselves and for that purpose their priority status
must be maintained.466 While coastal areas reluctantly accepted the 1996
move to abolish and phase out import tax exemptions, 467 they have been
seeking replacements, such as new or expanded bonded or free trade
YANG, supra note 426, at 175.
While officials are supposed to serve state power, they may also "employ guanxi methods
to promote their private gain." Id. In the latter case, the exercise of official power is anti-
thetical to state power as it "makes the existing system of distribution and administration il-
legitimate in the eyes of the people," but also officials engaged in guanxi "are showing a
loyalty to a narrow, 'privatistic' and 'local' family, class, and regional interests, instead of
loyalty to the state." Id. at 176. More seriously, state leaders fear a shift in loyalty from the
beneficiaries of official favors to those officials instead of the state.
463 Foreign investors invited local leaders to banquets and made business proposals dur-
ing the banquets before any negotiations started. Such deals would not be challenged later
on technical grounds. Liu & Xu, supra note 318, at 12. Foreign investment decisions made
by local officials were sometimes based on "emotional" factors. Yantai Finance Bureau, su-
pra note 159, at 48.
46 Local officials thought that reduction of tax benefits would raise eyebrows and might
undermine the promotion of foreign investment. Just as granting preferential treatment sig-
nified a favorable attitude toward foreign investment, revocation of tax preferences might be
interpreted both at home and abroad as a negative sign of policy reversal. Chinese officials
understood that cuts in tax preferences would amount to policy changes and therefore would
adversely impact foreign business confidence in China. Such concerns were expressed dur-
ing the debate on the adoption of the 1991 UTL, and many officials opposed a provision
authorizing the State Council to withdraw tax benefits from existing FIEs as a result of state
industrial policy change. I SONG RuFEN, CANJIA LFA GONGzuo SuoI [NOTES FROM MY
PARTICIPATION IN LEGISLATIVE WORKS] 277-78 (1994).
465 "Repeated hints in the official media that Beijing may cancel low-tax advantages of
special economic zones ... met with strong local opposition." Joseph Kahn, Beijing Strug-
gles to Stem Slide in Taxation Power, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at 1, 4.4
66 Jin Chenglong, Zhongguo Jinji Tequ Jiben Zhengce Bubian Yixie Juti Bushu Jiang
Tiaozheng He Wanshan [Basic Policy Regarding Chinese Special Economic Zones Remains
Unchanged, But Some Arrangements Will Be Made and Ameliorated], JINJI Yu FALU
[ECONOMY AND LAW] (HK), Feb. 1996, at 30, 30. SEZs have been trying to maintain their
preferential policies. See Shao Mingiun & Liang Youping, Liang Shui He Yi De Ruogan Si-
kao [Reflection on the Merger of Two Taxes]; S-EWAI SHuiWU (INT'L TAXATION IN CHINA),
1996 No. 3, at 8, 9-10 (tax preferences in SEZs are needed to facilitate economic integration
with Hong Kong).
467 See, e.g., Li Xiuheng, Difang Zhengfu Buman Quxiao Jinkou Shebei Mianshui Youhui
[Local Governments' Discontents for the Abolition of Tax Exemptions for Imports of Equip-
ment]; XiN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JouRNAL), June 3, 1996, at 16 (municipal govern-
ments in the Pearl River Delta region complained about the move).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:549 (1998)
zones461 in which tax exemptions for imports survived after April 1,
1996.469 The central authorities have permitted compensatory measures to
offset the impact of tax change on foreign investment47 because prosperous
SEZs and coastal areas epitomize the success of the country's opening up
policy. On the other hand, not all aspirations of SEZs and coastal areas can
be accommodated. Local requests for the status of free port were turned
down, for instance.471 In return, Beijing has agreed to keep regional prefer-
ential schemes for the time being.472 Localities seeking to attract foreign
investment through tax preferences are by no means limited to SEZs and
coastal areas.473 Officials in interior provinces have been just as eager and
468 See Ripe for Investment, supra note 153, at 9 (Shenzhen is doubling the area of one of
its two bonded zones and looking to set up a third); Shenzhen Lantian She Baoshuiqu [A New
Bonded Zone at Lantian Gang, Shenzhen], MIN BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Oct. 10, 1996, at
AlI (a third bonded zone in Shenzhen was approved). With the abolition of import tax ex-
emptions, it was reported that foreign investment in bonded free trade zones surged. Elaine
Chan, Investment Surges as Taxes Rise, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Oct. 14, 1996, Business, at
3 (increased foreign investment in Tianjin bonded zone); see also Agnes Cheung, Shenzhen
Fights For Investment Edge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 9, 1996, at 7 ("Shenzhen is
pressing for central government approval of incentives aimed at keeping the special eco-
nomic zone competitive in attracting foreign investment" as well as incentives for opening
the domestic market and lowering project service charges).
469 For various advantages of free trade zones, see also Anne Stevenson-Yang, Quiet In-
cursions, CHINA BUs. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 36.
470 See, e.g., Willy Wo-Lap Lam, SEZs Again Seen as Economic Beacons, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Dec. 20, 1996, at 12 (Shenzhen was given experimental enterprises group-
ing with the creation of an industrial village, a hi-tech park and an estate for privately owned
hi-tech firms). As recently as April 1997, one year after the 1996 sweeping change in import
tax, the Guangzhou municipal government apparently got approval from the central authori-
ties for import tariff cuts for foreign investment projects. Cheung Lai-Kun, Tax Breaks Ap-
proved, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Apr. 30, 1997, Business, at 6.
471 Shenzhen long hoped to obtain a free port status comparable with that of Hong Kong,
but Beijing rejected the idea. Jin Ziyan, Ziyougang Meng Cheng Paoying [The Dream of
BecomingA Free Port Did Not Come True], MIN BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Jan. 27, 1997, at
A12; see also Free Port Status Ruled Out, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27, 1997, Business,
at3.
472 Despite the warning that SEZs may lose their tax preference status, the Shenzhen
Party secretary got assurance from the central authorities that "the policies towards special
economic zones will remain unchanged and the 15% corporate tax rate for foreign joint
ventures will be kept." Cheung, supra note 468. Zhuhai, another SEZ adjacent to Macau,
was reported to reduce enterprise income tax to the limit allowed by the state in order to at-
tract or retain foreign investment. Zhuhai Youhui Waishang Difia Jiang Wucheng [Zhuhai
Grants Preferences to Foreign Businesses and Land Price Reduces by 50%], MING BAO
(MING PAO) (HK), Sept. 12, 1996, at A15. There have been reports that under pressure of
the coastal regions, the central government may even reconsider its previous decision to re-
voke import tax exemptions. Renee Lai, Second Thoughts on Tax Exemption, S. CHINA
MORNING PoST, Aug. 8, 1997, Business, at 5. As one official admitted, SEZs still "excel in
many areas including lower import tariffs, foreign trade and finance." Xiao Yu, SEZs Con-
tinue to Hold Keyfor Reform Drive, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Feb. 5, 1997, at 7.
473 For other coastal preferential schemes, see Waishang Touzi Jin Jiaotong You Youhui
[Preferences for Foreign Investment in Transportation in Tianjin], MIN BAO (MING PAO)
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aggressive in pushing for special tax and non-tax privileges as their coastal
counterparts.
4 7
V. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND CHINESE ASSUMPTIONS
Advocates of the concept of economic efficiency as used in Western
literature claim that market forces are the only efficient way to allocate re-
sources.475 This market efficiency view strongly militates against govern-
ment intervention in a free market, including government manipulation of
tax law.476 Perfectly competitive markets are presumably the only way to
achieve the optimal allocation of resources in a society. As tax incentives
are intended to affect resource allocation by deviating from market princi-
ples, they are objectionable per se.477 In contrast to the market efficiency
view is what is called "technical efficiency" 471 which accepts government
intervention in the economy and does not bar tax incentives. According to
the technical efficiency view, the issue is one of cost/benefit analysis:
whether a tax incentive is the "cheapest way the government can induce"
the particular economic behavior it is seeking.479 The objectives of business
(HK), Sept. 6, 1996, at A13 (a five-year income tax exemption followed by another five-year
50% reduction granted to foreign investments in transportation by the city of Tianjin).
474 Ivan Tang, Poorer Inland Provinces Push For Privileges, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 26, 1997, at 9. For other new regional schemes, see Anhui Hezi Gaosu Gonglu Ke Huo
Duozhong Youhui [Joint Ventures in Highway Construction in Anhui Province May Get
Various Preferences], XIN BAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), June 2, 1996, at 4 (50%
tax reduction to foreign investment in road construction in the province). On February 27,
1995, the city of Beijing obtained the same status as Coastal Open Cities. Provisions Con-
cerning Taxes & Fares for FFEs, CHINA TRADE & INVESTMENT, Oct. 1996, at 13, 13.
475 There appear to be three different notions of efficiency as applied to the analysis of tax
incentives. The first one is called "universal market efficiency" which assumes that per-
fectly competitive markets would lead to the optimal allocation of resources in a society.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Egficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
TEX. L. REV. 973, 980-86 (1986). Those who doubt the existence of such markets might
prefer the concept of "sectorial efficiency" which focuses on "discrete parts of the economy
to determine if profitability could be increased or consumers' choice improved as between
them." Id. at 986. Like universal market efficiency, however, sectorial efficiency concludes
that "the government ought not be intervening in the economy at all." Id. at 987; see also
Edward McCaffery, Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1145, 1155 (1992) (the most common meaning of the word "efficiency" refers to "the neo-
classical economic ideal involving the allocation of resources in society"); Stanley A. Kop-
pelman, Tax Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1188 (1988)
("efficiency refers to an allocation of resources under a perfectly competitive market"). The
third notion of economic efficiency refers to "technical efficiency." See infra notes 478-82
and accompanying text.
476 Zelinsky, supra note 475, at 981 (universal market efficiency) & 987 (sectorial effi-
ciency).477 Id. at 980-92 (discussing arguments and analyses against use of tax incentives).
478 Id. at 992.
479 Id. at 992; see also Roger Cowie, Using Tax Incentives to Improve American Com-
petitiveness: A Framework for Normative Analysis, 31 AM. Bus. L. J. 417,440 (1993) ("The
primary concern with technical efficiency is determining which element of net taxes (i.e.,
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tax incentives in the West are defined in terms of economic growth, stabil-
ity, and structural changes in regional development, sectorial orientation
and asset composition.4"° Tax incentives are efficient if they actually in-
duce desirable changes with minimum cost.481 If a tax incentive merely re-
wards business activities which would have taken place anyway, the
government has acted inefficiently.482 Profitability and investment deci-
sions may be influenced by a myriad of factors such as the investor's as-
sessment of market conditions, or the availability of credit, raw materials,
labor, utilities, transportation, distribution facilities, and qualified profes-
sional, technical and managerial staff.483 As a result there have been tre-
mendous doubts as to how tax incentive legislation could remedy
deficiencies related to such factors.48a A causal link between tax treatment
and investment decisions is always difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
taxes, subsidies, or regulations) can achieve the desired benefits at the least cost"). The ef-
fect of tax incentives on investment flows has been assessed at both micro and macro levels.
See Chen-Young, supra note 291, at 295-99. At the micro level, the focus was on the sig-
nificance of tax measures on the investment decisions of private investors; questions were
asked as to how tax benefits affected business decisions on location, and how private firms
responded to tax initiatives. Id. at 295-99. At the macro level, studies tried to compare the
cost of tax incentives to the government and to the economy with benefits to be received and
investigated the impact of tax incentives on revenue goals and economic and social objec-
tives in the areas of salaries and wages, corporate profit, and balance of payment. Id. at 299-
304. Studies on the effect of tax incentives relied on surveys of businesses, economic stud-
ies or other empirical studies. For a discussion of various methods and their results, see, e.g.,
Yelpaala, supra note 293, at 399-411; RICHARD M. BIRD, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT:
THE STATE OF THE ART 32-45 (1980) (analyzing findings about Canadian tax incentives).
480 See, e.g., BIRD, supra note 479, at 26-31.
481 As one commentator explained:
An economic incentive granted to encourage a business to invest resources in the state
is a fiscal success if the revenue lost due to tax abatement and other economic incen-
tives plus the increased public expenditure due to the new activity is less than the in-
creased revenue generated by the new activity.
Kolesar, supra note 291, at 300.
482 See Zelinsky, supra note 475, at 992. As another commentator notes:
If... tax rates are not a major influence in the [foreign direct investment] decision pro-
cess, a tax incentive granted by a host country might be a costly and ineffective expense
to a government without corresponding benefits.
Yelpaala, supra note 293, at 386.
Studies are generally critical of tax incentive legislation as no evidence has been found to
show a causal link between tax treatment and investment decisions. Id. at 379-413; BIRD,
supra note 479, at 46-57 (no clear evidence that incentives increased investment or suc-
ceeded as an instrument of growth-oriented public policy); see also Yitzhak Hadari, The
Role of Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Investments in Selected Developing Countries
and the Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L LAW. 121, 124 (1990) (a study of U.S. investors in Israel
showed that "[t]ax incentives were not regarded as being of any major importance for the in-
vestors").
483 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 291, at 5. As "all of these factors, among others,
play a role in investment decisions, the role of the tax factor is highly indeterminant." Id. at
5-6.
484ld.
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For some, absence of proof indicates that tax incentives are generally ineffi-
cient.485
For others, "[i]n a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, a
world in which most significant policy decisions rest on assumptions and
conjectures, certain reasonable suppositions lead to the conclusion that tax
incentives can serve the cause of efficiency. ' ,486 Based on these supposi-
tions and conclusions, politicians and government officials pass tax incen-
tive legislation for political purposes. Taxation is "one of the range of
governing instruments at the disposal of government '48 7 and can be utilized
"to maintain the acceptability and influence of the governing party with im-
portant segments of opinion. 4 88 Business demands as well as competitive
moves by neighboring states have aroused and influenced domestic political
pressure. The adoption of incentive measures represents a positive sign,
both internally and externally, of governmental efforts and attitude toward
business. Internally, "[t]he offering of incentives, and the consequent suc-
cessful recruitment of a new corporation, give the appearance that the ad-
ministration is doing something to help the state."48 9  Externally, tax
incentives could create an impression of as favorable an investment climate
as that in neighboring states and municipalities.490 Only a government that
is friendly to foreign businesses is thought to grant tax concessions and the
enactment of tax incentive legislation is seen as prima facie evidence of a
favorable official disposition toward private investors.491
'85 As one scholar argued:
The fact that there might be an observed negative relationship between taxes and net
profits does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between taxes and FDI. Even
an observed negative relationship between taxes and FDI would not imply a causal re-
lationship. Taxes and FDI might be functionally correlated, but they are not necessarily
causally related. Statisticians, for example, would consider correlation between two or
more variables to be causally related if the system were entirely linear and one identi-
fied all the influences within that system.
Yelpaala, supra note 293, at 379 (emphasis in original).
FDI is short for "foreign direct investment." Yelpaala, supra note 293, at 365. In the
Chinese context, the definition of FDI has usually been broad, "embracing not only invest-
ment in equity joint ventures (JVs) and wholly foreign-owned ventures (WOVs) but also the
use of foreign funds for co-operative ventures (CVs), cooperative development of oil re-
sources, compensation trade and on some occasions even processing and assembly arrange-
ments." Cohen & Valentine, supra note 11, at 163 n.3.486 Zelinsky, supra note 475, at 977.
487 BirD, supra note 479, at 59.488 Id.
489 Kolesar, supra note 291, at 307.
490 Id.
491 See generally HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 291, at 60-65 (discussing the role of
tax incentives in improving investment climate). In fact, the belief that tax incentives would
help induce investment decisions was so strongly and widely shared that politicians and leg-
islators never ceased their efforts to attract investment inflows through fiscal measures. Yel-
paala, supra note 293, at 380.
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The Chinese were aware of efficiency arguments against tax incentives
as early as the late 1970s. 492 Economic efficiency, which relied on market
forces and opposed the role of government in resource allocation, was
ideologically out of place in China. As to technical efficiency, like their
counterparts in the West, Beijing policy makers have been interested in the
achievement of their policy goals. Decision making in China traditionally
relied on an "extensive use of general criteria of choice.., that were passed
down from the central party and government organs as general direc-
tives, ' ,493 and substitution by "ideological values . . . for objective engi-
neering or economic standards of choice. 4  As noted, political power in
China was "a vital matter ... for all welfare and human concerns," and
Chinese officials "found it painfully difficult to accept economic theory as a
proper element in the determination of policies and priorities. ' 495 Naturally,
"skilled economists have won little power or respect and the political lead-
ers are nearly illiterate in economic theory.,4 96 The Chinese leadership's
policy decisions, like its tax preference rules, were not supposed to be
questioned on technical grounds or by neutral standards;497 it was a political
choice to attain policy objectives while bearing high fiscal cost,498 and the
government had to follow with economic measures to implement the politi-
cal decision.499 Chinese economists and tax experts might also feel reluc-
tant to talk about efficiency for cultural reasons. Under the
friendship/relationship approach, for instance, the Chinese were supposed
to seek long-term commitments from parties. A meticulous economic cal-
culus would violate the spirit of friendship and guanxi. In the art of guanxi,
it would be better for a party to be the donor without an immediate full re-
turn."o The expectation for an immediate full return could demean the re-
lationship into "an overt instrumentality of 'buying and selling"' and run
492 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 21, at 12.
493 isKiN, supra note 32, at 83 (such general criteria were "that industry should support
agriculture, that each locality should strive to build up a comprehensive and relatively inde-
pendent industrial system, that rural incomes should be distributed basically according to
work done and secondarily on a per capita 'supply' basis").
494 Id. at 84.
495 PYE, supra note 331, at 25-26.
496 Id. at 26.
49' Although the post-Mao leadership disfavored policies and ideologies associated with
the Maoist development model, Demberger, supra note 32, at 35-72, the politicization of
economic-decision making remained largely untouched.
498 See, e.g., FANG, supra note 46, at 44; Du, supra note 47, at 192 (discussing revenue
sacrifice in exchange for advanced technology).
499 It is interesting to note that the Chinese word for "economy" is jingji which is short
forjingshi Jimin, which literally means "to order the world and succor the people"; the con-
cept of economy in China is therefore inextricably tied with the social order and the function
of the state. Gemet, supra note 341, at xxxi. Unlike other civilizations, the Chinese have
never separated economy from political authority. PYE, supra note 331, at 24-26.
500 See YANG, supra note 426, at 144 ("[T]he other person owes [the donor] something,
the longer the better, because [the donor is] in a superior position in future dealings.")
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counter to the main tenet of a guanxi relationship, namely, the notion that
"the instrumental nature of the gift must be masked. '0 1 Because tax bene-
fits were presented as gifts to solicit friendship and relationship building, it
would be inappropriate to ask for any short-term dollar-for-dollar returns.
In short, under Chinese tradition, one should not openly calculate economic
gains or losses when stressing friendship/relationship. 50 2. As stated in the
August 1983 Red Flag editorial, the Chinese should treat foreigners with 1i
and friendship even though no deal was made in the end.
Because tax preferences meant the state would forego revenue, it
would be politically unacceptable to concede tax revenue to foreigners
without sufficient benefits in return. Chinese officials and commentators
pointed to Lenin's support for Western firms' participation in oil, timber,
mining, and manufacturing operations in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.
50 3
They quoted Lenin who said that by allowing concessions and letting con-
cessionaires earn profits, the Soviet Union should be able to gain much
more from foreign capitalists than the other way around.5s 4 To show that
501 Id.
502 Ordering human relationship is as important to the Chinese as efficiency is to the
Westerners:
Confucian rationalism puts a premium on the affective relations of human beings..
In Max Weber's terms, China is a "familistic state": the family is a miniature state;
the state, an enlarged family. To the Chinese, the preservation of this pattern of inter-
personal relationships has long remained a matter of fundamental importance.
In contrast, Western rationalism is aimed at achieving efficiency, which refers to the
relationship between effort and result, input and output. Efficiency is achieved with a
small commitment of the former and a great gain of the latter. In the pursuit of effi-
ciency, objectivity assumes fundamental importance; human emotions and human rela-
tions should not interfere with the search for efficiency. Centralization, specialization,
standardization are emphasized; quantitative analysis is vigorously pursued so that eve-
rything can be measured in terms of an input-output ratio.
Hung-chao Tai, Confucian Rationalism and Political Modernization, in CoNFUCIANIsM AND
MODERNIZATION: A SYMpOsIuM 35, 39-40 (Joseph P.L. Jiang ed., 1987).
503 See, e.g., Red Flag Editorial, supra note 45, at 3; Yu Liangzao, You LieningZurangzhi
Sixiang Dao Deng Xiaoping Jingfi Tequ Lilun De Fazhan [From Lenin's Ideas for Foreign
Concessions to the Development of Deng Xiaoping's Theory on Special Economic Zones],
SHEHUI KEXUE YANJIU [SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH], No. 6, at 50 (1996). For an English
discussion of Lenin's view on allowing foreign concessions in the Soviet Union, see LouIs
FISCHER, THE LIFE OF LENIN 474 (1964).
s04 Lenin said:
The concessionaire is capitalist. He conducts his business on capitalist lines, for profit.
He is willing to enter into an agreement with the proletarian government in order to
obtain extra profits, over and above ordinary profits, or in order to obtain raw materials
which he cannot otherwise obtain, or can obtain only with great difficulty. Soviet
power gains by the development of the productive forces, by securing an increased
quantity of goods immediately, or within a very short period. We have, say, a hundred
concerns, mines and forest territories. We cannot develop all of these - we lack the ma-
chines, food, and transport .... By "implanting" state capitalism in the form of conces-
sions, the Soviet government strengthens largescale production as against petty
production, advanced production as against backward production, machine production
as against hand production.
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China would gain more from opening up and from preferential treatment,
the authorities sought to create the presumption that the benefits of tax pref-
erences would induce investors to do business in China, making the country
the ultimate beneficiary. 505
The 1980 JVITL promised a lower rate, tax holidays and other prefer-
ences to EJVs, as most early foreign joint venturers came from Hong Kong
or used Hong Kong as a springboard into investment in China. Hong Kong
taxes the income and profits of its residents and corporations only if they
have a local source. 6 Profits from investment outside the territory are ex-
empt from local profit taxes.50 7 When Hong Kong-based businesses in-
vested in Mainland China, profits earned from China would therefore not be
taxed in the territory. Moreover, Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese inves-
tors were engaged in labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. Because such
projects tended to be low-profit and therefore cost-sensitive,0s preferential
treatment would have had a visible impact on their bottom line. Arguably,
as Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese businesses were the most likely to in-
vest in China anyway, tax preferences intended for these investors might
look redundant and unnecessary. For Chinese decision-makers, however,
since Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese investors would most likely appre-
ciate tax preferences, 509 fiscal measures would not be wasted. Indisputably,
The Tax in Kind (June 1921): The Significance of the New Policy and Its Conditions, in
LENIN, ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION: SELECTED WRITINGs 337 (James E. Connor ed.,
1968).
Lenin also argued: "Our existence and the hastening of our escape from a critical situa-
tion and from hunger is a gigantic force and a revolutionary factor much greater, from the
view point of world economy, than the few pennies they [foreigners] will earn from us."
FISCHER, supra note 503, at 474 (quoting Eighth Congress of Soviets, Dec. 21, 1920).
505 See, e.g., Qingdao Shi Guoshuiju Ketizu [Study Group, Qingdao City State Taxation
Bureau], Dui Woguo Shixing Shuishou Youhui Zhengce De Jidian Sikao [Some Reflections
on Our Country's Tax Preference Policy], SHUISHOU YANJIU ZILIAO [TAX RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Feb. 29, 1996, at 17, 17-18 (assuming that tax preference policy made great
contribution to the success of inducing foreign capital to China) [hereinafter Qingdao Tax
Bureau].
506 Under Hong Kong revenue law, one is liable for profits tax only if all the following
conditions are fulfilled: (1) the taxpayer carries on a trade, profession or business in Hong
Kong, (2) the taxpayer derives profits from that trade, profession or business and (3) those
profits arise in or are derived from Hong Kong. Inland Revenue Ordinance, §14 (H.K.).
507 When business operations which give rise to profits have been conducted both within
and without Hong Kong, an apportionment of profits can be done for assessment of tax li-
ability. DAVID FLux & DAVID G. SMITH, HONG KONG TAXATION: LAW & PRACTICE 158-59
(1996-1997 ed.).
508 For instance, export-oriented foreign investment enterprises in Shenzhen were usually
small capital type, and their profit margin was below five percent. ZHANG, supra note 307,
at 36.
509 For Hong Kong investors, tax incentives have been important considerations for in-
vestment decisions. See, e.g., Daniel K C Cheung et al., Taxation and Its Implication on
Cross-Border Profits of Manufacturing Businesses in Hong Kong, 4 J. ENTERPRISING
CULTURE 401, 408 (1996) (according to one survey, "government attitude and investment
incentives" including tax incentives ranked only after the "cost" factor in impacting Hong
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the country's foreign investment policy direction determines tax prefer-
ences. Hi-tech investments were most likely to come from U.S., Japanese
and Western European multinational companies, which as the Chinese were
aware, were more interested in access to the Chinese domestic market and
technology protection than in tax treatment.51° As hi-tech investors were
less likely to react to tax preferences than investors in labor-intensive proj-
ects, there would be more uncertainty about the impact of tax treatment on
hi-tech investment decisions. Because the acquisition of advanced technol-
ogy is now identified as the chief goal of opening up, however, hi-tech spe-
cific tax preferences are more likely to benefit the country.51  The Chinese
approach satisfied political needs without painstakingly establishing a
causal link between tax preferences and investment decisions through rig-
orous analyses. It was also consistent with the cultural factors discussed. 2
To the Chinese, tax preferences are not supposed to work only on economic
grounds. Economic benefits are intermediaries that transmit Chinese virtue,
sincerity, and friendly sentiments.1 3
Only when tax benefits go to foreign governments instead of investors
would preference rules cease to be justified. The 1981 FEITL provided
very limited tax benefits as compared to the 1980 JVITL.51 4 The legislation
was primarily aimed at foreign oil companies engaged in joint development
and exploration of offshore oil and gas reserves, and seventy percent of
Kong investment decisions in Chinese Mainland). See also Chou Wei Hui Jingfi Xiaozu
Cheng Taolun Touzi ZhongXi Bu [The Economic Group of the Preparatory Committee Dis-
cussed Investment in Central and Western Regions], XIN PAO (HONG KONG ECONOMIC
JOURNAL), Oct. 11, 1996, at 8 (discussing Hong Kong investors in interior provinces). Re-
cently, the Chinese government decided to extend the grace period for import tax exemption
in recognition of the importance of such tax benefits for foreign investors. Waiqi Ziyong
Shebei Guanshui Ke Yanqi [Extension of the Grace Period for Foreign Enterprises'Imports
of Self-Use Equipment], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Feb. 4, 1997, at A13.
510 See, e.g., Liu & Xu, supra note 318, at 13 (stating that tax preferences had little effect
on investors from France, Germany and Japan).
511 The Chinese might also argue that "incentives limited to particular sectors or indus-
tries will be effective in diverting capital to such industries." MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, su-
pra note 6, at 603. The effectiveness of current attempts targeting hi-tech projects is reduced
by the fact that many run-of-the-mill investments are already offered tax benefits. See Qing-
dao Tax Bureau, supra note 505, at 19 (discussing lack of investment in transportation, en-
ergy, power supply, communication, new-tech and other state priority sectors because of
deficient preferential treatment); Yu Bo, Shewai Shuishou Youhui Zhengce De Sikao [Re-
flection on Foreign Related Tax Preferences], CAIZHENG YANJiu ZrLiAo [FINANCE RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Feb. 17, 1990, at 22, 25 (stating that preferences broadly available to all kinds
of FIEs encouraged investment in labor intensive and service industries, but hindered foreign
investment in state priority sectors).512 See supra Part IV.
513 Helping financially-difficult foreign projects was an important way to show Chinese
sincerity. ZIANG, supra note 295, at 178.514 See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
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those investments involved U.S. oil companies.55 Countries like the United
States have taxed the income of their citizens and corporations on a world-
wide basis, including income derived from foreign investment, though they
allowed taxpayers to credit domestic taxes against certain taxes paid or ac-
crued in other countries. 16 A host country's lower taxes and tax holidays
for foreign investors would not be accepted as a basis for the home coun-
try's tax credit, as in the case of the United States, which has not recognized
tax sparing.5 17 The tax positions of foreign companies contemplated by the
1981 FEITL were therefore different from those of investors targeted by the
1980 JVITL. If the 1981 FEITL granted similar tax benefits, the Chinese
government would simply concede revenue to foreign governments which
collected the difference.18 Tax rates for those foreign companies were
therefore set at relatively high levels to minimize revenue outflows in joint
oil and gas exploitation projects.1 9 Meanwhile, the 1981 FEITL legislation
515 Yin Keqin, Waiguo Qiye Shoudeshui Ji Qi ShixingXize De Zhengce Jingshen He Zhi-
dao Yuanze [The Policy Spirit and Guiding Principles of the Income Tax Law on Foreign
Enterprises and Its Detailed Implementing Rules], CAIZHENG YANJiU ZILiAO [FINANCE
RESEARCH MATERIALS], Nov. 25, 1982, at 21, 21-22; Wang, supra note 292, at I (discussing
the need for income tax on foreign oil companies engaged in oil exploration projects).
516 Under the United States foreign tax credit rule, a credit is allowed for foreign income
tax paid or accrued, or for foreign taxes paid in lieu of income taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 901-03
(1987), the credit is allowed to American citizens, residents and corporations for foreign
taxes levied directly on income received by them, like dividends, royalties or income from a
branch, id. § 901; an American party can also claim a credit for any income taxes levied on
the income of a foreign corporation from which it receives a dividend, id. § 902. For a dis-
cussion of the complex U.S. tax credit rule, see ELISABETH OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX
CREDIT (1961); ELISABETH A. OwENs & GERALD T. BALL, THE INDIRECT CREDIT (1975).
517 Tax sparing describes tax exemptions and reductions a country grants to encourage
certain activities including foreign investment, see Stanley S. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax
Treaty and "Tax Sparing," 11 NAT'L TAX J. 156, 157 (1958), and if recognized for purposes
of foreign tax credit, such forgiven or spared taxes would entitle the taxpayer to a credit in its
home country, even though they were unpaid in the host country. Id. For arguments against
tax sparing in the United States, see id. at 157-67.
... See, e.g., Caizhengbu Shuiwu Zongju Fuzeren Chanshu Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa [A
Leading Official of the Taxation Bureau of the Ministry of Finance Expounds The Income
Tax of Foreign Enterprises], WENHUI BAO (WEN WEI PO) (HK), Dec. 12, 1981, reprinted in
MANUAL OF CHINESE FOREIGN TAX, supra note 285, at 124, 129 (stating that tax must en-
courage foreign investment and make foreign investors profitable, but state interest must be
protected against revenue losses to other governments; when it came to relationships be-
tween China and foreign investors' home countries, China must safeguard its sovereignty
and economic interest on the basis of equality and mutual benefits); Editorial, Cujin Guoji
Jingfi Hezuo De Xin Shui Fa [New Tax Laws for Promoting International Economic Coop-
eration], CAIMAO ZHANXIAN [FINANCE AND TRADE FRONT], Sept. 19, 1980, reprinted in
MANUAL OF CHINESE FOREIGN TAX, supra note 285, at 134-36 (income tax on EJVs involved
distribution between states; Chinese JVITL safeguarded state economic interest).
519 Yin, supra note 515, at 24. Those who advocated a tough position vis-a-vis foreign
companies were associated with the finance and tax departments of the central and local
governments. Understandably, finance and tax officials were most concerned about revenue
losses as their responsibility was to insure the adequacy of tax revenue and its collection;
how much tax they collected was also the indication of their job performance. For instance,
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provided low tax rates to small-scale, low profit foreign enterprises, which
included most investors from Hong Kong. Hong Kong investors would
actually benefit from low tax rates under Hong Kong's tax law. The
authorities created a uniform income tax regime in 1991 to replace differ-
entiated treatment under the 1980 JVITL and 1981 FEITL.521  As to
whether foreign investors would benefit from the 1991 UTL preferential
scheme, the Chinese finance minister explained that corporate tax rates in
countries like the United States came down significantly during the
1980s.5 22 Moreover, China concluded many bilateral tax treaties that rec-
ognized the concept of tax sparing and therefore allowed foreign investors
Shenzhen tax bureau officials once opposed tax holidays for all foreign investment enter-
prises even though such measures were widely accepted as necessary to promote opening up.
Mo Wangyun et al., Shenzhen Jingfi Tequ CaizhengJingji Qingkuang De Kaocha [Observa-
tion of the Financial and Economic Situations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone],
CAIZHENG YANJIUZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Aug. 25, 1984, at 6, 10.
520 Yin, supra note 515, at 22.
521 During the early years of the opening up policy, EJVs were preferred to non-EJV
forms of investment. On the basis of Eastern European countries' experiences, the Chinese
government felt more comfortable with EJVs which would provide Chinese enterprises easy
access to technology, management and other skills brought in by foreign partners, see, e.g.,
Yang Yali, Dui Woguo Liyong Waizi Fangshi De Chutan [A Preliminary Discussion on
Forms of Foreign Investment To Be Utilized by Our Country], CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO
[FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Sept. 9, 1982, at 9, 9. In contrast, WFOEs, by definition,
would exclude participation by the Chinese and therefore looked less attractive in terms of
technology access. See Liyong Waizi Jige Wenti [Some Issues on Using Foreign Invest-
ment], XuESHu YANJIU DONGTAI [TREND OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH], Nos. 1 & 2 (1983), re-
printed in CAIZHENG YANJIU ZILIAO [FINANCE RESEARCH MATERIALS], Jan. 1, 1985, at 11.
Compared to EJVs which usually involved a long-term commitment of 10 to 30 years, EJV
implementing rules, supra note 217, art. 100, and therefore permitted the Chinese to benefit
more from foreign partners, CJVs were more flexible and provided an ideal vehicle for
short-term projects and therefore benefited the Chinese less. Zhongwai Hezi Yu Jie Waizhai
Yinjin Jishu Liduobishao Rong Yiren Tan Liyong Waizi Fangshi [More Benefits Than Short-
comings for Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures and Foreign Borrowing: Rong Yiren Speaks of
Forms of Foreign Investment], SHInm JINGJI DAOBAO [WORLD ECONOMIC HERALD], Nov. 22,
1982, at 2. The government did not prohibit CJVs and WFOEs as they may still be useful in
some cases, Xu Dixin, Guanyu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang De Jige Wenti [On Questions of
Further Opening Up], in 1984 ZHONGGUO JINGJI TEQu NIANJIAN [1984 YEARBOOK OF
CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES], 773, 773 (Xianggang Zhongguo Jingji Tequ Nianjian
Chubanshe [Hong Kong Publishing House of Yearbook of China's Special Economic
Zones], 1984) [hereinafter Y.B. SEZs] (as some investors sought the form of wholly foreign
owned enterprises to control technology, management or profit share, allowing WFOEs
would therefore boost foreign investment), but neither did it encourage non-EJVs through
preferential measures. Differences between the JVITL and FEITL therefore reflected,
among other things, such policy bias in favor of EJVs. The early policy bias against non-
EJV forms of investments later proved to be unwarranted and even harmful to the country's
objective of seeking foreign capital and technology and non-EJV forms of investment were
gradually granted the same or similar treatment as EJVs, as the 1991 UTL showed.
522 Revenue concerns such as those present during the drafting of the 1981 FEITL were
said to be largely resolved because corporate income tax rates had been lowered to around
34% during the 1980s in countries like the United States, Great Britain, Singapore and Ma-
laysia. Wang, supra note 69.
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to keep tax preferences they were entitled to under Chinese law.523 Double
taxation risks were therefore much reduced.524
VI. TAX EQUITIES, DOMESTIC DISCONTENTS AND REVENUE CONCERNS
In the West, fairness generally requires that "taxes ... bear similarly
upon all people in similar circumstances. 5 21 The rule of horizontal equity
is said not only to "offer protection against arbitrary discrimination" but
also to "reflect the basic principle of equal worth." Because tax incen-
tives are usually selective, they are generally considered to be against eq-
uity.527 The Chinese seemed to pay little or no attention to tax equity when
they first introduced separate tax and preferential rules for domestically-
owned enterprises and foreign investment enterprises. Separate preferential
treatment for overseas businesses was initially thought to be practical and
desirable as it allowed the government to apply "international practice" to
forein investment projects with as few domestic implications as possi-
ble.52  China's economic reform has since brought about tremendous
changes to domestic enterprises.529 The development of markets and the
weakening of state planning were two significant changes. 530 The state no
longer sets the price for goods and does not dictate wages for workers, or at
least not directly.5 31 Enterprises have been forced to make ends meet on
their own without state subsidy. The government replaced profit remittance
by state enterprises with income taxes,532 which were designed to reward
523 See ZHONGGUO SHEWAI SHUIsHOu SH1wu [A TAXATION GUIDE TO FOREIGNERS IN
CHINA] 289-94 (Wang Xuanhui ed., 1996) (tax sparing was accepted by tax treaties with
countries like Japan, Great Britain, Malaysia, Denmark, Finland, Canada, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Singapore, Australia, Kuwait, Italy, South Korea; tax treaties with United States,
Russia, Israel, Brazil, and a few other countries did not accept tax sparing).
524 Wang, supra note 69.
525 HENRY SIMMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 8 (1950).
526 Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 113
(1990).527 See Deborah M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1949,
1955 (1994) (tax incentives created horizontal inequity); Yelpaala, supra note 293, at 386
(when tax incentives were offered against domestic entrepreneurs, there would be serious
distortional effects); Kolesar, supra note 291, at 296 (the principal inequity of tax incentive
programs may be that businesses that do not qualify for tax abatement are placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage). In practice, of course, there is a question of how "similar circum-
stances" should be defined. Musgrave, supra note 526, at 113.528 See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
129 For an overview and case study of Chinese domestic enterprise reform during the
1980s, see William A. Byrd, Chinese Industrial Reform, 1978-89, in CHINESE INDUSTRIAL
FIRMs UNDER REFORM 1, 1-32 (William A. Byrd ed., 1992).
530 As William A. Byrd observed, as a result of the 1980s reform, "directive planning and
administrative allocation of industrial goods has declined sharply, while the role of markets
and marketlike mechanisms has greatly expanded." Id. at 14.
53' Id. at 5-9.
532 Experiments with enterprise income taxes started in 1979, and comprehensive changes
occurred in 1983 when the State Council approved the Ministry of Finance's Trial Methods
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good performance. It was assumed that production would respond to mar-
ket demands, and managers and workers could personally benefit from the
success of their businesses thanks to a liberalized incentive mechanism.
33
As state protection has been reduced, SOEs have encountered tough market
competition from non-state sectors, which received state encouragement. In
1985, the State Council revised the progressive income tax schedule for
collectively-owned enterprises, and reduced their tax burden. 34 After the
Party changed the country's Constitution to allow for privately-owned busi-
nesses in 1988 , 35 the government applied a favorable thirty-five percent in-
come tax rate to private enterprises, 536 compared with the then fifty-five
percent rate for large and medium state-owned enterprises. 37 Because non-
state sectors are thriving, the performance of many SOEs remains dismal.
S38
Critics blamed disparate tax treatment for the plight of the state sector. By
1991, large- and medium-sized SOEs paid a higher percentage of their
of Li Gai Shui [Changing Profit to Tax] for State Enterprises [Caizhengbu Guanyu Guoying
Qiye Li Gai Shui Shixing Banfa] on April 24, 1983, 1983 FAGui HUIBIAN 132. Accordingly,
all profit-making state-owned large and medium enterprises would pay income tax on their
realized profit at a fiat rate of 55%. Id. After-tax profit was divided into two parts: one part
was to be remitted to the state treasury, and the other part would be retained by enterprises
according to state regulations. Id.
533 Chinese enterprises have since demonstrated a strong orientation toward profits and
"profits were valued primarily because they could be used to improve workers' living stan-
dards, through bonuses, welfare, and enterprise-provided housing." BYRD, supra note 529,
at 14.534 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiti Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Income Tax of Collective Enterprises], is-
sued by the State Council on April 11, 1985, 1985 FAGUI HUBIAN 161.535 ZHONGGUO XIANFA [CHINESE CoNsTuIoN], art. 11 (1988).536 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Siying Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Income Tax of Private Enterprises], art. 3,
adopted by the Seventh Standing Session of the State Council on June 3, 1988 and promul-
gated by the State Council on June 25, 1988, 1988 FAGUI HUmiAN 249,249.537 For a discussion of domestic enterprise income tax prior to 1993 reform, see WONG ET'
AL., supra note 27, at 56-59; CHINA: REVENUE MOBILIZATION, supra note 27, at 40-43.538 Problems faced by Chinese SOEs are serious and several. One is chronic waste. Ac-
cording to a recent official estimate, Chinese factories have stockpiled a record U.S. $60.2
billion worth of goods, the equivalent of more than a quarter of the entire nation's 1996 in-
dustrial output. Tom Korski, Mainland Push to Curb Massive SOE Waste, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 28, 1997, Business, at 1, 5. Another problem is worker surplus. It has
been reported that China's public sector has a surplus work force of up to 54 million or 36
per cent of the entire state payroll, and between 15 to 20 million of these workers would be-
come unemployed by the year 2000. Tom Korski & Agatha Ngai, 20m Jobs to Go by 2000
in China's State Sector, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 7, 1997, at 1. Today, 43% of state
enterprises employing 20 million workers are losing money; another 30% of state enterprises
employing another 20 million workers are only making money through accounting manipu-
lation; state enterprises have bank debts of more than 2,000 billion yuan. Vivien Pik-Kwan
Chan, State Firms in Rush to Go Bankrupt, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 2, 1997, at 8.
State sector losses totalled 61.6 billion yuan in 1996, a 30% increase from 1995. Wang Xi-
angwei, China Digs Deep to Aid State Sector, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Mar. 4, 1997, Busi-
ness, at 1.
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profits in income tax than did the non-state enterprises.53 9 Differences in
tax treatment between the state and non-state sectors were eliminated on
January 1, 1994, when a set of uniform income tax regulations governing
all DOEs, whether state-owned or not, took effect.540 Since then, the critics
have shifted the thrust of their complaints to various tax and non-tax prefer-
ences benefitting FIEs.
To be sure, the government has granted tax breaks to DOEs in general
and SOEs in particular.54 1 Overall, FIEs seem to pay less income tax than
DOEs do, however. 42 A comparative study has concluded that the income
tax burden of FIEs is less than that of DOEs. 543 While the nominal rates for
both DOEs and FIs remain the same (i.e., thirty-three percent - the rate
for FIEs includes three percent local surtax), FIEs have enjoyed reduced
rates, generous tax holidays and other preferences.544 As a result, the
amount of their income tax payment for 1991 represented only 12.7% of
their profits, and, if tax-exempted profits are also included, the ratio further
dropped to 8.1%. 545 While the tax burden of FIEs stayed unchanged in
1994, the actual tax liability of DOEs was estimated at twenty-eight percent
539 In 1991, the tax burden for large- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises was 40%,
that of collective enterprises was 25.8% and the tax burden of private enterprises stood at
30%. Wang Chengrao, Shilun Liangzhong Qiye Suodeshui Youhui Zhengce De Tongyi Yu
Wanshan [A Preliminary Discussion on the Unification and Improvement of Two Enterprise
Income Taxes and Preferential Policies], SHUIwU YANJIU [TAX STuDIES], 1995 No. 12, at 7,
10.
540 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regula-
tions of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax], promulgated by the State
Council on December 13, 1993, TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 270.
541 For instance, domestic enterprises using certain resources for production are exempt
from income tax for five years, TAX SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 10, at 230-3 1, and a vari-
ety of domestic service enterprises enjoy income tax exemptions and reductions, id. at 234:
new enterprises in old revolutionary base regions, minority areas or economically underde-
veloped areas may be granted two years' income tax exemptions or reductions, id. at 236;
certain food producing enterprises are granted income tax exemptions or reductions, id. at
239; enterprises listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange pay a reduced 15% enterprise in-
come tax rate, id. at 239. Local governments also use tax reductions to help industries,
Shanghai Baifia Shangshi Gongsi Huo Jianshui Cheng Ba [Tax for A Hundred Listed Com-
panies in Shanghai was Reduced by 18%], MING BAo (MING PAO) (HK), Sept. 13, 1996, at
A12. Chinese domestically-owned enterprises also set up companies abroad and use such
foreign companies to invest in China in order to benefit from tax preferences as foreign in-
vestment. See Shier Nian Zhongguo Liuchu Zfin 2035 Yi Meiyuan [China's capital outflow
amounts to US$ 203.5 billion in 12 years], XIANGGANG SHANG BAO (HONG KONG
COMMERCIAL DAILY), Nov. 6, 1996, at B6.
42 Since 1988, however, FIEs and DOEs in Shenzhen SEZ and Hainan SEZ have been
subject to the same normative and preferential treatment under the enterprise income tax and
turnover tax systems. See supra notes 103 and 214; Wu SHENGWEN, SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU
NASHUI SHIWU [TAX PRACTICE IN SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE] 63-74 (1995) (dis-
cussing various tax preferences enjoyed by FIEs and DOEs in Shenzhen).
543 Wang, supra note 538, at 10.
544id.
545 id.
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of their profits for the same year. 46 Tax preferences favoring FIEs have
been contrasted to the plight of DOEs and have been criticized as inconsis-
tent with the development of a socialist market economy.5 47 While many
other factors may have contributed to DOEs' dismal performances, dispa-
rate tax treatment has received the most criticism. Take, for example, the
tax exemptions enjoyed by FIEs for imports of capital goods. An original
purpose of import tax exemptions was to reduce foreign investors' start-up
costs so their contribution in kind could be brought into China duty-free and
tax exempt.5 48 Because DOEs were not generally offered similar benefits,
the abolition of import tax exemption for FIEs "was necessary to create a
level playing field as China progressed toward a market economy.
549
Moreover, the tax breaks discouraged purchases of capital goods in the do-
mestic market.55 0
The Chinese use of equity arguments has a distinctive flavor of patri-
otism or nationalism. A strong national interest is thought to be at stake
when foreign capital is perceived to have seriously menaced domestic in-
dustries 55 ' As SOEs constitute the backbone of the country's socialist
economy and provide most jobs and state revenue, their predicaments have
as many political consequences as economic implications. 5 2 In the early
years of its opening-up policy, the Chinese government assumed that the
546 Id.
.47 See, e.g., Wang Lujin, Tan Woguo Shewai Shuishou Fazhan Zhanlue [On the Devel-
opment Strategy of Foreign Taxation of Our Country], SHUAVu YANJIU [TAX STUDIES], 1995
No.7, at 51, 53; Cai Zheng, Tongyi Nei Wai Zi Qiye Suodeshui De Nandian Yu Duice [Diffi-
culties and Solutions in Unifying Income Tax Treatments of Foreign Enterprises and Non-
foreign Enterprises], SHEVAI S-URwU [INT'L TAxATON IN CHINA], 1996 No. 7, at 7, 7.
48 For the impact of the abolition of import tax exemptions on FIEs' cost, see supra note
15.
s49 Xiao Yu, SEZs Continue to Hold Key for Reform Drive, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 5, 1997, at 7 (quoting vice-director of the State Council's Special Economic Zones Of-
fice who defended the April 1996 abolition of import tax exemptions).
550 See Zhongguo Jixu Fan Qingxiao Fa Baohu Shichang [China Urgently Needs Anti-
Dumping Law for Market Protection], MING BAO (MING PAO) (HK), Aug. 16, 1996, at A12
(large quantity of imports of machinery and electronic products were attributable to import
tax benefits for FIEs).
551 As was recently observed, "cries of despair were heard from China's shipping indus-
try, textile industry, bicycle makers, and paper manufacturers. With varying degrees of ur-
gency, these sectors warned that their share of China's domestic market was being gobbled
up by foreign firms." Ted Plafker, Repellent Sought for Blood-Sucking Pests, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Sept. 2, 1996, Business, at 3.
552 Chinese Premier Li Peng stated that SOEs have constituted the economic foundation
of socialism and that the issue of how SOEs are managed is a life and death issue for the so-
cialist system. Li Peng Biaoshi Guoqi Guanhu Shehui Zhuyi Zhidu Xingwang [Li Peng
States State-Owned Enterprises Relate to the Rise and Fall of the Socialism], XIN BAO
(HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Jan. 27, 1997, at 10. He ruled out radical steps such as
privatising large state firms and reiterated that the state would continue to financially support
large state enterprises which constituted the pillar of national industry. Willy Wo-Lap Lam,
Premier Rules Out Big Privatisation, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 28, 1997, at 8.
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domestic market would stay largely closed to foreign funded businesses and
that any domestic sales, if permitted, would be subject to tight control.
While legal and administrative hurdles blocking access to the Chinese mar-
ket remain formidable to date, official rhetoric has become more flexible
and increasingly concessive lately. The Chinese now accept the notion of
national treatment. As domestic anxieties are addressed, however, national
treatment is used as a double-edged sword. If FIEs receive national treat-
ment in terms of market access and other benefits, tax gaps between FIEs
and DOEs must close. 53 The recent use of horizontal equity in China is
limited, however, to differences between FIEs and DOEs, and disparate tax
treatment among FIEs is not affected. The Chinese continue to take a par-
ticularistic approach in favor of certain types of foreign projects like hi-tech
projects.
In the West, tax incentives are associated with horizontal inequity. For
the Chinese, however, equity does not militate against tax preferences. In
fact, advocates for uniform taxation of FIEs and DOEs usually have as-
sumed that, although the rules should be changed, the preferential policy
would be kept. DOEs have been eagerly seeking tax benefits for them-
selves. 5 4 The domestic parties' use of equity does not lead to condemna-
tion of tax preferences per se; it is mostly an excuse for claiming the same
tax benefits given to foreign businesses. In reality, however, it is unlikely
that existing tax preferences favoring foreign businesses can indiscrimi-
nately be extended to domestic enterprises. One reason is the seriousness of
the revenue impact, as DOEs provide the most tax revenue to the state. To
achieve horizontal equity, the Chinese first have to reduce existing tax pref-
erences favoring foreign investment. This move would also raise revenue.
The 1993 tax reform was supposed to equalize turnover tax burden for FIEs
and DOEs555 and, not surprisingly, resulted in tax increases for some FIEs.
The April 1996 revocation of tax exemptions for imports of capital goods
sought to treat DOEs and FIEs equally by terminating one of the most sig-
nificant tax benefits FIEs enjoyed for over a decade.
Another aspect of tax equity - vertical equity - requires "an appro-
priate differentiation among unequals. ' '5 6 Vertical equity is more contro-
versial than horizontal equity because the differentiation is made based on
553 Sun, supra note 16, at 10.
554 See, e.g., Josephine Ma, CNOOC Seeks Concessions After Order to Relocate Plant, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 1996, Business, at 4 (China Offshore Oil Corporation sought
tax concessions from Hainan provincial government for plant relocation).555 See Wang Xuanhui, Qian Tan Tongyi Nei Wai Liuzhuanshui Zhi De Biyaoxing [A
Preliminary Discussion on the Necessity for A Unified Turnover Tax System for Domestic
and Foreign Parties], SHawAi SHuIwu [FOREIGN TAXATION], 1994 No. 4, at 7, 8 (noting that
prior to the 1993 tax reform, in comparison to turnover taxes paid by DOEs, some FIEs'
CICT burdens were heavier, but other FIEs' CICT burdens were lighter. A unified turnover
tax system was intended to even up such differences).
556 Musgrave, supra note 526, at 113.
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"social taste and political debate. 557 Prior to 1994, China had a revenue-
sharing arrangement under which a portion of locally-collected revenues
were set aside as the central government's revenues. 8 The rest went into a
pool to be shared between the central and provincial/local governments ac-
cording to pre-determined formulas or contracts.5 9 Under this structure,
rich provinces could forego tax revenues because they shared the cost of tax
breaks with the central government, whereas poor provinces had little room
to maneuver because they desperately needed all the revenue they could
560get. 0 Poor regions tended to view tax preferences as abuses and perver-
sion on the part of rich provinces.61 Without regional preferences, rich
provinces would have contributed more to the state treasury. Equity con-
siderations argue for increasing state revenue in order to allocate more re-
sources to the development of the interior provinces. Deng Xiaoping had
assured the interior regions that the rich coastal regions, which benefited
from special policies, would assist in developing other regions through in-
creased tax payments or profit remittances to the state. Opponents to
preferential treatment in SEZs and other coastal areas believed that SEZs
and coastal areas failed to live up to Deng's expectation because their con-
tribution to state revenue remained small compared to their shares of gross
national product.5 63 Direct state investments and financial support for inte-
rior provinces required more government spending, which is possible only
with increased revenue. Reforming preferential schemes to increase reve-
nue collection from coastal areas would therefore enable the state to allo-
cate more resources for interior development.
For the central government, an approach based on equity could achieve
significant revenue gains. There has been growing interest in the impact of
preference rules on government revenue.564 Since the early 1980s, the cen-
tral government's tax revenue, as a share of the gross domestic product,
55 7 
Id.
558 WONG ET AL., supra note 27, at 81-134.
559 
Id.
560 Id. at 128-29, 131 (rich provinces like tax preferences).
56i The 1994 tax reform has limited the room for tax reduction by local governments as
state tax bureaus in charge of collecting state-fixed tax revenue are not reporting to local
governments; still, local officials promised subsequent reimbursement for prior tax payments
as incentives to foreign investments. Zhongyang Jianshi Gedi Xin Shuizhi Zhixing Qing-
kuang [The Central Authorities Check and Inspect the Implementation of New Tax Systems
by Localities], XIANGGANG JINGJI RIBAO (HoNG KONG ECONOMIC TIMES), Oct. 31, 1996, at
A28; see also supra note 446.
562 Jin, supra note 466, at 30.
563 id.
564 See, e.g., Xi'an Shi Guoshuiju Zhengyanshi [Policy Research Section, Xi'an City
State Taxation Bureau], Yinjin Waizi Yu Shuishou Youhui De Yanjiu [A Study on Attracting
Foreign Capital and Tax Preferences], SHnUISHOU YANJnu ZILIAO [TAX RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Feb. 29, 1996, at 13, 14 (single-minded adoption of tax preferences could
weaken the revenue-raising function of taxation); Wang et al., supra note 167, at 24, 24
(guarantee of state revenue as the first principle of enterprise income tax).
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steadily declined because of tax concessions made to local governments and
companies. 565 The 1993 tax reform rebalanced inter-governmental fiscal
relations by allocating more tax revenues to the central government.
566
Customs duties, VAT and consumption taxes collected by the state customs
authorities have become the fixed tax revenues of the central government.
67
The abolition and phase-out of duty-free and tax-exempt imports in April
1996 were therefore expected to significantly contribute to the central gov-
ernment's coffers. 568 The decision to end import tax exemptions coincided
with a tariff reduction package,569 as some of the negative impact of the
revocation of import tax exemptions on foreign investors could be absorbed
by lower custom duties. Overall, the move to undo tax breaks has netted a
gain to the state treasury. During the first seven months of 1996, for in-
stance, the Chinese customs reportedly collected 47.4 billion yuan in import
duties and taxes - a 27.4% jump from the previous year - and the aboli-
tion of import tax exemptions alone brought in about ten billion yuan.
5 70
The April 1996 decision hit coastal areas the hardest and narrowed tax gaps
between coastal areas and interior provinces.571 Meanwhile it helped the
state collect more tax revenues. In summary, DOEs and interior areas com-
plain about inequities in order to advance their own claims for more re-
sources, and the government's revenue goal has been wrapped in tax equity
clothes.
565 See Penelope B. Prime, Taxation Reform in China's Public Finance, in CHINA'S
ECONOMIC DILEMMAS, supra note 48, at 167, 176-79; Joseph Kahn, Beling Struggles to
Stem Slide in Taxation Power, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at 1.
566 Plan of 1993 Tax Reform, supra note 224, at 3 (the purposes of the 1993 tax reform
include reinforcing the central capacity to macro-manage economy, re-arranging the fiscal
relationship between the center and localities, and increasing the ratio of tax revenue in
GNP).567 See supra note 224.
568 Previous import tax exemptions, while rewarding "placing the two ends outside" proj-
ects, also discriminated against export producers relying on domestic supplies. See Sun, su-
pra note 242, at 54 (export enterprises using domestic supplies had to pay turnover taxes
whereas export enterprises using imported materials were tax-exempt). Western economists
have long argued that host countries should benefit more from investments using domestic
resources and materials than they would from foreign capital, which brings its own resources
with it and uses the host country as a production site only. Therefore, tax incentives "should
be linked to domestic value added which the foreign capital induces." MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 6, at 604.
569 1995 Notification on Import Taxation Policy, supra note 14. Before the 1996 tariff
cut, China's nominal tariffs on imports remained unacceptably high - 40% on average.
However, because of various duty-free and tax-exempt imports, the sums actually collected
were aberrantly low. China then announced its intent to lower tariffs in a bid for member-
ship in the World Trade Organization. After April 1, 1996, China's overall tariffs fell to an
average of 23%. Id.
570 Impact from Duty Cuts Minimal - Income from Tariffs Soars, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 2, 1996, Business, at 3.
571 See Christine Chan, Zhuhai's Attractions Fade for Foreigners, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 11, 1996, China Business Review, at 2.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The 1995 World Bank Paper examined China's tax preferences favor-
ing foreign investors from efficiency and equity perspectives.572 It found no
evidence indicating that foreign investment came to China because of the
country's tax concessions. 73 Assuming China's tax preferences worked ef-
fectively only for ten percent of foreign investment in the country, the paper
put revenue loss at U.S. $5 billion.57  It believed that special tax treatment
reserved for foreign firms encouraged domestic capital to go abroad and
then come back as "foreign investors" to enjoy preferences, evidencing a
strong case of inefficiency and waste.575 The 1995 World Bank Paper criti-
cized regionally-based preferential schemes for distorting investment loca-
tion decisions and fostering regional economic disparities. It also pointed
out that tax preferences favoring foreign investment placed DOEs in a dis-
576advantageous position. Findings of inefficiency and inequities led to the
conclusion that the use of tax preferences as an instrument to vie for foreign
investment should be phased out within the next few years.5 77
The Chinese, however, are not ready to abandon tax preferences as an
instrument to promote their opening-up policy and vie for foreign capital
and technology. First, like politicians in many other countries, Chinese of-
ficials assume that fiscal measures can act as a strong incentive to affect in-
vestment decisions. This is especially true given the fact that reforms in
areas such as market access will have a long way to go in order to satisfy
many of the foreign demands for improvement of investment conditions in
China. Moreover, as domestic and international precedents have shown,
fiscal measures are an important indication of the leadership's policy ori-
entation and preference. An attempt to deny all tax benefits is almost cer-
tain to wreak havoc. Officials eager to attract foreign investment for local
economic development would resist such an attempt. Foreign business
communities would interpret the attempt as an unfavorable policy shift.
The negative impact of such a move on the image of the country as well as
actual inflows of foreign investment could outweigh any resulting benefits,
as Chinese officials seemed to recognize when they recently decided to re-
store some of the import tax exemptions they had abolished just over a year
before. Finally, the symbolism of tax preferences is even more significant
according to Chinese culture and tradition. Tax reductions and exemptions
are the expressions of Chinese sincerity, generosity and moral superiority.
572 1995 World Bank Paper, supra note 17.
573 Id. at 5-6. Relying on "international experiences," the 1995 World Bank Paper con-
cluded that tax preferences were ineffective in terms of attracting foreign investment because
taxes represented only a small part of cost and foreign investors had to pay tax in their home
countries anyway. Id. at 4, 5.
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For the Chinese, only if one acts sincerely and generously can one win re-
spect, a good reputation and trust from others. Without respect, a good
reputation, and trust from others, a person cannot receive outside help. As
the success of the country's modernization depends on foreign assistance in
terms of capital investment and transfers of technology and expertise, the
Chinese people have felt compelled to demonstrate sincerity and generosity
through grants of tax or non-tax benefits. Meanwhile, favors and gifts
granted to foreign businesses have placed the Chinese people in a superior
position for action in case foreign investors fail to meet the Chinese expec-
tations. Fiscal sacrifices are not deadwood losses; they can be translated
into political, moral and psychological advantages.
On the other hand, as recent shifts in the foreign investment policy re-
quire adjustments on preference rules, the Chinese people have been look-
ing for new justifications. Chinese officials should have found the
conceptual basis of the World Bank Paper - economic efficiency and tax
equity - inspirational and helpful as many of the points that the Paper
made appeared to be in line with the Party's new policy orientation. A dif-
ference between Chinese decision-makers and the authors of the World
Bank paper lies, however, in their respective starting points and beliefs.
The authors of the World Bank Paper started from economic concepts. The
Chinese have focused on how to justify their intended tax preference law
changes; the modem concepts are the means to an end. So far, the cultural
traditions have escaped analysis and scrutiny thanks to an apparent agree-
ment among many Chinese that a discussion on such a topic is as useless as
it is embarrassing. If the country sticks to its path of reform and moderni-
zation as the post-Deng leadership vows, however, efficiency and equity
questions would likely gain more meaningful understanding. Meanwhile,
the Chinese people would better appreciate and squarely deal with the
thorny issues such as differences between tradition and modernity and their
implications for the country's future, which they have so far chosen to
brush aside.578
.78 A recent study on foreign investment in Tianjin City concluded that there was a rela-
tionship between tax preferences and arrival of foreign investment, as statistics showed that
ETDA and other areas with a lower 15% rate attracted more foreign capital than the rest of
the city with the 24 or 30% rate. Tang Caibin, Xiyin Waishang Zhyjie Touzi Yu Shuishou
Youhui Xiangguanxing De Tantao [An Investigation into the Relationship Between Luring
Foreign Investment and Tax Preferences], SHUISHOU YANJIU ZILIAO [TAX RESEARCH
MATERIALS], Feb. 29, 1996, at 21, 23-24. Such studies support the official position that
while the past preference policy was a success, existing preferences should be changed to
suit changing policy concerns.
